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This thesis examines the influences on and evolution of the Irish Republican
Army‗s guerrilla war strategy between 1917 and 1921. Utilizing newspapers, government
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political concerns in waging an insurgency. It argues that while tactical innovation took
place in the field, IRA General Headquarters imposed policy and directed the conflict
with a concern for the political results of military action. While implementing strategies
necessary to effective conflict of the war, this Headquarters staff was unable to reconcile
a disjointed and overburdened command structure, leading its disintegration after the
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

In 1832, Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz published On War, which would
become one of the most famous and influential works of European military theory. One
major claim of this volume is that war is politics by other means, stating, ―The political
view is the object, War is the means.‖1 This unity of military strategy and political policy
forms the cornerstone of modern state relations. Lacking a unified state, such a marriage
of military and political concerns was slow to develop in Ireland. For centuries violent
outbursts against colonial interference from neighboring Britain had little political
guidance except in emulation of English institutions.2
The doctrine of republicanism, expounded by the United Irishmen in the 1790s,
gave Irish nationalists a distinct political goal, embodying complete independence from
Great Britain and a workable alternative government. Inspired by the American and
French examples, the Irish republican ethos held that complete autonomy could only be
achieved through conflict. The military doctrine that the United Irishmen developed
centered on a mass popular uprising with international support, particularly from the
French. Goaded into premature rebellion by an efficient British secret service, the United
Irishmen‘s uprising of 1798 turned into a series of military fiascos repeating themselves
in different areas of the island. The British finally extinguished the uprising by defeating
a small, belated French landing in August.3
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Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport (Middlesex, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1981), 119.
R.F. Foster, Modern Ireland: 1600-1972 (London: Penguin, 1988), 89.
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Foster, Modern Ireland, 277-280.
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The 1798 rebellion prompted the Act of Union in 1800. Passed by both the
British and Irish parliaments, this act closed the Irish legislature, compelling its elected
representatives to sit in the Westminster parliament. Following the United Irishmen‘s
example, republicans attempted similar rebellions in 1803, 1848, and 1867. The result
was always the same. In each case, the British government was able to infiltrate the
republican movement, provoke its followers into open conflict, and crush them with
superior military force. In 1857, a group of radical nationalists led by James Stephens
formed the secret Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) to direct revolutionary efforts.
Widely known as the ―Fenians,‖ this group‘s ultimate goal was to foment open rebellion,
but its members engaged in many different schemes to undermine or embarrass the
United Kingdom. They received financial support from Irish people abroad, particularly
the Clan na Gael in the United States. In the 1880s, the Fenians sent individuals armed
with dynamite to Britain to terrorize the government and populace into recognizing Irish
nationalists‘ demands. Even these isolated incidents were meant to provoke a mass
uprising in which the British government of Ireland could be overthrown.4
Faced with the apparent futility of violence, Irish political leaders steered the
electorate toward extracting the maximum concessions by working within the United
Kingdom‘s constitution.5 While using much of the same rhetoric and symbolism of
republicanism, the constitutional movement eschewed violence and committed itself to
improving Irish people‘s status within the United Kingdom. Daniel O‘Connell led a
popular movement for ―Catholic Emancipation,‖ meaning the final removal of the socalled penal laws that barred non-Anglicans from sitting in Parliament or attaining

4
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Foster, Modern Ireland, 316, 393-395.
Oonagh Walsh, Ireland‟s Independence, 1880-1923 (London: Routledge, 2002), 9-10.
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government and judiciary positions. O‘Connell was leading a movement to repeal the
Act of Union when he died in 1847.6
In the 1860s Isaac Butt guided the constitutional movement to press for Home
Rule, a settlement that would reestablish an Irish parliament in Dublin subordinate to the
United Kingdom legislature, with the King as head-of-state. The most auspicious time
for Home Rule came while Charles Parnell led the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) in the
1880s, and allied their interests with the Liberals. The nationalists were opposed by the
Irish Unionist Party, those representatives who believed that Ireland should remain a part
of the United Kingdom, and saw Home Rule as the first step towards complete
separation.7 Their power-base was in Ireland‘s northernmost province of Ulster, but there
were significant Unionist populations scattered throughout the country. Liberal Prime
Minister William Gladstone introduced the first Home Rule Bill in 1886, but it was
defeated in the House of Commons by the Unionists and their Conservative allies. A
second effort in 1893 passed the Commons but was defeated in the House of Lords.8
The Liberal-IPP alliance gained power again in 1910, and its first legislative
priority was to reduce the power of the Lords. This paved the way for the Third Home
Rule Bill, which Prime Minister Herbert Asquith introduced in 1912. The Liberal-IPP
majority ensured the act passed the Commons, and under the new arrangement, the Lords
could not veto legislation but only delay it for two years.9 Thus, the IPP and its leader
John Redmond delivered a constitutional settlement that had eluded O‘Connell, Butt, and

6

R.F. Foster, ―Ascendancy and Union,‖ in The Oxford History of Ireland, ed. R.F. Foster (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989), 157-159; Foster, Modern Ireland, 291.
7
Edward Carson, ―Introduction,‖ in Against Home Rule: The Case for the Union, ed. S. Rosenbaum
(London: Frederick Warne, 1912), 18.
8
Walsh, Ireland‟s Independence, 9-10, 16.
9
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Parnell, and by 1914 Ireland was to reestablish its legislative independence for the first
time in more than a century.
The situation changed dramatically in that two-year span. Upon the Home Rule
Bill‘s passage, Unionists led by Edward Carson founded the Ulster Volunteer Force
(UVF), a paramilitary body pledged to resist its implementation by force. The movement
enrolled nearly 85,000 Irishmen, and garnered support from sections of the British
populace and army.10 Nationalists formed the Irish Volunteers in 1913, which leaders
insisted was not directly opposed to its Ulster counterpart, but aimed at pressuring the
government into implementing Home Rule as planned.11 By 1914, the year Home Rule
was to come into force; the United Kingdom faced possible civil war over the Irish
question, and was suddenly engaged in the most difficult struggle against a continental
foe since the Napoleonic Wars. Redmond and the IPP pledged their support to the war
effort, on a promise that Home Rule would be implemented following the war.
Many Irishmen joined the British army to fight the Central Powers, but a small
group of republicans were determined to take advantage of the foreign war to mount an
insurrection. The IRB, which had been influential in the Irish Volunteers from their
foundation, intensified their infiltration and began planning a rebellion.12 The result was
the Easter Rising—a conflagration mostly confined to Dublin that cost the lives of more
than 100 British soldiers, approximately sixty rebels, and caused the arrests of more than
3,500 suspected Irish republicans. The British military court-martialed and executed
10

For Ulster Volunteer numbers, see Intelligence Notes, 1913-1916: Preserved in the State Paper Office,
ed. Breandán Mac Giolla Chiolle (Dublin: Oifig an tSoláthair, 1966), 100. For unionist support within the
British army, see Hubert Gough, Soldiering On: Being the Memoirs of General Sir Hubert Gough (New
York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1957), 100-110; Henry Wilson, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life
and Diaries, ed. C.E. Callwell, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1927), 1:140-141.
11
Eoin MacNeill, ―The North Began,‖ in The Irish Volunteers, 1913-1915: Recollections and Documents,
ed. F.X. Martin (Dublin: James Duffy, 1963), 57-61.
12
Michael Foy and Brian Barton, The Easter Rising (Thrupp, UK: Sutton Publishing, 2000), 8-9.
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sixteen rebel leaders. Frustration with the British war effort and the seemingly heavyhanded reaction to the Rising culminated in a popular turn against British government in
Ireland. Within weeks of the rebellion‘s suppression, its leaders were turned into
martyred heroes in the tradition the United Irishmen and the Fenians.13
In Yeats‘s words, Ireland after the Rising was ―changed, changed utterly.‖14 The
political strategies that had guided moderate Irish nationalism no longer seemed
appealing compared to the republican ideal. The failed rebellion also changed republican
military strategy, convincing many that if they were to defeat the British army, they
would need a campaign based not on popular insurrection but tactical innovation. This
thesis will examine the combined political and military strategies that republicans
pursued after 1916, during what has come to be called the Irish War of Independence.
Early histories of this period were often written to serve political ends. While
writers close to the events and their protagonists were uniquely qualified to write their
narratives, and had access to records other chroniclers did not, they often could not
separate personal feeling or political views from their work. Piaras Béaslaí, a republican
General Headquarters Staff member, wrote one of the earliest histories of the period. His
Michael Collins and the Making of a New Ireland (1926) contains a wealth of inside
information and reproductions of documents, but serves as both a sympathetic biography
and an explanation of the mindset of supporters of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, which ended
the conflict. Dorothy Macardle‘s The Irish Republic (1937) is an impressive record of
the 1916-1923 period, but also an emphatic vindication of the anti-Treaty stance,

13

Foy and Barton, The Easter Rising, 210-211, 242.
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particularly Eamon de Valera‘s actions. De Valera even supplied a preface to the work,
calling it ―the complete and authoritative record‖ of the time.15
Academic historians have generally approached the period with a view to
illuminating other perspectives than those of republican leaders. Charles Townshend was
among the first historians not connected with republicanism to write an authoritative
work on the period. His British Campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921 (1975) provides a
thorough discussion of high-level British military and governmental policy, but little
information from the republican side and virtually none from the everyday soldier of
either force.16 David Fitzpatrick‘s Politics and Irish Life, 1913-1921 (1977) argues that
the political upheavals of the period were a bottom-up phenomenon, and that radical
ideas and general dissatisfaction with the status quo were more widespread than scholars
had hitherto admitted.17 More recent scholarship attempts to highlight individual
experiences of the war. Joost Augusteijn‘s From Public Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare
(1996) combines republicans‘ personal experiences with statistics to trace increasing
trends of radicalization and violence.18 Other scholars have attempted to find nonpolitical causes for violence during the conflict, including Peter Hart in The I.R.A. and Its
Enemies (1998).19 Hart‘s work has drawn criticism for its assertions that violence during

15
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the period was random, vengeful, or religiously motivated.20 In Armed Struggle (2003),
Richard English also suggests religion as a motivating factor, and that the war became a
self-perpetuating cycle of violence.21 Michael Hopkinson‘s Irish War of Independence
(2002) represents a recent attempt at a cohesive history of the conflict, addressing the
academic arguments raised by previous scholars, incorporating various political
perspectives, and tracing the war‘s progression in multiple localities.22
While noting the importance of popular opinion during the conflict, most histories
do not analyze the methods and rhetoric combatants used to influence the press and
public.23 Ian Kenneally‘s The Paper Wall: Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland
(2008) gives a broad overview of official publications, both from the republican and
government sides. However, he does not analyze the language they employed, instead
focusing on mainstream press treatments of the conflict from such publications as the
Freeman‟s Journal, the Irish Independent, the Irish Times, and The Times of London.24
Throughout the conflict, republicans attempted to convey political messages and
validate their military campaign through the press. As military historian Michael Howard
observes, ―War in the twentieth century was not, as it had been in the past, a conflict
between armed forces alone, or even between treasuries. It was one between the will-

20

For collections of historians‘ critiques on Hart‘s work, see Jack Lane and Brendan Clifford, eds.,
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power and the morale of the belligerent populations.‖25 Therefore, newspapers are
important primary sources. The Irish Republican Army‘s official journal An t‟Óglác
provides valuable insights into the influences, evolution, and goals of the organization‘s
military strategy. GHQ staff provided its content, printed it secretly in Dublin, and sent
copies to every IRA unit in Ireland, despite the fact that possession of An t‟Óglác meant a
sentence of six months hard labor as of 1919.26 Throughout the conflict this publication
served mainly as an instructional journal and to broadcast republican GHQ orders, but
late in the war plans were underway to emphasize its propaganda value.27
The republican parliament‘s Irish Bulletin and Dublin Castle‘s Weekly Summary
represent propaganda efforts by the opposing sides to influence the mainstream press and
public opinion. The Irish Bulletin was specifically aimed at press and policy-makers;
intended to influence the international press in particular. Quoting mainstream
publications from Ireland and Britain, its editors put its own spin on news of the conflict,
emphasizing government forces‘ misdeeds and only gradually acknowledging the
relentless IRA offensive. The Weekly Summary was similar to An t‟Óglác in that it was
intended to boost morale and give instruction to combatants, but its format imitated the
Irish Bulletin and, like that publication, found its way into the hands of the press,
republicans, and legislators.
Utilizing propaganda sources such as An t‟Óglác, the Irish Bulletin, and the
Weekly Summary poses problems for historians. Propaganda is defined in this study as
information issued by a political body designed to persuade people to support its ideas.
This does not make such information incorrect in terms of bare facts such as names,
25

Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 128.
Irish Bulletin (Dublin), July 19, 1919.
27
Piaras Béaslaí, ―Departmental Reports. – Publicity,‖ Dáil Éireann – Volume 1 – 10 May, 1921.
26
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dates, or activities, but the editorial comment that accompanies such details heightens the
importance of cross-checking multiple sources and comparing their descriptions of
events. These comments also provide insight into how the writers wished to portray their
adversaries; a key component to understanding how combatants behaved in action, and
how such behavior was interpreted by the non-combatant public. Both sides attacked the
veracity of the other, and even these denunciations hold insights into the participants‘
attitudes and how they wished the conflict to be perceived. For example, government
officials‘ descriptions of the Irish Bulletin as ―the murder gang‘s publication‖ reflect
consistent attempts to undermine not only that organ but the entire republican campaign
by taking it out of the political context and describing it as mere criminality.28
Where possible, this thesis will contrast information contained in these sources
with that from mainstream news sources, particularly The Times of London and the New
York Times. While these are also prone to carrying propagandistic information from
either side, they provide a third-party perspective that changes in tone as events unfold,
whereas the official publications maintain static support for their faction.
Other primary sources used to supplement news accounts are participants‘
memoirs. These publications have long influenced how the War of Independence is
studied and understood. Subsequent writers allege that the Soloheadbeg ambush on
January 21, 1919 became interpreted as the starting point of the war because Dan Breen,
one of the participants, wrote one of the earliest memoirs of the conflict (My Fight for

28
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Irish Freedom, 1924), and claimed this was the first action.29 Some memoir writers
approach the subject openly, claiming merely to put their remembrances on paper, while
others consciously attempt to influence the dialogue on the period, asserting that their
book will ―set the record straight.‖ Issues of memory recur frequently in reading such
publications. Some writers admit that they cannot remember certain dates or details,
while others claim a full recollection, and still more consult outside sources to validate
their memories. Many memoirs are politically motivated or propagandistic. Republican
works are heavily influenced by politics and local pride. They sometimes present a
misleading picture of total IRA victory, deflect any criticism of that body, and condemn
pro-government forces in their entirety.30 Government officials‘ writings often display
bitterness over their ―surrender‖ at the end of the war, and occasionally assert inherent
Irish perfidy, cowardice, and savagery to interpret their adversaries‘ actions.31 Some
memoirs were written anonymously or leave out participants‘ names, as a record of their
actions might damage their reputations or government pensions. As late as the 1940s, the
Kerryman press published contributions to the Fighting Story series, collections of
republican memories focusing on specific counties, under pseudonyms. None of these
difficulties invalidate these works as sources. Apart from establishing a generally
reliable narrative from various points of view, the words of participants are invaluable

29

For Breen‘s narrative, see Dan Breen, My Fight for Irish Freedom (Dublin: Anvil Books, 1989), 33, 39.
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both to establish how and why events unfolded, and to investigate how they wished
themselves, their actions, and their opponents to be remembered.
This thesis will use these sources to illuminate the inspirations and influences of
republican military strategy. Previous works have downplayed or ignored GHQ‘s role in
guiding the conflict, investigating neither the influences at work in IRA guerrilla strategy,
nor how Dublin-based leaders interacted with units in the field. These unresolved issues
form the basis of investigation for this study. Joost Augusteijn presents GHQ‘s failures
to provide arms for many IRA units. Peter Hart and Richard English portray country
units as gangs of independent gunmen with little respect for authority or political
sensibility.32 Charles Townshend‘s ―The Irish Republican Army and the Development of
Guerrilla Warfare‖ (1979) mentions some glimmers of guerrilla ideas prior to 1919, but
does not elaborate on how these thoughts influenced IRA strategy, and does not
investigate the origins of violence in 1917 and 1918.33
While indicting previous methods, neither the political party Sinn Féin nor the
Irish Republican Army (IRA) emerged from the Easter Rising with its ideas fully formed.
The IRA drew upon many influences—conventional and unconventional—in evolving its
strategy for fighting what it viewed as an occupying British garrison. This thesis argues
that, while many tactical ideas and innovations were born in the field, republican General
Headquarters (GHQ) set a policy of guerrilla war and began to guide the organization by
this idea as early as 1918. The slow development of this policy, including restraining

32
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some of the more belligerent spirits among the rank-and-file, was one of the keys to
prolonging the struggle and forcing the British to negotiate a truce.
The first chapter examines the resurrection of Sinn Féin and the Irish Volunteers,
and their development between 1917 and 1918. I argue that, while most authors focus
only on the political developments in these years, the IRA also reorganized and began to
engage in aggressive actions that set the pattern for the guerrilla war. GHQ provided a
command structure and encouraged these efforts in the pages of An t‟Óglác.
The second chapter analyzes the establishment of a clandestine republican
government, its relationship to the Republican Army, and the slow spread of violence
throughout the country in 1919. The year began with sporadic actions that had
characterized the previous two years. The establishment of Dáil Éireann, the republican
parliament, enabled IRA propagandists to present the force‘s actions as defending an
elected government. The Dáil established the Irish Bulletin to convey what it portrayed
as British aggression to the international press. GHQ increasingly asserted its control
over the militant movement, establishing a unit under its direct control in Dublin and
sanctioning larger and more widespread attacks. At the same time, IRA leaders forbade
operations that would result in drastic casualties, forcing country units to conform to a
pace set from Dublin. By the end of 1919, the IRA was set to begin a widespread assault
on the rural police force, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC).
The third chapter scrutinizes increasing republican aggression during the first nine
months of 1920. It deals with a widespread series of assaults on RIC barracks, a sabotage
campaign directed by GHQ, and the origin of ―flying columns‖ to conduct the guerrilla
conflict. The government attempted to counter by bolstering the RIC, but new recruits

13
proved difficult to control. The destruction they wrought in reprisal for IRA attacks fed
republican propaganda, which Dublin Castle attempted to counter by establishing the
Weekly Summary.
The final chapter analyzes the last three months of 1920 to July 1921. October
1920 marked the beginning of the fiercest and bloodiest period of the war. Lord Mayor
Terence MacSwiney of Cork died on hunger strike, and Kevin Barry was the first IRA
member executed during the struggle. GHQ ordered a series of attacks across the country
in the wake of his execution. The Dublin leaders also sanctioned the killing of a number
of military intelligence officers living around the city in November, an event known as
―Bloody Sunday.‖ This was followed a week later by the Kilmichael ambush, in which
an entire patrol of Auxiliary RIC Cadets was wiped out. GHQ continued to encourage
more widespread attacks in 1921, leading to a number of IRA deaths as inexperienced
members of the force threw themselves into an increasingly desperate guerrilla war.
Despite British army adaptation to rebel tactics, IRA attacks continued to spread and
government casualties reached their highest levels in May. The Truce of July 1921 came
as a shock to both sides, abruptly ending a war that they both thought they were on the
verge of winning.
The thesis concludes by analyzing the effects of GHQ‘s initiatives throughout the
conflict. While they were successful in molding the IRA into an effective guerrilla force
and compelling the United Kingdom government to negotiate a treaty, the body that
resulted was unwieldy and its command structure convoluted. A profusion of officers
resulted in personality conflicts, and an upsurge in peacetime recruiting led to

14
indiscipline in the ranks. These factors contributed to the IRA split following the signing
of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, and the civil war that followed.

15
CHAPTER TWO:
FROM THE IRISH VOLUNTEERS TO THE IRA, 1917-1918

By the end of 1916, radical nationalist organizations including the Irish
Volunteers and Sinn Féin were hard-hit by government suppression and arrests. The
years 1917 and 1918 were largely characterized by rebuilding these organizations, but
also witnessed a resurgence of political violence in Ireland. This chapter will argue that,
while most historians mark the beginning of the War of Independence in 1919, the two
preceding years witnessed violent incidents that set patterns for the conflict. Despite their
disparate, unconnected nature, each of these events was intended to increase the military
capacity of the burgeoning Irish Republican Army or advance republican political goals,
and this period should be understood as the true beginning of the war.

Politics and the Gun
Volunteer reorganization began almost immediately after the Easter Rising‘s
failure. Seán Ó Muirthile and Diarmuid O‘Hegarty began touring the country during the
summer of 1916, establishing contact between the few leaders who had not been arrested.
These two were not only members of the Volunteers, but the secret, oath-bound Irish
Republican Brotherhood. The IRB had already infiltrated most nationalist organizations
founded in the twentieth century and planned the 1916 Rising.1 Its members regarded
their organization as the rightful government of the Irish Republic, and even sent Patrick

1

Diarmuid Lynch, The I.R.B. and the 1916 Insurrection, ed. Florence O‘Donoghue (Cork, Ireland: Mercier
Press, 1952), 21-32.
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McCartan to New York as ―Envoy of the Provisional Government of Ireland.‖2 Ó
Muirthile‘s and O‘Hegarty‘s contacts within this secret society helped them to re-forge
the shattered links of the Volunteer organization. Under cover of the Gaelic League Ard
Fheis (national conference) on August 7, the two gathered enough Volunteer delegates in
Dublin to form a provisional committee.3
Reorganization continued in earnest with Cathal Brugha‘s release from the Dublin
Castle hospital in November 1916. Born Charles Burgess, his name change signified his
commitment to the Gaelic revival. During the Easter Rising, he had served as ViceCommandant of the Fourth Battalion, Dublin Brigade. Wounded many times, the
authorities assumed Brugha would die, and he was therefore not tried or executed as were
16 other republican officers.4 Brugha had been an active member of the IRB, but after
his release, he met with Ó Murthuille and O‘Hegarty and informed them of his opinion
that the society had outlived its usefulness.5 Despite their differences in this regard, the
three convened another convention that month, and Brugha was elected the head of the
provisional committee governing the Irish Volunteers.6 The committee was dominated,
as the early Executive of the Volunteers had been, by members of the IRB.7
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Volunteer reorganization gained speed after most of the Rising prisoners were
released from Frongoch internment camp in Wales on December 23, 1916.8 The only
Irish political prisoners still in jail were the so-called ―convict prisoners,‖ who had been
sentenced by courts martial, in Lewes Gaol. The rebellion participants never forsook the
name Irish Volunteers, but they were increasingly known by a new title: the Irish
Republican Army. In fact, at the outset of the Rising on April 24, 1916, leaders Patrick
Pearse and James Connolly had gathered the insurgents and informed them that they were
now members of this new force.9 Maeve Cavanagh‘s book of verse, A Voice of
Insurgency, published just months after the revolt, refers to the executed Pearse as
―Commandant-General, I.R.A.‖ The title page includes a picture of two crossed flags,
one a traditional nationalist banner bearing a gold harp, the other a republican tricolor
with ―I.R.A.‖ in its white center.10 W.J. Brennan-Whitmore referred to himself as a
―commissioned officer of the Irish Republican Army‖ in his 1917 chronicle of
imprisonment: With the Irish in Frongoch.11
The prisoners‘ return to Ireland marked a resurgence of political violence. A
celebration to welcome the released inmates to Cork turned into a riot, as their supporters
attacked British soldiers in the streets.12 One of the earliest shooting incidents presaged
what would become standard IRA operating procedure: a unit created a reason for the
RIC to leave their barracks and ambushed them as they went to investigate. On the night
of February 17, 1917, local RIC received a report that shots had been fired into a farmer‘s
8
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house outside Portumna, Co. Galway. A patrol left the barracks, and five people opened
fire on them as they neared the house, wounding one constable.13 The shooting at the
farmer‘s house might have been connected to land issues, an endemic problem from the
nineteenth century, but the ambush of the RIC as they arrived was an innovation, and a
harbinger of the new conflict.
The IRB reorganized at the same time, electing a new Supreme Council in
February 1917. The officers were Seán McGarry, Michael Collins, and Diarmuid Lynch.
Other important figures included Con Collins and Tomás Ashe—who was still in prison.
All had taken part in the Easter Rising and spent time in British jails.14 Participation in
the rebellion served as a form of political capital in republican circles. It is not surprising
that this phenomenon should exist within the closed circles of radical nationalism, but
this political capital was to be tested publicly.
Shortly after the releases, a Parliamentary seat opened in the Roscommon North
constituency. The Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP)—the moderate nationalists who
supported Home Rule—ran Thomas Devine. A consortium of radical nationalists
decided to run George Noble Plunkett. The sixty-five-year-old was a Papal count, and
had been inducted into the IRB in April 1916.15 All three of his sons had participated in
the Easter Rising, and Joseph Plunkett, who had played a key role in planning and the
uprising, was executed. There was no party label attached to Plunkett‘s name, but he was
associated with the vague radical nationalism of ―Sinn Féin.‖16
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The Sinn Féin organization founded by Arthur Griffith in 1905 advocated
abstention from the Westminster Parliament as a means of achieving political
independence.17 During World War I, ―Sinn Féin‖ became a label attached to any radical
nationalist movement. In this vein, the press called Easter 1916 the ―Sinn Féin
Rebellion.‖18 In February 1917, Sinn Féin meant a rejection of using constitutional
methods to achieve Irish freedom. On this and no more precise platform, George Noble
Plunkett won the Roscommon North seat in a landslide, by more than 1,300 votes over
the IPP candidate.19 In his victory speech, the new MP announced that he would not take
his seat in Westminster. The Times quipped, ―A Sinn Fein victory apparently means
disfranchisement.‖20
This success encouraged the radical nationalists to take an even bolder step. A
seat opened in South Longford in May. This time, the Sinn Féin nomination was
definitely made by a group of IRB members. A series of covert negotiations between
Michael Collins in Dublin and Tomás Ashe in Lewes Gaol resulted in a nomination.21
Instead of running an equivalent to the venerable Papal count only laterally involved with
the Easter Rising, the Sinn Féiners nominated Joseph McGuinness—a man still
languishing in a British prison for participating in the failed rebellion. The Times
announced him as the ―Rebel Candidate.‖22 The election slogan became ―put him in to
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get him out.‖ That was just enough; McGuinness won the seat by only thirty-seven
votes.23
Barely a month later, the first fatality among government forces since the Rising
occurred in Dublin. On June 10, Cathal Brugha and George Noble Plunkett led a group
of several thousand Sinn Féin supporters into Beresford Place, where Brugha began to
address them. Dublin Metropolitan Police Inspector John Mills and a detail of officers
approached and declared the meeting illegal. As Brugha and Plunkett continued
speaking, the inspector arrested them. Mills was escorting the prisoners to Store Street
Police Station when a man leapt from the crowd and fractured his head with a single
hurley swing.24 This act might be considered a spontaneous outburst, except that Joe
Good of the Dublin Brigade wrote that the attacker was a Volunteer, and the city
companies had already decided to defend their leaders against the police.25 This killing
shows that as early as mid-1917, the IRA was organized and aggressive, though its
weapons were crude and purpose ill-defined. A month later, an unidentified woman
traveling in a Sinn Féin candidate‘s car near Tullamore called for ―three cheers for the
hurley that killed Inspector Mills.‖ County Inspector H.W. Crane felt that this accurately
indicated ―the temper of the Sinn Feiners.‖26
The day after Inspector Mills‘ killing, the London press announced the death of
Irish Parliamentary Party MP Major William Redmond in France. Already reeling from
two by-election defeats, the loss was a terrible blow to moderate nationalism. William
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was the brother of party leader John Redmond, and his service in the British Army
symbolized Irish moderate support for the war effort. British Prime Minister David
Lloyd George wrote that William Redmond died promoting ―a real partnership between
Ireland and Britain through the unifying influence of a common struggle for liberty.‖27
The death also meant another election contest.
Sinn Féin nominated another prisoner for the vacant East Clare seat. Their
candidate was Eamon de Valera, who commanded Dublin‘s Third Battalion during the
Rising. At Boland‘s Mills in southeast Dublin, troops under his command wreaked
havoc among British reinforcements entering the city, and his reputation immediately
soared on this military prowess.28 He was often touted as the last surviving commandant
of the Rising, though Tomás Ashe held the same rank. In Lewes Gaol, de Valera insisted
the prisoners salute Eoin MacNeill, the Volunteers‘ former chief of staff who had
attempted to prevent the Rising, thereby helping to heal a potential fracture within radical
nationalism.29 Seeking to assuage all shades of Irish opinion, the British government
pressed forward with arrangements for a convention of nationalists and Unionists. The
Irish Convention, designed by Lloyd George to represent all shades of opinion on the
island, was to provide the government with a Home Rule plan that would be acceptable to
all parties.30 In this spirit of reconciliation, British Cabinet Minister Andrew Bonar Law
announced the immediate release of the convict prisoners on June 15.31
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The releases did not have the ameliorative effect hoped for by the government.
The Sinn Féiners not in prison had already declared their unwillingness to join in such a
convention. On May 24, they released a statement that they would only join such talks
on what The Times called ―fantastic and impossible terms,‖ including, ―the Convention
should be free to declare an Irish Republic,‖ and that the British would swear to uphold
any decisions of the conference, subject to verification by the United States and European
powers.32 Clearly the Sinn Féin leaders felt secure in their popular domestic and
international appeal, and were unwilling to work with the established parties or within the
political order. This defiance became more acute after the prisoner releases.
Several of the discharged convicts returned to Cork on June 23, and the following
day their supporters stoned the local Constabulary barracks. The Times reported that the
police confronted the Sinn Féin crowd, and were fired on with revolvers from
surrounding houses, wounding three constables. The Constabulary called on military
assistance, and the combined forces charged the crowd with fixed bayonets. In the course
of the melee, civilian Abraham Allen was bayoneted to death and thirty others were
injured. Republican sources claim that a policeman killed Allen while retiring to
barracks, when the Crown forces were under no threat. They also state that a coroner‘s
jury brought a murder verdict against Constable Prendergast, but the decision ―was
ignored by the English Government.‖33 The Times did not publish the finding, and
though Members of Parliament discussed the event, they never mentioned the dead man‘s
name.34
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The London paper noted a more violent tone in the East Clare election speeches
than in previous Sinn Féin campaigns. De Valera and speakers on his behalf continued to
use internationalist rhetoric, insisting that Ireland should be recognized at a peace
conference at the close of the European war. They tinged these optimistic
pronouncements with aggressive oratory, claiming that they were in favor of the violent
overthrow of British government if a suitable opportunity presented itself.35 Sinn Féiners
also capitalized on long-standing tension between landlords and tenants. J.J. Walsh, who
was imprisoned after the Easter Rising, said during the campaign that on the day the Irish
Republic was established, ―the landlords would be put against the wall and there would
be an end of landlordism.‖36
The assertion that Sinn Féin would gain independence via an international peace
conference was an attempt to capitalize on a deep reservoir of goodwill toward the Allied
Powers, now joined by the United States. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson‘s Fourteen
Points, which endorsed democracy and national self-determination, resonated powerfully
in nationalist Ireland. Maire Comerford, a member of the republican women‘s
organization Cumann na mBan, told an interviewer years later, ―Everything that Wilson
said—government by consent of the governed, war for small nations, open agreements
openly arrived at…go right down Wilson and it was a litany of things which stirred up
the Irish people right through.‖37
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Republican speakers used this rhetoric, but made it clear that they were willing to
use force if the peace conference failed them. De Valera told a crowd at Cresslough, Co.
Donegal, that ―Winning freedom internationally was infinitely preferable to any attempt
to win it from England.‖ In the same speech, he said that Sinn Féin would use ―every
means that common-sense and morality would admit of‖ to achieve its goals. He was
more explicit when he told a crowd at Letterkenny that ―Instead of begging for freedom
they would take as much as they could get,‖ and ―if they were prepared and organised
they could be in such a position, if a suitable opportunity presented itself to secure their
demand by force of arms.‖38
De Valera‘s meetings sometimes included militaristic displays. He was often
introduced as a ―Commandant of the Irish Republican Army.‖39 A meeting at Tullamore
on April 8, 1918, was attended by ―nearly 2000 Volunteers…all armed either with
hurleys or blugeons [sic] or sticks & a great many in uniform.‖40 A Constabulary
memorandum advocated de Valera‘s arrest, providing it was clear to the public that he
was detained ―not because of speeches advocating any abstract political ideas, but
because of his direct incitement to offences against the law.‖41 Concern for de Valera‘s
arrest and its effect on public opinion is evident in that Brian Mahon, general officer

38

―Summary of speeches made by Mr. de Valera and other Sinn Fein Leaders, during his tour in the
North,‖ CO 904/198/105 in Sinn Féin and Other Republican Suspects.
39
Sgt. Henry Cronin, ―‗Aeridheacht‘ at Tullamore,‖ CO 904/198/105 in Sinn Féin and Other Republican
Suspects.
40
County Inspector H.W. Crane, ―Tullamore, 8 April 1918,‖ CO 904/198/105 in Sinn Féin and Other
Republican Suspects.
41
―Wire U.S. to C.S.‖ [Wired in cipher], August 15, 1917, CO 904/198/105 in Sinn Féin and Other
Republican Suspects.

25
commanding the British forces in Ireland, gave the Constabulary permission to issue a
communiqué to the press on the instance of his arrest.42
The mix of peaceful and violent rhetoric resulted in an overwhelming victory for
de Valera. He defeated the Parliamentary Party candidate Patrick Lynch by nearly 3,000
votes. British observers were stunned and alarmed by the result. The Times wrote that
the Sinn Féin policy of ―open war on British authority‖ had paid off, resulting in ―a
victory for an Irish Republic.‖43
Violent outbursts greeted the triumph in certain parts of the country.
Constabulary bullets killed Ballybunion youth Daniel Scanlon outside of the barracks in
that Co. Kerry town on July 11, 1917. Partisan descriptions of this incident show how
polarized political opinion had become. Nationalist sources in Annie Ryan‘s Comrades
assert that Sinn Féin supporters were marching past the barracks, celebrating de Valera‘s
victory, when ―some RIC men there became so annoyed that they opened fire.‖44 The
Times says that the Sinn Féiners assaulted the barracks and fired shots through the
windows, and that constables shot over their heads until ―the attack became so resolute
they were forced to fire in earnest.‖ A coroner‘s jury returned a verdict of willful murder
against Constable Lyons and Sergeant Mulcahy.45
Encounters between the Constabulary and hostile civilians were not always fatal,
but they indicate rising tension and violence in the country. Enthusiastic Sinn Féiners
hung a republican flag bearing the letters ―I.R.‖ from a tall tree in Killyon, King‘s County
(now Co. Offaly) on July 13, 1917. Constabulary Sergeant Lacy climbed the tree and
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began sawing off the branch bearing the seditious emblem when a shotgun blast rang out
from a nearby hedge, wounding him in the arms and legs.46

Nationalists and the Royal Irish Constabulary
These early conflicts with the police seemed to validate Sinn Féin‘s most
incendiary rhetoric, which was reserved for the Royal Irish Constabulary itself. Many
speakers called them the ―eyes and ears‖ of the British government in Ireland, while Peter
Clancy of Ennis went so far as to call them ―murderers,‖ referencing Ballybunion as an
example.47 Volunteer Gearóid O‘Sullivan called the police ―their principle [sic,
principal] enemies,‖ and advised no one to so much as speak to them.48 Martin Walton
noted the prevalence of the RIC throughout the country, and their capacity for
information-gathering. He later told an interviewer, ―the country was studded at the time
with small police barracks every few miles…they were the eyes and ears. You couldn‘t
travel from Dublin to Swords—that‘s a distance of about seven miles—without going
into three RIC outposts, and everybody passing up and down the road was noted
carefully.‖49 Constables regularly attended Sinn Féin meetings and made notes of
possibly seditious speeches, but their reports reveal overt hostility from republican
crowds. District Inspector O‘Brien of Ennistymon believed that if police attempted to
send a note-taker to an upcoming meeting, it would take twenty armed constables to
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protect him.50 Instead, members of the force attended meetings in disguise, or got
second-hand accounts from informants.51
Nationalists had long held an ambivalent attitude toward the RIC. The force had
earned the title ―Royal‖ after helping to suppress the Fenian Rising of 1867.52
Nationalists frequently objected to the ―military‖ character of the force, and its
substantial arsenal. Planners of the 1916 Rising suggested rebels make Constabulary
barracks their first targets, primarily to seize weapons.53 The force—armed with modern
Lee-Enfield carbines—helped to combat the rebellion, but suffered a humiliating defeat
at Ashbourne at the hands of an IRA force commanded by Tomás Ashe and Richard
Mulcahy.54
Long-serving members of the force objected to republican accusations of spying.
Thomas Fennell, who retired as a District Inspector in 1905 and lived through the War of
Independence, stated in his memoirs that the Constabulary gathered information in the
course of regular policing. He wrote, ―the police were able to supply the Government
with any information required without engaging in espionage.‖55 The Royal Irish
Constabulary Manual stated that the prime object of the force was the ―prevention and
detection of crime.‖ The most effective method was to accomplish this was to ―obtain a
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good ‗local knowledge.‘‖ The manual encourages constables to learn the habits,
relationships, employment, and connections of the people in their districts by ―entering
into friendly conversations with them, endeavouring to gain their confidence (which I
should never abuse), and impressing on them that the police are their friends and
protectors.‖56 This upholds Fennell‘s assertion that spying was unnecessary for a normal
policeman.
However, the lengths noted above to which members of the force would go to
infiltrate and observe ―seditious‖ organizations indicate that espionage was a possible
occupation within the Constabulary. While using blanket terms to describe the force,
republicans often made distinctions between policemen who actively worked against
them and those that did not. Even during periods of violence, republicans claimed that
they only took extreme actions against the most ―offensive‖ members of the force, though
this distinction often broke down in practice.

Organizing Disorder
In October 1917, Sinn Féin and the Irish Volunteers held conventions to formalize
their organizations and elect leadership. On October 26, Sinn Féin elected Eamon de
Valera its president. The party had to compromise between Arthur Griffith‘s original,
more moderate policy calling for an Irish parliament with the British monarch as head-ofstate, and the out-and-out republicans led by Cathal Brugha. The resultant Sinn Féin
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constitution called for the recognition of Irish independence, following which the people
would decide on their own form of government.57
The following day, the Volunteers held their convention in secret. One day after
Sinn Féin chose him to lead that organization, the Volunteers voted Eamon de Valera
president. They also elected a twenty-member national executive—five members from
each province. Of these twenty, Cathal Brugha headed a Dublin-based resident executive
consisting of four Directors: Michael Collins for Organisation, Richard Mulcahy for
Training, Rory O‘Connor for Engineering, and Michael Staines for Supplies.58 This
arrangement lasted until March 1918, when the national executive appointed a General
Headquarters Staff. This staff was comprised of Chief of Staff Richard Mulcahy,
Adjutant-General and Director of Organisation Michael Collins, Quartermaster General
Sean McMahon, Director of Engineering Rory O‘Connor, Director of Training Dick
McKee, and Deputy Chief of Staff Austin Stack. Chaired by Cathal Brugha, the
executive remained in charge of Volunteer policy.59
Throughout this period, republicans debated whether the organized use of force
was possible, or the best means of achieving Irish independence. Sinn Féin activist P.S.
O‘Hegarty was of the opinion that, ―After 1916, there should not have been a shot fired in
Ireland.‖60 He was equally cynical regarding his country‘s efforts at international
recognition, writing, ―So far as the Peace Conference was concerned, it was all waste
labour, and might just as well have been recognised as such at the beginning. We never
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had a chance of getting into the Peace Conference.‖61 Fr. Pat Gaynor, an early Sinn Féin
convert, claimed that the only benefit of violent action was the international exposure it
gave the republican cause. He wrote, ―The one solid argument in favour of our war was
that the shootings were ‗news‘ and received world-wide publicity.‖62 The split in opinion
on physical force becomes more apparent considering that brothers of both writers
commanded brigades in the IRA; Seán O‘Hegarty of the First Cork (North), and Seán
Gaynor of the First Tipperary (North).63
Contemporary condemnations of violence came from the press and from within
the Sinn Féin organization itself. An RIC sergeant recorded that, while sharing the
platform with de Valera on New Year‘s Day 1918, Rev. J.W. O‘Meehan said, ―It was not
he said by lying in wait for a victim behind a ditch, or attacking a man‘s house at night
that they would obtain their independence. Such outrages were he said the work of
cowards; were un-Irish and foreign to the methods of the men of Easter Week.‖64 Such a
denunciation is indicative of the unease with which even the most active Sinn Féin
supporters viewed physical force, but the fact that these types of statements did not stop
the violence shows the determination of those who committed it. It is possible that
denunciations of physical force tamped down aggressive attacks, but by and large
members of the burgeoning IRA engaged in whatever activities they felt would
strengthen their organization in local areas.
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In late 1917, republican arms raids became commonplace. Joe Good wrote that
from the time his company was reorganized in 1917 their Commandant Dick McKee
ordered them to raid for arms, but to refrain from shooting police.65 The most profitable
was a September 2 raid on Cork Grammar School, where the Volunteers seized twenty
rifles belonging to the British Officer Training Corps.66 On the night of November 25,
1917, four masked men armed with revolvers entered the home of a British soldier near
the town of Cashel, Co. Tipperary. The intruders declared that they were members of the
Irish Republican Army, and demanded the soldier‘s rifle. A young man in the house
chided the raiders, and ―reminded them of the injury that they were doing to his brother,
who was a soldier and as good an Irishman as any of the intruders.‖ The masked men
replied that the brother ―was an English soldier, but that they were soldiers of the Irish
republic.‖ The masked men seized the rifle and left.67
Despite the mounting disorder, British officials were reluctant to deal with the
Irish situation while the European war continued. In the House of Lords on November
15, 1917, Viscount Chaplin ―rose to call attention to the gravity of the situation in
Ireland,‖ but began, ―I am well aware that some people think it undesirable that there
should be any discussion of this kind during the war.‖68 This admission indicates that
British lawmakers were divided on the question of publicly recognizing what was
happening in Ireland. Nevertheless, Chaplin went on to say that the situation in Ireland
was ―becoming worse and worse every day,‖ and that the republican movement was
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―undoubtedly progressing throughout the greater part of Ireland.‖69 Chaplin was
delivering a warning about the danger of republican rhetoric, but members of the
movement‘s rank-and-file continued to join this with action.
In early 1918, police posts became targets of republican raids. On St. Patrick‘s
Day, Volunteers in Eyries, Co. Cork raided the local RIC barracks while most of the
garrison monitored a parade arranged as a distraction.70 Two Volunteers were killed
during a failed barracks raid at Gortatlea, Co. Kerry, on April 13, 1918.71 The deaths
made Constables Boyle and Fallon, known to have been the shooters, marked men.
Unidentified attackers shot at them in broad daylight on a Tralee street on June 14,
wounding Fallon in the shoulder.72
In conjunction with the Irish conscription crisis and the German offensive on the
Western Front, Dublin Castle took action in mid-May 1918. Detectives working in the
Dublin Metropolitan Police learned that their employers were planning a general arrest of
Sinn Féin leaders. Some of these detectives, including Eamon Broy, Joseph Kavanagh,
and Eugene Smith, were sympathetic to the republican movement. All three sent the
information through back channels to republican contacts, and it eventually reached
Michael Collins.73 The fact that three Dublin detectives were willing to risk their jobs to
aid the radical nationalist movement highlights a recurring problem for the British
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administration in Ireland. As the authorities relied on a largely Irish civil service, it was
relatively easy for republicans to find sympathetic government employees. The passage
of this information to Collins marks the beginning of the republican intelligence system,
one which utilized numerous government insiders throughout the conflict.
Collins delivered the information to the Sinn Féin Executive and, on the night of
May 17, these republican leaders met and decided to acquiesce in the arrests. Darrell
Figgis later wrote that the only alternatives were to go ―on the run,‖ or to force the
Volunteers into premature active resistance.74 While most of the political leaders
resigned themselves to arrest, Brugha, Collins, Richard Mulcahy, and other military
leaders decided to go on the run. The same night, the British made a clean sweep of the
political leaders. The prisoners included de Valera, Arthur Griffith, Joseph McGuinness,
and many other Sinn Féiners all over Ireland. They were arrested on the pretence that
they had been scheming with Germany to foment another insurrection. In publicizing the
arrests, the British government assured the press that evidence would be forthcoming.75
Moderate Sinn Féiner Darrell Figgis argues in his memoir that the ―German plot‖
arrests had the unintended consequence of allowing militarists to take over the republican
movement. In particular, the IRB faction and its leader Michael Collins rose to
prominence in this period. Interestingly, the RIC had already tagged Collins as an upand-comer within the movement. In September 1917, the District Inspector for Bandon,
near Collins‘ Co. Cork home, noted he was a paid secretary for Sinn Féin and ―likely to
become a prominent and important member of that body.‖76 In March 1918, District
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Inspector Charles Collins of Granard called him ―a very dangerous criminal,‖ who
―boasts about the part he took in capturing the G.P.O.‖ during the Rising. The officer
warned, ―his activities, if not speedily restrained, will lead to serious mischief.‖77 The
German Plot arrests did not immediately produce an upsurge in violence, but during this
period, the trio of Brugha, Collins, and Mulcahy coalesced into the decision-makers of an
increasingly militant republican movement.78
Months after Viscount Chaplin‘s plea, the British government in Ireland
proclaimed fourteen of Ireland‘s thirty-two counties under the Criminal Law and
Procedure Act on June 14, 1918. This act allowed special juries to be drafted into areas
where prosecutors could not obtain convictions, or for the trials to be moved to another
location. The Times explained the necessity of these measures: ―Many magistrates in the
rural districts are in open sympathy with Sinn Fein and a number of moderate men have
been deposed by Sinn Feiners in the recent elections of chairmen of local bodies.‖79 On
July 3, 1918, the government went a step further in declaring Sinn Féin clubs, the Irish
Volunteers, and the Gaelic League ―dangerous organizations.‖ The proclamation
explained that these groups ―encourage and aid persons to commit crimes and promote
and incite to acts of violence and intimidation and interfere with the administration of the
law…[they] are a grave menace, and are designed to terrorize peaceful and law-abiding
subjects of his Majesty.‖80
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Despite these legal strictures, one of the most daring attacks on the Constabulary
took place five days after the proclamation. At Béal a‘ Ghleanna, Co. Cork, seven
Volunteers ambushed two constables en route to Ballyvourney in broad daylight,
assaulted the officers and captured their rifles. The attackers had standing orders not to
open fire, but a nervous Volunteer shot one policeman in the neck.81

Encouraging Violence
To this point, Volunteers undertook actions based on their own initiative or that of
local leaders. However, General Headquarters Staff in Dublin began directly
encouraging arms raids and defensive violence from the first issue of An tÓglác, The
Official Organ of the Irish Volunteers on August 15, 1918. This bi-monthly journal
published General Headquarters orders, gave tips on technical aspects of weapons and
equipment, and constantly encouraged Volunteer units to engage in operations. The
inaugural issue declared, ―The Volunteer does not talk, but acts…Whenever and however
an opportunity occurs of offering effective resistance to an attack of the enemy, that
resistance must be offered. Volunteers with weapons in their hands must never surrender
without a fight.‖82 Like Sinn Féin speakers around the country, An t‟Óglác also took on
the issue of the peace conference. Predicting that the European war would soon end, the
journal stated on October 29, ―The freedom of Ireland depends in the long run not upon
the play of politics, nor international dealings, but upon the will of the Irish people to be

81

Micheal O‘Suilleabhain, Where Mountainy Men Have Sown: War and Peace in Rebel Cork in the
Turbulent Years 1916-21 (Tralee, Ireland: Anvil, 1965), 39-44; Patrick J. Twohig, Green Tears for Hecuba,
Ireland‟s Fight for Freedom (Ballincollig, Ireland: Tower Books, 1994), 27-31; 396. The fact that this
incident resulted in no fatalities is a sign of poor IRA armament. The republican leader tested his shotgun
after the ambush, and both of his homemade shells failed to fire.
82
An t‟Óglác (Dublin), August 15, 1918.

36
free and maintain their freedom.‖ The same article exhorted Volunteers to ―leave no
stone unturned in the effort to arm and equip themselves thoroughly.‖83
Though GHQ staff were united in their call for decisive action, different views
existed as to what form the conflict would take. In an early edition of An t‟Óglác,
Michael Collins‘ column ―Organisation Notes‖ asserts the importance of the Company as
the basic Volunteer unit, but writes, ―Forget the Company of the regular army. We are
not establishing or attempting to establish a regular force on the lines of the standing
armies of even the small independent countries of Europe.‖ Instead, Collins describes the
Volunteers as a body of ―riflemen scouts,‖ capable of acting individually or in units. On
the very next page, however, the section ―Equipment Notes‖ lists the mess requirements
for a full company of eighty-one soldiers, including plates, mugs, knives, forks, and
spoons for every fighter.84 This hardly represents the vision of a small, mobile guerrilla
unit.
W.J. Brennan-Whitmore, a former British soldier who joined the Volunteers on
their inception in 1912, later wrote that tension always existed between leaders who
envisioned a regular force and those with different ideas. He told a Volunteer military
council meeting early in 1914, ―We could not possibly withstand the British army, in the
event of a clash, if organised and trained on their lines.‖ Brennan-Whitmore found a
sympathetic ear in J.J. ―Ginger‖ O‘Connell, a member of GHQ staff at the time, but
otherwise his ―views were received so unsympathetically as to almost amount to
indifference.‖85 Other officers eventually warmed to irregular ideas. Shortly before the
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Rising, Eamonn Ceannt, Cathal Brugha‘s commanding officer, asked Brennan-Whitmore
to write a Volunteer textbook based on his theories.86 In March and April 1916 the Irish
Volunteer, the organization‘s original journal, published a series of articles quoting
Hungarian General Arthur Görgei‘s chronicle of his own guerrilla campaign.87 The final
issue before the Rising carried an article entitled ―Guerilla Warfare in France,‖ noting a
little-known 1914 incident in which 400 French cavalry were cut off in the Ardennes and
launched hit-and-run attacks on the advancing Germans. The article called it ―an
excellent example of the system of tactics best suited to the Volunteers.‖88
The military failure of 1916 highlighted the need for new thinking. Particularly
poignant is Major John MacBride‘s exhortation to the Jacob‘s Factory garrison, likely
based on his experience fighting the British during the Boer War: ―never allow
yourselves to be cooped up inside the walls of a building again.‖89 MacBride was
executed after the surrender, but many of the Volunteers who heard his words went on to
actively work for a new kind of rebellion. The origins of republican tactics are difficult
to determine. Many observers claim that the type of guerrilla campaign initiated by the
IRA was without precedent, while some officers insist that their methods were unique,
homegrown, and wholly adaptive to the Irish situation.90 Republican field commanders
necessarily adapted to their local situations, but a close reading of IRA publications
reveals a number of historical precedents and theoretical influences at work.
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A note in an early edition of An t‟Óglác promised ―to give some account of battle
fought by irregular troops against regular armies in the past … particularly those combats
whose story contains military lessons for Volunteers.‖91 This trend toward guerrilla
warfare did not invalidate ideas from traditional military thinkers. Perhaps the most
important is nineteenth-century Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz. M.J. Costello, a
Volunteer in the First Tipperary Brigade and later a tactician in the Irish Defence Forces,
called him, ―The most notable of all writers on war.‖92 Among Clausewitz‘s lessons
pertinent to the Irish situation between 1917 and 1921 were his insistence on the
subordination of military strategy to political authority and objectives, as well as the
advantages (and disadvantages) of surprise in combat. Other ―regular‖ theorists cited by
An t‟Óglác include German General Friedrich von Bernhardi and French Marshal
Ferdinand Foch.93
Of course, guerrilla warfare was not without precedent by 1918. The final phase
of the Second Boer War of 1899-1902 had been a guerrilla struggle waged by Boer
commandos against vastly superior British forces. The potential for such a war in Ireland
had been considered decades earlier. For example, James Fintan Lalor, a Young Ireland
activist, wrote a letter published in the Irish Felon outlining the circumstances under
which he believed Irish fighters could defeat the British Army. After warning his readers
that they possessed no military organization or arms, Fintan Lalor advised, ―The force of
England is entrenched and fortified. You must draw it out of position; break up its mass;
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break its trained line of march and manoeuvre, its equal step and serried array.‖94 By
emphasizing small-unit tactics, the IRA did exactly this by forcing Crown forces to
divide their strength, spreading them thinly over the whole country in a system of patrols.
The republican campaign benefited in both military and political senses from
another piece of advice from Fintan Lalor:
You cannot organize, or train, or discipline your own force to any point of
efficiency. You must therefore disorganize, and untrain, and undiscipline
that of the enemy, and not alone must you unsoldier, you must unofficer it
also; nullify its tactique and strategy, as well as its discipline; decompose
the science and system of war, and resolve them into their first elements.
You must make the hostile army a mob, as your own will be.95
The IRA achieved a measure of discipline and organization unthought-of by Fintan Lalor,
but it still attempted to nullify the British Army‘s tactics by initiating a campaign
antithetical to the great power struggle of World War I. Unofficial reprisals and random
shootings by Crown forces exemplify the extent to which the Republicans
―undisciplined‖ their enemy and gained propaganda victories from the brutal
consequences.
The British empire of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries had
already witnessed a series of irregular wars. Colonel C.E. Callwell collected a number of
lessons from these campaigns in Small Wars (1899). This title encompassed rebellions,
guerrilla warfare, and any campaign ―where organized armies are struggling against
opponents who will not meet them in the open field.‖96 Like Clausewitz, Callwell
stresses the necessity of having a clear political goal guiding military operations and
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states, ―it is the difficulty of bringing the foe to action which forms, as a rule, the most
unpleasant characteristic of these wars.‖ Having drawn out an enemy, a superior force
will almost always prevail in combat, but it is the prelude which frustrates the ―regular‖
commander.97 With this principle in mind, Callwell calls guerrilla warfare ―a form of
operations above all things to be avoided.‖ While the regular commander seeks ―decisive
methods,‖ an adept guerrilla leader will avoid confrontation. According to Callwell, ―no
amount of energy and strategic skill will at times draw the enemy into risking
engagements, or induce him to depart from the form of warfare in which most irregular
warriors excel and in which regular troops are seen at their worst.‖98 Throughout the
Irish conflict, the British military and press predicted and prepared for a switch from
guerrilla to regular operations in which rebel forces could be drawn into open combat.99
Republican forces were routinely criticized for shooting from behind hedges or
fences. John Fails, a Constabulary recruit from Rathkeale, Co. Limerick, said later,
―most of the shooting at that time was done by the IRA from behind stone walls, a ditch
or something, and you were on the road going along on your duty. There was nothing to
stop them shooting you and you would never know it.‖100 Callwell specifically
advocated this type of ―hedge fighting‖ in The Tactics of Home Defence (1908). A
product of the recurrent ―invasion scares‖ in the prewar United Kingdom, Callwell‘s
work suggests that Britain‘s and Ireland‘s human-made landscape—especially hedgerows
and fences—could be used to military advantage. In this type of ―enclosed country,‖
Callwell says that artillery and mounted troops would have limited effect and the onus of
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action would be on infantry.101 Though he imagines a conflict between major powers
deploying large conventional armies, the author notes that the nature of the terrain would
break these into small units, and that battalions, companies, and sections would require
training and efficient officers to act independently.102 This type of warfare would be
decided by a series of minor unconnected actions, sometimes without larger forces
having knowledge of them.103 These small units should use cover to maximum effect.
Callwell writes, ―The kind of ground that one naturally associates with rural England
lends itself to an extraordinary extent to the concealment of strength and of movements,‖
adding, ―The utilisation of hedgerows for concealing the movements of infantry is an art
in itself.‖104 The IRA put Callwell‘s theories to the test; particularly in utilizing cover,
and small, independent units engaging in disconnected actions.105
The writers of An t‟Óglác also drew guerrilla inspiration from the Spanish
resistance to Napoleon‘s invasion, the Cuban insurgency against Spain, as well as Boer
General Christiaan de Wet‘s and German General Paul-Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck‘s
campaigns against the British.106 Despite variances in time and place, all of these
examples stress the importance of mobility, choosing the terrain for combat, avoiding
unsustainable casualties, and winning the active support of the local population
Another arena of the conflict was the ―intelligence war,‖ fought mostly in Dublin
but in a smaller way throughout the country. The tactics of this shadowy war also had
precedents, emphasizing subtlety and the importance of personal knowledge of the
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enemy. Séamus Ó Maoileóin, whom Collins recruited to work as a spy, said that he and
other intelligence officers studied W.J. Fitzpatrick‘s Secret Service Under Pitt (1892),
and ―many other books of that nature.‖107 Fitzpatrick describes the methods of British
agents in cultivating informers among the United Irishmen. He includes a warning for
contemporary plotters in his preface: ―The organisers of illegal secret societies will see
that, in spite of the apparent secrecy and ingenuity of their system, informers sit with
them at the same council-board and dinner-table, ready at any moment to sell their blood;
and that the wider the ramifications of conspiracy, the greater becomes the certainty of
detection.‖108 Republican officers took the warning, but instead of being discouraged,
used Fitzpatrick‘s work to avoid the doom he pronounced on them.
As the intellectual climate at GHQ trended toward guerrilla war, its publication
began to encourage definite action. When Volunteer Donncadh MacNeilus wounded two
RIC officers while resisting arrest in Cork on November 4, 1918, An t‟Óglác lavished
him with praise. The next issue read, ―his gallant defence against enemy aggression will
evoke the admiration of every decent Irishman…The fate of MacNellis [sic] will be
watched with careful sympathy by the Volunteer Organisation.‖109 Taking the cue, Seán
O‘Hegarty and members of the First Cork Brigade organized a rescue one week after the
arrest.110 An t'Óglác‘s writers crowed over the victory, saying ―This daring exploit, by a
half-dozen Volunteers, was skillfully planned and carried out with a courage and
efficiency which we would hold up to all Volunteers for imitation … Every incident in
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connection with the MacNellis [sic] affair gives cause for pride and an example for
imitation to all Volunteers.‖111 It is important to note the repeated exhortation to other
Volunteers to emulate both MacNeilus‘s resistance and his rescue, as this indicates a
definite active policy.
The MacNeilus rescue took place the same day the European war ended and just
weeks before the United Kingdom held a general election. For months, British
politicians and the press had been downplaying Sinn Féin‘s prospects. The Times
mocked the abstentionist policy, calling it ―expensive propaganda.‖112 The paper could
not deny that the party was predicted to win between fifty-two and fifty-six seats, while
the IPP expected just twenty-five. However, The Times insisted that with fewer
representatives at Westminster Irish prosperity would wane, and ―Sedition will become
unpopular from the moment it interferes with money-making.‖113 General John French,
the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, assured a Londonderry audience that moderates would
regain power ―when the country is free once more from the tyranny of organized
sedition.‖114
During the election campaign, republicans continued to make dual statements
regarding international recognition and a resort to violence. By presenting themselves as
a party that would work through international institutions such as the forthcoming peace
conference, Sinn Féiners could counter the suggestion that a vote for them would be
wasted on an unrealistic abstentionist policy. More generally, Sinn Féin was able to offer
Irish electors both peace and the sword. While not committed to the peace conference as
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the sole arbiter of independence, Irish republicans benefited from this rhetoric in two
further ways. First, Sinn Féin politicians mollified moderates in their party and won over
reluctant members of the public. Second, they constrained the British scope for action in
Ireland. While Sinn Féiners appeared to be open to a peaceful solution of the conflict
through international cooperation, repressive exercises on the part of the British would
only increase sympathy for Ireland at the peace conference and elsewhere.
British pundits must have been astounded by the election results. The poll was
held on December 14. Sinn Féin won seventy-three of Ireland‘s 105 seats. Unionists
scored twenty-six victories, and the Irish Parliamentary Party retained just six seats.115
As soon as the full results were announced two weeks after the poll, the republicans
declared that they would set up their own assembly in Dublin.116 The Times continued to
argue that the republicans‘ momentary victory would lead to their demise. Its Dublin
correspondent wrote, ―Parliament will not be sitting for a month before the question of
Sinn Fein‘s policy of abstention becomes a subject of acute controversy in Nationalist
Ireland.‖117 The Cork Volunteers ended the year with one more act of defiance. While
politicians bickered over Cabinet seats, the ―Sinn Feiners‖ blew up a monument to Irish
soldiers who fought in the British army in the Second Boer War.118

115

Brian Feeney, Sinn Féin: A Hundred Turbulent Years (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003),
109-110. The author gives the party vote totals as follows: Sinn Féin – 474,859; Unionist – 289,025; IPP –
220,226.
116
The Times (London), Dec. 30, 1918.
117
The Times (London), Dec. 31, 1918.
118
New York Times, Dec. 30, 1918; New York Times, Dec. 31, 1918.

45
Conclusion
Historians typically describe 1917 and 1918 as years in which the republican
movement engaged in peaceful reorganization and political campaigning. However,
violent rhetoric and action went hand-in-hand with these activities throughout the period.
Organized violence took place, which cost lives on both sides, and set the pattern for
future years of conflict. The fact that republican actions took few lives in this period was
a result of their poor armament, rather than a lack of aggression. British attempts to
contain republican violence through the machinery of regular law failed. The IRA took
advantage of this cautious approach to prepare its forces. Florence O‘Donoghue,
intelligence officer for the First Cork Brigade, emphasized the operational and
psychological significance of this period when he recalled that, ―The slow build up of
activity from 1917 to 1919 … allowed the Volunteers and the people to become
acclimated gradually to the atmosphere of war.‖119 From 1919, IRA operations became
more sophisticated, deadlier, and prompted increasingly drastic British responses.
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CHAPTER THREE:
A SYSTEM OF GUERRILLA WAR, 1919

A sergeant and constable of the Royal Irish Constabulary were patrolling the
Dublin Mountains on January 19, 1919. Arriving at Three Rocky Mountains, they
stumbled into a group of men conducting illegal military drill. Typical procedure over
the past two years had been for the police to arrest the leader of such parties, and to
disperse the rest. On this occasion, the drillers attacked the policemen, seized their
revolvers and truncheons, tied up the sergeant, restrained the constable with his own
handcuffs, and left them lying on the mountainside.1
The episode was embarrassing for the Constabulary, but not lethal. The same
could not be said for other policemen just two days later in Co. Tipperary. Seán Treacy
and Dan Breen, Vice-Commandant and Quartermaster of the Third (South) Tipperary
Brigade, were planning to seize a cartload of gelignite being moved to Soloheadbeg
quarry. Breen later asserted that the two felt the IRA was at a dangerous point in its
development. He wrote, ―The Volunteers were in danger of becoming merely a political
adjunct to the Sinn Féin organisation.‖ According to Treacy, they and their comrades
―had had enough of being pushed around and getting our men imprisoned while we
remained inactive.‖ Breen argued that the republicans needed the explosives, but said of
the expected six RIC guards, ―if they put up an armed resistance, we had resolved not
merely to capture the gelignite but also to shoot down the escort.‖2
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Breen, Treacy, and seven other Volunteers took up positions in ditches and
hedges on the Tipperary-Soloheadbeg road on January 16. The explosives did not pass.
On the fifth day of the party‘s vigil, a cart bearing two Constabulary members and a
driver appeared on the roadway. As the vehicle entered the ambush, the masked
Volunteers stood in the roadway and, brandishing revolvers, shouted, ―Hands up.‖
Constables James McDonnell and Patrick O‘Connell reached for their rifles, and the
attackers shot them dead.3 Breen wrote, ―Our only regret was that the escort had
consisted of only two Peelers instead of six. If there had to be dead Peelers at all, six
would have created a better impression than a mere two.‖4
This theft and shooting, committed the same day as the opening of Sinn Féin‘s
republican parliament Dáil Éireann, is often interpreted as the first shots in the War of
Independence. As the previous chapter shows, conflict between the republicans and the
police had been going on for some time before 1919, both in the ad hoc fashion of
resisting arrest and preplanned ambushes such as at Béal á Ghleanna. The killings at
Soloheadbeg represent a process of escalation that took place throughout the year. This
chapter will analyze that process, arguing that though local units continued to act on their
own, IRA General Headquarters controlled the direction and pace of the conflict and
provided the link to a political organization necessary to unify an otherwise disparate
organization.
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Legitimizing Violence: A Republican Government
Indeed, the Soloheadbeg ambush made very little impression on the immediate
political situation. Both The Times and the New York Times reported the event as a
double-murder. The idea that the perpetrators were Irish Volunteers or that the crime
might have had a political intent was not mentioned.5 Both newspapers covered the
opening session of Dáil Éireann more thoroughly, though with little enthusiasm. The
Dáil opened, coincidentally, the same day as the Soloheadbeg ambush. The Times said of
the preparations for Sinn Féin‘s parliament, ―The whole thing is, of course, childishly
illegal.‖6 The New York Times correspondent was bored by the proceedings, calling them
―deadening,‖ with little ―concession to popular interest.‖7 The American publication also
called Irish—the tongue in which the Dáil conducted business before translation—a
―dead language,‖ prompting an angry response from Sinn Féiner and Gaelic Leaguer
Padraic Colum; then residing in New York.8
During its opening session, the Dáil called roll, listing thirty-five members as ―fé
ghlas ag Gallaibh‖ or ―imprisoned by the foreigners.‖9 Cathal Brugha, chairman of the
Volunteers‘ resident executive, was elected Ceann Comhairle, or Speaker of the House.
This honor likely would have gone to de Valera, but he was still imprisoned in Britain on
the ―German plot‖ charges. The ―Declaration of Independence‖ moved and accepted at
the sitting asserted that ―the Irish Republic was proclaimed in Dublin on Easter Monday,
1916, by the Irish Republican Army acting on behalf of the Irish people,‖ and demanded
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the evacuation of the British garrison from the country.10 The ―Message to the Free
Nations of the World‖ referred to ―the existing state of war between Ireland and
England.‖11 The British government did not see the Dáil as a serious enough threat to
take active steps against it, but in republican minds a significant change took place on its
establishment. Fighting for a government—though ridiculed and unrecognized—
legitimized the acts of aggression against Crown forces already taking place.12
Though Soloheadbeg did not singlehandedly change the course of the Irish
struggle, the government‘s response and GHQ‘s reaction to the Dáil opening did alter the
situation. Tipperary was proclaimed a ―disturbed district,‖ and subject to martial law.
The day after the Dáil‘s opening, four republicans escaped from Usk prison in Wales.
They climbed the prison wall, made their way to a waiting ship, and survived a search at
the Dublin docks—all without being discovered. One of the four was Joseph McGrath,
elected representative for the St. James division of Dublin, who could now take his seat
in the Dáil.13 Before the month was out, arms raids took place in at least three different
Co. Cork towns, and grenades were thrown at a Londonderry prison.14
On January 31, the Volunteer organ An t‟Óglác echoed the Dáil‘s assertion that a
―state of war‖ existed ―between Ireland and England.‖ It added that IRA members were
justified ―in treating the armed forces of the enemy—whether soldiers or policemen—
exactly as a National Army would treat the members of an invading army.‖ They were to
―use all legitimate methods of warfare against the soldiers and policemen of the English
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usurper.‖15 Piaras Béaslaí, who wrote the editorials, asserted that they were approved by
Brugha and the GHQ staff, and therefore reflected Volunteer policy.16
While the Dáil was meeting, another jailbreak was in the works. Eamon de
Valera worked for the Lincoln Gaol prison chaplain. Following Mass one morning, he
found a key lying unattended near the sacristy. He made a wax impression of the key
from one of the warm church candles, and enlisted fellow-prisoner Seán Milroy to sketch
the resultant impression.17 Around Christmas 1918, Mrs. Seán McGarry received a card
from her imprisoned husband featuring a cartoon figure trying to unlock a house door,
using an incredibly detailed key. The prisoners also sent an explanation of what the card
meant, in Irish, to the officer commanding the Manchester IRA. GHQ pieced the
information together, and Michael Collins took charge of the escape attempt. Two
attempts to smuggle keys into the prison hidden in cakes failed; the keys got through, but
were too small. Next the republicans sent in blank keys and files, and prisoner Paddy de
Loughrey deconstructed a jail lock to make master keys for the escapees. On the night of
February 3, de Valera, Milroy, and Seán McGarry used three duplicate keys to open and
re-lock their cell doors and prison gates. Collins and Harry Boland were waiting outside
to spirit them to safe houses in Manchester, with the help of republicans from Liverpool
and London.18
The escape of the Sinn Féin president and two associates garnered great publicity.
Articles in the British and international press speculated on how the escape was managed,
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and The Times derided the government‘s ―indecision‖ on how to deal with Irish
prisoners.19 The operation also showed the value of the British IRA organization. Built
in small units from Irish emigrant communities around the country, these clandestine
groups were already involved in arms smuggling, but incidents like the Lincoln escape
displayed their capacity for direct operations.20
Rising enthusiasm required GHQ to head off several attempts to escalate the
conflict, or even redirect it from the emerging system of guerrilla war. The first
emanated from the Tipperary Volunteers, soon after the Soloheadbeg action. On
February 23, officers of the Third Tipperary Brigade took a page from the government‘s
book and drafted a ―proclamation‖ against the Constabulary in their county. It stated that
by the end of the month, any members of the Force remaining in the county ―will be
deemed to have forfeited his life. The more notorious police being dealt with as far as
possible first.‖ The document extended the threat to anyone paid by the British
government, or ―who helps England to rule this country.‖ Civilians giving information to
the Constabulary and doctors who assisted them were also threatened with execution.21
The brigade officers sent the draft to Dublin, where the Dáil and GHQ forbade its
publication. Richard Mulcahy later wrote that such an initiative would ―disrupt the minds
and lives of a whole people,‖ undercutting the IRA‘s support.22 Breen said that he and
his Tipperary colleagues ―could not understand their reluctance, seeing that ours was the
only logical position.‖23
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Other Dáil members were still languishing in prison, among them Robert Barton,
representative for West Wicklow. Chief of Staff Richard Mulcahy visited him in
Mountjoy Gaol in Dublin posing as a solicitor‘s assistant. While the guard was watching
the visitor gave Barton news of his pending court martial, and when he looked away
Mulcahy slid the prisoner a file. Over the next three days, Barton sawed through the bars
on his window. On the night of March 16, he rigged a dummy in his bed and escaped by
a rope ladder thrown to him from outside the prison. Barton left a note in his cell to the
governor stating he had left ―owing to the discomfort of the place,‖ and asking him to
hold his baggage until it was called for. On St. Patrick‘s Day, the IRA gave Dublin a
present: another republican legislator on the loose.24
Barton was the first prisoner ever to escape Mountjoy, but twelve days later,
twenty Volunteers repeated the exploit. During exercise on March 29, a rope ladder was
thrown against the outside wall. Seven prisoners ―covered‖ the nearby guards with
―revolvers‖—which were actually kitchen spoons held under their clothes, and the
republicans scrambled over the wall and vanished amid the Dublin streets. The escapees
included J.J. Walsh, Dáil member for Cork City, and Piaras Béaslaí, member for East
Kerry and editor of An t‟Óglác.25 None of the individuals taken out of prison could
change the course of the conflict, but the republican goal of delegitimizing British rule
and making the country ungovernable appeared to be advancing dramatically during the
string of high-profile getaways. The Times commented two days after the Mountjoy mass
breakout, ―Escapes of Sinn Fein prisoners have become so common of late that they
24
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excite little wonder, though much disgust, in the minds of the public.‖26 The derision that
had marked commentary on the Dáil‘s opening was disappearing as its members made a
mockery of the British prisons and the IRA continued its campaign of ―outrage‖ in the
countryside.
On March 20, Volunteers raided the military arsenal at Collinstown Aerodrome,
four miles north of Dublin. Five of the twelve republicans involved were working as
contractors at the facility before the operation, and their knowledge of the facility and
inside preparations enabled it to take place. GHQ approved the raid and supplied khaki
clothing and masks to disguise the Volunteers. The raid netted the IRA an enormous
haul, consisting of seventy-five rifles with bayonets and 5,000 rounds of ammunition.
Patrick Houlihan, who planned the raid, noted with regret that the military suspected
some of the contractors had been involved, and they all lost their jobs shortly after.27
An attempt to rescue Robert Byrne from Limerick Workhouse Hospital signaled
the spread of this campaign to that county. Byrne, adjutant of the Limerick City
Brigade‘s Second Battalion, had been moved from prison due to his weakness after
undertaking a hunger-strike for political prisoner status. On April 6, twenty Volunteers,
two armed with revolvers, entered the Workhouse during visiting hour. At a whistle
blast, the republicans rushed the five constables and one warden guarding Byrne. The
prisoner tried to rise, but Constable Martin O‘Brien threw himself on top of his bed.
After a short melee, Constable Spillane was shot in the spine, O‘Brien killed, and Byrne
carried out on a Volunteer‘s shoulders. Once outside in the getaway car, however, the
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rescuers realized Byrne had been shot. He died that evening.28 An t‟Óglác described
Byrne‘s death as ―deliberate murder,‖ and the Irish Bulletin used his case as evidence of a
―shoot-to-kill‖ policy to prevent prisoners escaping alive.29 The government designated
Co. Limerick a ―special military area‖ on April 7 and a ―disturbed district‖ three days
later.30
At the end of March, John Charles Milling, a resident magistrate and former RIC
Inspector with a penchant for locking up Volunteers, was shot dead in his home in
Westport, Co. Mayo.31 On April 6, an armed group concealed behind roadside hedges
opened fire on a patrol of four policemen in Eyries, Co. Cork. Three of the constables
were wounded, but none killed.32 On April 20, Liam Lynch and six Volunteers of the
Second Cork Brigade raided Araglen Constabulary barracks while three of the fourconstable garrison was at Mass. They overpowered the one constable left on duty and
seized six Lee-Enfield carbines, 400 rounds of ammunition, and a revolver.33 Three days
later two soldiers were assaulted in Arklow, Co. Wicklow, and deprived of their arms and
ammunition.34
While aggressive actions spread, the republican movement faced a crisis
regarding the relationship between its political and military components. On March 24, a
notice appeared in the press purporting to have been issued by Sinn Féin‘s general
secretaries. It stated that de Valera would be welcomed into Dublin by the Lord Mayor,
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with bands playing and demonstrations by Sinn Féin and the Irish Volunteers. The notice
was signed by two Sinn Féin secretaries, Harry Boland and Tom Kelly. The Times noted
that ―The last time when the corporation publicly welcomed a distinguished visitor to the
city was when Queen Victoria visited after the Boer War.‖ The paper had an explanation
ready-made, asserting that ―The arrangements for his [de Valera‘s] reception seem to be
designed with the object of impressing the Peace Conference and American opinion with
the supremacy of the Republican movement in Ireland.‖35
When the Sinn Féin Executive gathered that day, none of them recalled
sanctioning such a reception. Darrell Figgis asked Kelly why he had signed the notice.
Michael Collins rose, and declared that the reception plans had not been issued by Sinn
Féin, but by ―the proper body, the Irish Volunteers.‖ He indicated that the public
demonstration was meant as a provocation, declaring ―Ireland was likely to get more out
of a state of disorder than from a continuance of the situation as it then stood.‖ Returning
to the issue of the authority for the statement, Collins added, ―The proper people to take
decisions of that kind were ready to face the British military, and were resolved to force
the issue. And they were not to be deterred by weaklings and cowards.‖36
Collins was essentially telling the assembled political leaders that military
commanders would decide the course of the republican movement. The Dáil‘s
Declaration of Independence had recognized the IRA‘s role in asserting the republic
during the Easter Rising, and now one of its GHQ staff was attempting to flex his muscle
over the political body. Collins‘s bombastic style did not cow Arthur Griffith, who was
attending his first Executive meeting since his arrest in May 1918. He stood and told
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Collins that no body had authority to decide whether to go ahead with the reception than
the Executive.37 The Sinn Féin leaders debated for two hours. P.S. O‘Hegarty, who was
never a Volunteer and opposed military action after 1916, argued the reception should
proceed. He made an analogy with Daniel O‘Connell‘s abandonment of a mass meeting
at Tara after it was proclaimed by the British.38 The debate carried over to the next day,
when Griffith reported that de Valera also objected to the reception, and the Executive
cancelled it.39 The press of March 26 carried news of the decision.
Collins continued to view ―politicians‖ with disgust. He wrote to Austin Stack on
May 17, ―The policy now seems to be to squeeze out anyone who is tainted with strong
fighting ideas.‖ He added the next day, ―It seems to me that official Sinn Féin is inclined
to be ever less militant and ever more political, theoretical.‖40 Ironically, Collins himself
held military and political positions as the Volunteers‘ Adjutant General and Director of
Intelligence, as well as the Dáil‘s representative for South Cork and Minister for Finance.
Richard Mulcahy considered his, Cathal Brugha‘s, and Collins‘ dual military and
governmental roles a strength.41 The relationship between the two arms of the movement
remained ambiguous, but strengthened as the conflict deepened and each became
dependent on the other.

GHQ and the Detectives
Collins‘s main military initiative in this period consisted of an all-out offensive
against the few indispensable British officers in Ireland: the detectives of G-Division of
37
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the Dublin Metropolitan Police. The detectives, known as ―G-men,‖ were responsible for
tracking and gathering information on political dissidents. At the end of the 1916 Rising
Collins had watched as they picked out republican leaders for court martial and
execution.42 He became director of intelligence in January 1919, taking over the office
from Eamonn Duggan. There were already three G-men feeding republicans intelligence:
Eamon Broy, James Kavanagh, and Eugene Smith, but their efforts were unorganized.
The new director undertook a policy of meeting face-to-face with these double-agents,
and getting as many of them as possible.43
Immediately upon taking the position, Collins began building up a staff. He
promoted the Dublin Brigade‘s intelligence officer Liam Tobin to be his chief
intelligence officer. The IRA‘s Assistant Quartermaster General Tom Cullen was coopted into the department and came next in seniority, followed by Frank Thornton.44
Collins is often described as singlehandedly directing every minute detail of the
intelligence department, but part of his success in managing as many projects as he did
was his ability to delegate.45 His own interviews refer to ―the trustworthiness of my chief
aids.‖46 Tony Woods, a veteran of the Dublin Brigade, went so far as to say, ―Tobin, of
course, was the real Intelligence man in Dublin in the Tan struggle, not Collins.‖47 This
critique likely goes too far in attempting to shift credit for the intelligence war away from
the director, but it is important in that it emphasizes the roles of his subordinates.
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Other contemporary and recent writers have painted the republican intelligence
department as an authority unto itself, striking when and at whom its members pleased.48
Liam O‘Doherty, an officer in Dublin‘s Fifth Battalion, insisted, ―no spy was shot
without the authority of G.H.Q. The latter body, presided over by Cathal Brugha,
Minister for Defence, went carefully into all the circumstances of each case before giving
their final decision.‖49 Mulcahy later wrote, ―We each knew what the other was at and
particularly in his [Collins‘] domain of intelligence.‖50
Collins was encouraged by the successful prison escapes and gained greater
access to information as the Dáil and its subsidiary office came into operation.51 By
April 1919, he had decided the G-men needed to go. Collins later wrote, ―England could
always reinforce her army. She could replace every soldier that she lost…To paralyse the
British machine it was necessary to strike at individuals. Without her spies England was
helpless.‖ New recruits might enlist in G-Division to replace the numbers of each one
lost, but executing an individual detective erased his knowledge and therefore his threat
to the republican movement forever. As Collins put it, ―even when the new spy stepped
into the shoes of the old one, he could not step into the old one‘s knowledge.‖52
The intelligence director began his assault by doing some detective work of his
own. On the night of April 7, Detective Eamonn Broy let him and Volunteer Sean Nunan
into G-Division headquarters in Brunswick Street Police Station. The republican
intelligence director made notes on each detective in the political section. He read the
information they had collected on known republicans and learned their names and where
48
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they lived.53 Collins also found a book of telephone messages from Irish citizens giving
information to G-Division.54 Two days later, Volunteers tried to intimidate the detectives
into resigning. They raided Detective Sergeant Nicholas Halley‘s home, and bound and
gagged Detective Constable Denis O‘Brien, leaving him in the middle of a city street.55
Before the IRA‘s offensive in the intelligence war could progress, politics
intervened. The Dáil‘s second session opened on April 1. Sean T. O‘Kelly had taken the
chair as Ceann Comhairle from Cathal Brugha at the January 22 meeting, and de
Valera—fresh from Lincoln Gaol—was now elected Príomh-Aire, or President of the
Dáil.56 Brugha had ceremonially tendered his resignation as Príomh-Aire, and the next
day was named Minister for Defence.57
During the second session‘s third meeting on April 10, de Valera rose and called
for the police forces to be socially ostracized. In doing so, he called up a tactic that had
played a large role in the ―Land War‖ in rural Ireland during the 1870s and 1880s.58 De
Valera stated, ―The people of Ireland ought not to fraternise, as they often do, with the
forces that are the main instruments in keeping them in subjugation.‖ Given the
composition of these forces, boycott meant accentuating divisions among Irish people,
including family members and community residents. De Valera said that he was
reluctant to move against the RIC and DMP because they were Irish as well, but that he
spoke out on behalf of imprisoned republicans—who were in their predicament as a
result of police activities. In the course of the speech, he called the Constabulary
53
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―England‘s janissaries,‖ and ―no ordinary civil force, as police are in other countries.
The R.I.C., unlike any other police force in the world, is a military body.‖ De Valera
reached his full thunder in declaring:
They are given full licence by their superiors to work their will upon an
unarmed populace. The more brutal the commands given them by their
superiors the more they seem to revel in carrying them out—against their
own flesh and blood, be it remembered!
The republican Príomh-Aire said that a full boycott ―will give them vividly to understand
how utterly the people of Ireland loathe both themselves and their calling.‖59 At no time
did de Valera forbid violent action against the police, but his call for social ostracization
and the warnings issued by the intelligence department required time to take effect.60
In June, de Valera left for the United States, hoping to raise funds and to gain
recognition for the Irish Republic either at the peace conference or in the Senate.61 By
July, no appreciable difference had been made in the Dublin situation. In fact, on July 1
police discovered an arms dump in Lower Stephen Street.62 David Neligan, who joined
G-Division at Collins‘ request and fed the intelligence department information, said that
the principal detectives; Barton, Bruton, Hoey, and Smyth, were all fighting for
promotions by arresting republicans.63 Robert Brennan remembered Smyth as
―particularly active against Sinn Féin.‖64 At the end of the month, a group of Volunteers
was specially attached to the intelligence department. The officer in charge was Michael
McDonnell, or ―Mick Mac,‖ and his second was Patrick Daly. This was the beginning of
a special unit within the Dublin Brigade known as ―The Squad.‖ They were attached to
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the intelligence department and called upon to assassinate detectives.65 Their first target
was Detective Sergeant Patrick Smyth.
Smyth was walking toward his home in Drumcondra on the evening of July 30,
when four Volunteers approached him near his home at Millmount Avenue. They
opened fire and wounded him, but Smyth ran all the way to his front door, where he
collapsed wounded. He lingered in hospital for several weeks before dying of his
wounds. The Volunteers who committed the shooting were alarmed that Smyth had been
able to run so far and clung to life so long after being hit. They switched from .38 to .45
revolvers in future actions.66 The Times stated a week after the incident that Smyth had
been ―literally riddled with bullets.‖67

Widespread Violence
Attacks around the country continued. On June 23, Volunteers assassinated
District Inspector Hunt in Thurles, Co. Tipperary.68 The next day, two Constables were
disarmed at Camp, Co. Kerry. The most activity took place in Co. Clare. In July the IRA
ambushed a Constabulary patrol at Kilfenora and attacked Inch barracks.69 In August,
Volunteers attacked Broadford, Moyona, and Tubben barracks; killed two Constables in
an ambush near Illaunbaun, seized all the arms in Newmarket-on-Fergus barracks, and
attacked a patrol at Moyfadden.70 On August 4, the incidents spread to Co. Louth, where
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nineteen rifles en route to the Royal Artillery were stolen from a railroad depot at
Greenore.71
Despite the widespread violence, government responses remained localized.
Tipperary and Clare had already been declared ―disturbed districts‖ on April 10, with
Counties Cork and Limerick. This empowered the Constabulary to move in
reinforcements from other counties, but the incidents were so widespread few police
could be spared from any area. Moreover, the force was understaffed due to a policy of
non-enrolment during the World War meant to encourage potential police to join the
British Army. Eamon Broy later said that the Constabulary heads did not realize they
were facing an unprecedented situation and ―could not adopt the old manoeuvre of
transferring members temporarily from a quiet area to a disturbed district.‖72
The piecemeal government response continued. On July 3 Dublin Castle declared
Sinn Féin, the Irish Volunteers, Cumann na mBan, and the Gaelic League ―dangerous
organizations‖ and banned them throughout Co. Tipperary. On August 14, the same
measure was applied to Co. Clare.73 Another facet of the government response was to
withdraw Constabulary garrisons from isolated barracks in Clare, Limerick, Galway,
enabling them to concentrate their forces in larger population centers, but essentially
abandoning large portions of the country. At the same time, a system of fortifying the
remaining barracks with steel shutters and sandbags began.74 As the Constabulary
retreated and the republican boycott began to take effect, the force‘s means of
intelligence-gathering dried up. Around this time, Constable John Regan sat down in a
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pub in Bantry, Co. Cork, with one of his usual informants. Regan asked ―if he had heard
anything fresh.‖ ―I‘m finished,‖ the man replied. Regan tried to coax him, but the
informant said, ―I tell you I‘m finished. These fellows are serious, and if you take my tip
you‘ll go a bit easy too.‖75
Republicans were taking steps to establish a daily newspaper. There were many
weeklies dedicated to the Sinn Féin cause. The Times described them as carrying out ―a
sort of guerilla warfare on the Irish government‖ months before using that title to
describe the republican military campaign.76 Nevertheless, rumors that Sinn Féin
intended to take on professional journalism began as early as January. Poking fun at
republicans‘ supposed foreign funding, youth, and intellectualism, The Times commented
that money would be no problem, but the party‘s ―ability to find managing and editorial
staffs for a peculiarly difficult venture in journalism is another question…its young
writers and orators lack the training and experience which are necessary to success in
daily journalism.‖77 At the April 2 Dáil sitting, Terence MacSwiney of mid-Cork made a
motion to start a daily paper, but the matter was referred to the propaganda department. 78
On July 12, a newsletter entitled ―Acts of Aggression committed in Ireland by the
Military and Police of the Usurping English Government‖ found its way to the mailboxes
of select foreign correspondents and British legislators. The paper was a simple
repetition of raids, arrests, and alleged assaults by Crown forces gleaned from the pages
of the daily press.79 This forerunner of the Dáil‘s Irish Bulletin initially attracted little
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notice, but as the propaganda department stepped up its efforts the British administration
took action against the outspoken republican press.
In August, the Minister for Defence took measures to bind the IRA to the Dáil.
Initially, the Irish Volunteers were answerable to no authority except their own executive.
On August 20, Cathal Brugha moved that every Dáil representative and Volunteer should
swear an oath of allegiance to ―support and defend the Irish Republic and the
Government of the Irish Republic, which is Dáil Éireann, against all enemies, foreign and
domestic.‖80 The motion sparked some debate. Tom Kelly called it ―a species of
coercion‖ against the Volunteers. Arthur Griffith, acting president in de Valera‘s
absence, spoke strongly in favor of the oath. Brugha said that ―he regarded the Irish
Volunteers as a standing Army, and that as such they should be subject to the
Government.‖81 The motion passed thirty votes to five.
The controversy over the oath to the Dáil speaks to the lingering distrust between
various sections of the republican movement. Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, with
whose work Volunteer leaders were familiar, insisted that military authority should be
subject to civil authority and that wars cannot be conducted without the political ends in
view.82 In a war such as that being fought in Ireland, in which the sides were so unequal
and many anticipated a negotiated settlement, this necessity was even more apparent.
Nevertheless, the Volunteers were created as an independent organization, and the Dáil‘s
recognition that the IRA founded the Republic during the Easter Rising gave them a
certain legitimacy for many of the rank-and-file. For these reasons the oath created some
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dissension. Todd Andrews of the Dublin Brigade later wrote, ―I was sorry we took the
oath to Dáil Éireann. I thought, or rather felt, that no outside organization should have
any say in the activities of the Volunteers.‖83 In practice, the oath was unevenly
administered to various republican units at the discretion of their officers, but
theoretically it bound the IRA to the Dáil.
On September 7, 1919, fifteen soldiers of the King‘s Shropshire Light Infantry
marched through the town of Fermoy, in Co. Cork, in the south of Ireland. As they
neared their destination – the town‘s Methodist church – three motor-cars of clubwielding men surrounded them, while others appeared in the streets brandishing
revolvers. Though the soldiers carried no ammunition, the officer in charge ordered them
to resist with rifle butts and bayonets. A melee ensued, during which the attackers shot
Private William Jones dead, wounded two of his comrades, and subdued the rest with
their bludgeons. They seized the soldiers‘ rifles and fled the scene in the waiting cars.
The military gathered reinforcements and gave chase, but found the escape route blocked
by felled trees.84
The attack had been carried out by the IRA‘s Second Cork Brigade under
Commandant Liam Lynch. Other members of the British military made a swift,
unofficial response. About fifty to sixty soldiers swept into Fermoy the next night,
breaking windows and looting shops for about two hours, until convinced by the arrival
of other members of the military to return to barracks.85 The official response was far
more wide-ranging and prolonged. On September 12, Dáil Éireann, the republican
parliament set up in Dublin by members of the political party Sinn Féin, was declared a
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―dangerous organization‖ and suppressed. The RIC arrested suspected republicans all
over Ireland, and a wave of newspaper suppressions threatened to silence the voice of
radical nationalism in public discourse.
After September 1919, the British government in Ireland tolerated little
expression of republican sentiment. On September 17 police raided the Cork Examiner
offices and seized parts of its printing press. Three days later the same treatment was
meted out to seven Dublin-based weekly papers, all supportive of Sinn Féin.86 By
September 24, publications in Dundalk, Birr, and three each in Kerry and Limerick met
the same fate.87 Even the venerable Freeman‟s Journal, the organ of the moderate Irish
Parliamentary Party, was forced to cease publication for six weeks beginning in midDecember.88 It was the first systematic, island-wide response to a republican attack.
One publication that escaped the purge was the Dáil‘s secretly published ―Acts of
Aggression‖ newsletter. While early issues simply repeated actions of police and
military against republican suspects, the issue of September 13, following the events in
Fermoy, carried its first editorial comment. It declared, ―During the foregoing six days
English Military terrorism in Ireland reached its high water mark.‖ It called the arrests ―a
wholesale onslaught on the Republican movement‖ and asserted that ―Not a county in
Ireland escaped from this molestation.‖ It made no mention of the IRA attack that had
spurred the entire ―onslaught.‖89
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While republican propagandists launched rhetorical attacks on the British
government, IRA members took the Dáil‘s suppression as a mandate for further violence.
Writing from New York, Patrick McCartan said, ―England has now openly declared war
on Ireland.‖90 Taking previous republicans statements at face value, it would have been
more consistent to say that the British administration now recognized the ―state of war‖
the Dáil claimed existed before January 1919. Chief of Staff Richard Mulcahy wrote that
after the suppression, ―a positive element of violence was introduced as a policy‖ within
the IRA. While most previous attacks attempted to seize arms and intimidate police, the
new strategy was to eliminate the British presence from as many parts of Ireland as
possible. As Mulcahy put it, the IRA would ―provide clearance areas in the country
where the writ for the Dáil could begin to run, and the smaller bodies of Volunteers, who
were engaged in active hostilities, could have security and a certain freedom of
movement.‖91
The all-out offensive Mulcahy describes did not begin immediately upon the
Dáil‘s suppression, but the attacks continued despite the British crackdown. The day of
the suppression, Detective Constable Daniel Hoey was walking behind the Brunswick
Street Police Station in Dublin when three Volunteers of the intelligence Squad walked
up behind him and shot him dead.92 The British IRA participated in another operation,
helping to rescue six Volunteers from Strangeways Gaol in Manchester on October 25.93
The conflict spread to Meath the next week. On October 31, an IRA unit raided Ballivor
barracks and killed Constable William Agar. They locked up the rest of the garrison and
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seized all arms and ammunition in the day room. The same night, another Meath IRA
party opened fire on Dillon‘s Bridge barracks, wounding Sergeant Matthews but failing
to capture the building.94

GHQ Policies: Controlling the Pace
In September, Michael Brennan, the officer commanding the East Clare Brigade,
planned what he called ―a general onslaught‖ against Constabulary barracks throughout
his area. The goal was to secure as many rifles as possible. Brennan felt, ―As nothing
like this was anticipated it would almost certainly have been successful, but there
probably would have been heavy casualties.‖95 Mulcahy learned of the scheduled assault
just two days before it was to take place, and called Brennan to Dublin. The Chief of
Staff told him ―that the people had to be educated and led gently into open war and what I
proposed doing might scare them off.‖96 The East Clare Brigadier was disappointed,
feeling that by the time GHQ allowed him to act, the RIC arms would be out of reach.
Mulcahy‘s countermand undoubtedly saved lives on both sides and maintained the
Headquarters goal of a slow buildup to the war, but Brennan‘s brigade suffered from a
lack of arms throughout the conflict.97
The First (East) Cork Brigade planned a similar action for December. Brigade
Commandant Tomás MacCurtain pitched the project to fellow Corkman Collins, who
refused to sanction the project and referred him up the chain of command. Vice-
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Brigadier Terence MacSwiney met with Mulcahy early in November seeking approval to
attack ten different Constabulary barracks in one night. Michael Leahy, commander of
the Brigade‘s Fourth Battalion, later wrote that due to casual security measures in the
rural outposts, ―the capture of most of the R.I.C. barracks in the brigade area would
involve little more than walking in and capturing all arms, supplies, and records.‖98
MacSwiney proposed the barrack assaults as a prelude to a general uprising of Volunteers
in Cork City. Mulcahy later quoted him as saying, ―They could hope to last about a
fortnight anyway before they would be wiped out, but the flag would have been raised
and in six months time the same could be done in Galway.‖99
The idea of Volunteer ―risings‖ in urban areas was a step backward from
Headquarters strategy. It was very similar to the tactics followed during the 1916 Easter
Rising, and many who experienced that failure were unwilling to repeat it. If the IRA
concentrated its scant weapons in a single area at a given time, they could expect a
greater impact. However, MacSwiney was certain the effort would still fail, and the most
favorable result that could be hoped for was a negotiated settlement after the British tired
of bloodily suppressing urban uprisings every six months. Both the Clare and Cork plans
indicate a willingness to incur heavy casualties. Moreover, executing the idea of urban
uprisings would ruin several of Ireland‘s largest cities and towns. Such human and
material sacrifices were inimical to Headquarters‘ plans. Florence O‘Donoghue,
intelligence officer in the First Cork Brigade and later a military historian, wrote that two
essential keys to Headquarters‘ plans were: ―The governing policy of not committing the
whole force to the conflict at the start,‖ and ―though severe damage was done to the
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economic life of the country…no part of the country was completely devastated.‖100 The
Chief of Staff offered a compromise by allowing the Cork Brigade officers to select and
attack three barracks in one night.101 Leahy states that a further condition was to await
the outcome of a particularly sensational attack in the works for Dublin, and it was
January 1920 before the attacks could proceed.102
During their November 1919 meeting, MacSwiney accused Mulcahy and GHQ
officers of not understanding the mindset in the rest of the country. Long years of
drilling and arrests, as well as a feeling of having ―missed out‖ during 1916 were
frustrating country Volunteers.103 Demoralization was a serious threat to the IRA.
Periods of inaction, mass arrests, a lack of arms, and constant accusations of cowardice
and murder in the press took a toll on rank-and-file morale. Moreover, these incidents
show that tension existed between Headquarters and the most active republican units
from the beginning of the war‘s escalation.
That GHQ provided little support and fewer arms were familiar complaints
throughout the conflict. From 1919, Headquarters attempted to enforce a monopoly on
arms acquisition. Local units were discouraged from buying weapons except through
GHQ. Among the first to attempt to subvert this policy was the energetic Michael
Brennan of Clare. After seizing £1,500 in British pension funds during a raid on the
Limerick post office, he proceeded to Dublin to buy arms. He acquired a number of
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revolvers before being informed that Dublin Brigade officers were unhappy he was
―spoiling the market.‖ GHQ ordered him to cease his activities.104
Thomas Kettrick, quartermaster of the West Mayo Brigade, took his quest for
arms to England. Having arranged to transport weapons and explosives back to Mayo, he
found that Michael Collins ―was enraged at our going independently to England without
permission from Headquarters,‖ and also heard that his activities would ―upset the
market.‖105 Matthew J. Kavanagh of Wicklow‘s Arklow Company also tried to buy
weapons in Liverpool, and faced the same opposition. Collins confronted him and
―started off with a terrible harangue and abused me at a frightful rate for daring to
interfere by tapping a Headquarters source of supply for arms.‖ Collins softened and let
Kavanagh buy a few revolvers out of GHQ‘s stock, but the Wicklow Volunteer left
Dublin disappointed.106
In addition to stifling independent attempts to acquire weapons, Headquarters
only sparingly distributed arms from its stockpile to country units. GHQ had a habit of
only supplying weapons to units that were already active. An October 1920 issue of An
t‟Óglác admonished its readers, ―Those who complain of insufficiency of munitions and
equipment, should take steps to secure more from the enemy. Those who get ‗stuff‘
[arms] should make good use of it.‖107 Collins wrote to a brigade commander in May
1919, ―When you ask me for ammunition for guns which have never fired a shot in this
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fight, my answer is a simple one. Fire shots at some useful target or get to hell out of
it.‖108 The irrepressible Michael Brennan saw this as favoritism. He later wrote:
I made many trips to Dublin, mostly endeavouring to persuade GHQ to let
me have some arms. The only result was a few revolvers occasionally.
Neither then nor later did I ever succeed in extracting one rifle from GHQ.
This was much resented as we knew that a certain number of rifles were
going to Cork. We had the feeling that Collins was using his influence in
favour of his own county.109
Billy Mullins, quartermaster of the First Kerry Brigade, found dealing with Headquarters
relatively easy. He made regular trips to Dublin, handed over the proceeds from many
Volunteer fundraisers to Collins, and GHQ shipped the weapons to Kerry under the
address of a local merchant.110 Mullins‘s experience shows that the GHQ system of arms
purchase could work, but might also enforce a cyclical situation of inaction. Volunteer
officers complained that they could not act without weapons, but Headquarters officials
refused to supply weapons to brigades that lacked the capacity to act.
Thus, by late 1919, most republican actions still aimed at acquiring arms. These
included a raid on a British sloop in Bantry, Co. Cork on November 17. Local
Volunteers held up the crew with revolvers and came away with ten Canadian Ross
rifles.111 Reporting the incident, The Times exclaimed that Sinn Féin had ―dared to
declare open war on the British Navy.‖112 On November 29, members of the Squad
tracked Detective Sergeant Johnny Barton down College Street, where they shot him. As
he lay dying, the G-man cried out, ―Oh god, what did I do to deserve this?‖ A rumor
gained circulation in Dublin that he had joined the political section just fifteen minutes
108
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before being shot. Though police officials insisted Barton was on ―ordinary criminal
work‖ when he was shot, this was untrue.113 Neligan later wrote that Barton had
accepted work in the political division well in advance of his killing in hopes of a
promotion, while The Times noted that he arrested an ex-soldier on suspicion of
wounding Detective Wharton weeks earlier.114 Nevertheless, the belief in instantaneous
republican vengeance attests to the presumed power of intelligence department.115
The conflict spread to Co. Donegal on December 14, when a Constabulary patrol
was ambushed at Dungloe.116 The attackers‘ arms consisted of one rifle, one shotgun,
and two revolvers, but they wounded all four policemen. Though they captured no
weapons in affray, the republican commander of the operation Joseph A. Sweeney
asserted that ―the incident raised the morale of the Volunteers locally.‖ He added that he
regretted Sergeant McKenna—who he says was ―not officious‖—lost a leg due to his
wounds.117 By contrast, Constable Bolger was assassinated the same day in Kilbrittain,
Co. Cork, and Tom Barry later claimed that he was ―a most aggressive policeman.‖118
The year‘s final issue of An t‟Óglác appeared on the same day as the Dungloe
ambush. The Volunteer journal had been silent since October, as its editor Piaras Béaslaí
was once again imprisoned. Freed during the Strangeways Gaol escape, he wrote:
A year ago we compared the Irish Volunteers to any army in the trenches
whose activities were confined to occasional trench raids and sniping.
Since then the raids and sniping have greatly increased in frequency; in
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fact a situation has been created which more resembles guerrilla
warfare.119
The statement shows that even the directors of the struggle, some of whom still harbored
images of parade-ground armies and set-piece battle tactics, were only now coming to
grips with its unconventional nature. Throughout the year, GHQ staved off attempts to
quicken the pace of the conflict, while encouraging its slow spread throughout the
country. The same editorial hinted that a ―big push‖ by the Volunteers might not be far
off.
The most sensational attack of 1919 occurred four days after the Dungloe
ambush. It was the operation that caused GHQ to insist the Second Cork Brigade
postpone their barrack attacks until January 1920. It is likely that Headquarters
communicated the same warning to other brigades, as no barrack assaults followed the
Meath attacks at the end of October.
On December 19, as the three cars of Lord Lieutenant John French‘s entourage
returning to the Viceregal Lodge in Phoenix Park neared Ashtown crossroads, gunfire
suddenly erupted from the roadside. The Lord Lieutenant‘s bodyguard Detective
Sergeant Halley told the driver, ―We are in it. Go like the devil.‖ As the car began to
speed away, Halley was shot in the hand. The first car sped out of the crossroads while
the attackers loosed their full fury on the second car—in which they knew French usually
travelled. A grenade exploded inside the vehicle, and gunfire peppered it furiously. As
this attack opened, the third car entered the crossroads. The six soldiers in this vehicle
opened fire, and several more grenades exploded near the roadway. Sergeant Rumbold
took aim with his rifle and shot one of the attackers through the throat. The military
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emptied their weapons and also sped off into Phoenix Park. When the shooting stopped,
the bullet-riddled second car was smoking in the crossroad, its driver Corporal Appleton
and DMP Constable O‘Loughlin were wounded, and Volunteer Martin Savage lay dead
in the crossroad.120
Piaras Béaslaí later wrote that the attack on French, ―the head of the British
machinery of violence against us,‖ was ―especially justified.‖ He added that GHQ
approved the attack and Michael Collins planned it.121 Dan Breen—who took part in
several attempts to kill the Lord Lieutenant while in Dublin—said there were no less than
twelve attempts on his life during 1919.122 On this occasion, they left Ashtown
convinced that they had got him at last. No one could have escaped the devastation dealt
upon the second car. Reading the newspapers that evening, the Volunteers learned that
French had not traveled in the second car but the first, which had sped out of range
carrying one wounded detective and a few bullet holes.123
Breen, who was wounded in the attack, later attempted to claim victory. He
wrote, ―We had routed an entire contingent of British soldiers with their rifles, their
machine-guns, and their armour-plated car.‖124 But it was a Pyrrhic victory. In the type
of campaign developing in Ireland—in which fighters and materiel had to be used with
great economy—the Ashtown ambush was an abject failure. The Times immediately
interpreted the attack as an attempt to repeat the Fenian assassinations of 1882, which
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claimed the lives of the Chief Secretary and Under-Secretary for Ireland as they walked
in Phoenix Park.125
The attack garnered great publicity, but The Times claimed its affects might work
against the republicans. The paper‘s correspondent reported, ―Ireland‘s grief and shame
at the attack on the Lord Lieutenant are greater than its surprise,‖ adding, ―there is good
hope that the outrage may do something to break the present reign of terror in Ireland.
Hitherto the country has watched the campaign of crime in a spirit of sullen apathy…the
attempt on Lord French‘s life may induce the Bishops, and perhaps even the leaders of
the Sinn Fein Party, to denounce outrage.‖ Archbishop William Walsh of Dublin and
Cardinal Logue, head Catholic prelate in Ireland, obliged in denouncing the assassination
attempt, but The Times waited in vain for a similar announcement from Sinn Féin
leaders.126
The Ashtown ambush pushed another story from the headlines. The attempted
assassination came just three days before Prime Minister Lloyd George announced his
Irish policy. Throughout 1919, the British government had been engrossed with the
Versailles negotiations, but as that conference closed officials turned their attention to the
worsening situation across the Irish Sea.127 Lloyd George first established that his
government would not allow a ―hostile republic‖ in Ireland, and speaking as much to
Irish sympathizers in the United States as to his own audience, asserted ―any attempt at
secession will be fought with the same determination, with the same resources, with the
same resolve as the Northern States of America put into the fight against the Southern
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States.‖ The Prime Minister proceeded to propose two Home Rule parliaments for
Ireland: one for the largely Catholic and nationalist southern twenty-six counties and
another for the mostly Protestant and Unionist six northeastern counties. Lloyd George
recognized that two of the six counties (he did not mention them by name, but they were
Fermanagh and Tyrone) were majority Catholic and nationalist as well, but used this as
his basis anyway. The two parliaments would be linked via a Council of Ireland to which
they would each appoint members.128
Instead of the denunciation of violence for which The Times hoped, Sinn Féin
leaders promptly criticized the Home Rule plan. Speaking from Buffalo, New York, de
Valera anticipated the two-parliaments approach and rejected it before hearing details of
the plan. He said the Irish people had voted for a republic, ―free from the domination of
any imperial authority.‖129 The New York Times correspondent in Dublin quoted Arthur
Griffith as saying Lloyd George‘s proposals were not meant to operate in actuality, but to
―affect and mislead public opinion in America.‖ He rejected the American Civil War
analogy and framed the conflict in colonial terms, saying, ―The relations of Ireland and
England are not the relations of Illinois or California with Washington. They are
fundamentally the former relations of Finland and Poland with Russia, or Bohemia with
Austria, or Cuba with Spain.‖130
The New York paper denounced the violent campaign in no uncertain terms. An
editorial entitled ―Sinn Fein Madness‖ declared:
The first effect of the campaign of assassination, aside from alienating
well-wishers of the Irish republicans, must be the pouring of
reinforcements into the country, already strongly garrisoned, to put an
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armed guard at every crossroads and make an end of terrorism. There
could be nothing more hopeless for separatists, already confronted by
obdurate and populous Ulster, than to challenge the might of Great
Britain.131
It might have been hopeless, but republicans were determined to make the challenge
nonetheless. On December 26, armed and disguised men entered a police hut at
Lissycasey, Co. Clare. The Times claimed the building was not in use, while the New
York Times said all of the constables were on duty. The raiders removed the caretaker, a
constable‘s wife, from the building. The fact that neither publication reported that the
raiders captured arms seems to indicate that the hut was not in use, but the presence of a
caretaker—and a constable‘s wife at that—shows that if it was not currently in use, the
RIC intended to reoccupy it. With the building clear, the raiders burned it to the
ground.132 GHQ‘s policy of clearing the RIC and allowing the Dáil‘s writ to run was
under way.

Conclusion
Though conflict had been occurring for some time before 1919, the year was a
significant period of organization within republicanism, and escalation of the conflict in
which it was engaged. Throughout the year the IRA engaged in non-lethal arms seizures
such as that at Three Rocky Mountains and Collinstown Aerodrome, but these were now
combined with deadly ambushes such as that at Soloheadbeg and Illaunbaun. Police
casualties during the year amounted to seventeen killed and thirty-nine wounded. One
British soldier was killed while four were wounded.133 Throughout 1919 Republican
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GHQ extended its control over the IRA, while not micromanaging unit actions.
Headquarters continued to exhort units to action through An t‟Óglác, legitimized their
deeds through the alliance to the Dáil, and managed both the pace of the escalation and
the flow of arms into Ireland. The intelligence department established a unit in Dublin
under GHQ‘s direct authority, and commenced a policy of targeted assassination that
helped to safeguard the entire movement. Republicans were routinely excoriated in the
British and international press, but the Dáil‘s establishment of the Irish Bulletin
intensified the propaganda battle that had been waged since 1916. By the end of 1919,
GHQ‘s determination to spread and gradually escalate the war was evident in every
arena: the offensive against the RIC, intelligence, and propaganda. The next phase began
from the outset of 1920.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
DISTURBING EVERY AREA, JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 1920

On the night of January 2, 1920, Volunteers of the Irish Republican Army‘s First
Cork Brigade opened fire on Inchigeelagh, Kilmurry, and Carrigtwohill RIC barracks. In
each area, a large number of unarmed Volunteers took up axes and sledgehammers to
destroy telephone and telegraph wires, fell trees and build barricades across roads for
miles around to delay reinforcements from other posts. The attacks on Inchigeelagh and
Kilmurry barracks broke off after an amount of ammunition was expended. During the
Carrigtwohill attack, Michael Leahy ordered several Volunteers to advance under cover
from their comrades‘ fire and break holes in the barrack wall. The attackers inserted
sticks of gelignite in the openings and blew the building open. The RIC garrison of five
constables and a sergeant surrendered, and the Volunteers seized all their arms and
ammunition.1
These attacks marked the widening of the campaign against the RIC. Already
strained by ambushes and assassinations, the police were now subject to attacks against
their posts. The IRA soon joined this aggressive policy with one of extensive sabotage.
This chapter will argue that, while not directing every action, republican GHQ oversaw
the intensification of these campaigns and took measures to ensure action across Ireland.
Seeking full-time guerrilla units, GHQ seized on the idea of ―flying columns‖ developing
in a country unit, and took steps to establish them in other areas. In the same period, the
IRA intelligence department continued to eliminate spies, particularly in Dublin. The
British government, no longer distracted by the Versailles negotiations, turned its
1
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attentions to Ireland. Taking steps to reinforce the police, the government‘s missteps
opened it to republican propaganda attacks, lending credence to the Dáil‘s Irish Bulletin.
Republican propaganda became so potent that Dublin Castle responded with the Weekly
Summary, a publication that became notorious for justifying the increasing violence in
Ireland.

The RIC Under Attack
Following the Cork attacks, IRA units attacked barracks in counties Galway,
Kerry, Limerick, Longford, Tipperary, Waterford, and Wicklow in the same month.2
Though none of these attacks on occupied posts were successful, they showed that
republican forces were well-armed enough to expend precious ammunition attacking a
fortified barracks. Moreover, an initial failure could be followed by success. The
barracks at Castlehackett, Co. Galway survived a night of assault on January 9, only to be
evacuated the next day. IRA members returned and burned the deserted building to the
ground.3 In addition to these attacks, raiders destroyed another unoccupied barracks in
Clare.4
In February, the attacks spread to Co. Kilkenny, with a failed assault on Gowran
barracks.5 The Cork Volunteers successfully raided Castlemartyr barracks on February
9.6 The Westmeath Brigade was to open its campaign by attacking Ballymore barracks
on February 20. Officer Seamus O‘Meara arranged for the Athlone area Volunteers to
2
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concentrate their arms for the attack, but on the night designated the rifles failed to arrive.
Several brigade members were court-martialed and either reduced in rank or dismissed
from the Volunteers for their failures. O‘Meara explained, ―While some men were
willing to fight, they did not like the fight to be near their own houses. Not everyone was
prepared to risk his people‘s home, especially at that time.‖7 Two days later Westmeath
Volunteers successfully raided Ballynacargy barracks, seizing all the arms in the
building.8
The northern part of the country had seen little action, and GHQ sent staff captain
Ernie O‘Malley to Monaghan. He immediately decided to attack the isolated Shantonagh
barracks near Ballytrain. Eoin O‘Duffy, commander of the Monaghan Battalions (the
county was not yet organized along brigade lines), led the assault. P.J. O‘Daly,
O‘Duffy‘s second-in-command, later wrote that about 120 Volunteers mobilized for the
attack on the night of February 13; perhaps half of them were armed with rifles,
revolvers, or shotguns. The unarmed men took the same precautions against
reinforcements as those in Cork. At about 1 a.m., four Volunteers stole up to the barracks
and began to mine the gable wall with gelignite. At the same time, a dozen riflemen
opened fire on the barrack. After about two hours exchanging gunfire, the Volunteers set
off the mine, destroying the wall. The garrison surrendered, and the attackers seized six
Lee-Enfield carbines, revolvers, and grenades. O‘Daly wrote that Sergeant Lawton, in
command of the garrison of one other sergeant and four constables, was actively antirepublican at his previous post and assumed he would be executed. He asked the
Volunteers not to kill them, saying, ―We are all Catholics, like you.‖ One of the
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attacking party responded, ―How do you know what we are?‖ He added that after the
capture, RIC posts in the surrounding area were abandoned and the garrisons
concentrated in larger towns.9
The New York Times noted that the Ballytrain operation was the first barracks
captured in Ulster.10 The Times correspondent was more disturbed by a failed attack
more than a week later. In the early hours of February 23, constables in Ballynahinch
barracks in Co. Down were awakened by a faint explosion. They found that holes had
been drilled into their post, and a stick of gelignite was protruding from the wall.
Telephone and telegraph wires leading to the barracks had been cut, and roads were
blocked for miles around. The writer noted that it was ―the first time that an outrage of
this character has been attempted in North-East Ulster,‖ referring to the six-county area
designated by Lloyd George for exclusion from the Dublin parliament.11
The sporadic nature of these assaults and ambushes on patrols placed a mental
strain on the police. Constable Peter Gallagher later told an interviewer, ―you could go
out and you wouldn‘t know when you‘d be fired on…If you thought about being targets,
sure you wouldn‘t be able to live. You tried to put that to the back of your mind. Sure
there‘d be nobody in the police if they thought of it that way.‖12 Proposals to reinforce
the Irish police were several months old. At the end of October 1919, Lord Lieutenant
French appointed a committee to report on the possible reorganization of both the RIC
and the DMP.13 Nothing seems to have come of the initiative. On December 15 the
9
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DMP Chief Commissioner announced that willing citizens could be enrolled as ―special
constables‖ to patrol the capital and prevent crime, but this also did not result in positive
action.14 On December 29, The Times refuted a rumor that members of the London
police would be brought to Dublin to suppress ―general crime.‖15
The last rumor was the closest to the truth. It was not London police who were to
be brought in, however, but unemployed ex-soldiers from across the United Kingdom.
RIC recruitment opened in Britain on New Year‘s Day, 1920.16 The new enlistees
became known as ―Black and Tans,‖ because their hurried mobilization did not allow
time to issue full dark-green RIC uniforms for them. They substituted military khaki for
the missing items. Most observers, and some participants, assert that the first Black and
Tans arrived to reinforce the ―old RIC‖ on March 25.17 However, it is clear from
newspaper reports that British recruits in their strange attire began permeating the force
more than a month prior to this date. An account of a February 12 shootout in Rathdrum,
Co. Wicklow said of the Constables involved: ―Some of them, apparently military
recruits who had recently joined the force, wore khaki with the Constabulary caps and
overcoats.‖18 Two days later, Volunteers held up a Constable guarding mail in Cork city.
The Times referred to the victim as ―a newly-joined English recruit.‖19
The introduction of these non-Irish members of the Royal Irish Constabulary is
highly significant for the new arenas of propaganda they opened to both sides. For the
British administration, taking demobilized soldiers off the streets and providing them
14
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government jobs allowed officials to capitalize on their fight against unemployment and
their promises to provide for the heroes of the Great War. At the same time, they were
taking steps to stamp out lawlessness in Ireland.
For republican propagandists, the introduction of British former soldiers into the
RIC simplified their goal of vilifying the force immensely. They had taken pains from
1917 to 1919 to portray the force as composed of spies who were morally to the national
movement. In their papers and memoirs, republicans make excuses for shooting
members of the ―old RIC.‖ They allege that only deserving policemen were dealt with
that way. Members of the IRA‘s intelligence department sought specific reasons for
shooting DMP members. Tom Barry described Constable William Agar, killed in
December, as ―arrogant.‖ Sergeant Lawton of Ballytrain thought he would be executed
for anti-republican activities. By contrast, Joseph Sweeney felt a need to apologize for
wounding the un-officious Sergeant McKenna at Dungloe.
Despite long-term efforts at vilification, the republicans failed to convince all
Irish people that the police were their enemies. Todd Andrews wrote that in 1919 several
members of his Volunteer company left the movement on being told they would have to
shoot police.20 Republicans claimed that the RIC was an adjunct of foreign colonialism;
now the British government infused it with actual foreigners, set apart from regular
Constables by their strange dress and British accents.
C.J.C. Street, an information officer in Dublin Castle, wrote that the mixture of
military and police uniform gave an undeservedly negative connotation to the new
recruits from the beginning. He asserted, ―It gave the impression that the men were not
members of the R.I.C., in the sense of being regular constables as heretofore. It was
20
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thought by some that they were a quasi-military force, half soldiers half policemen, and
that they were under the control of the Military Authorities.‖ Street added that the
impression persisted even after the new constables had been issued full police uniforms.21
These negative perceptions of a militarized police force were not improved by British
officials‘ statements. Chief Secretary Hamar Greenwood began a speech to a group of
recruits in October by quoting the RIC manual: ―Your first duty will be to prevent crime,
and your second to detect the criminal.‖ However, he reminded them of their wartime
roles by saying, ―I would urge each of you to live up to the traditions of the different
units in which you have so honourably served during the late great war.‖22 The Chief
Secretary was urging them to make their former units proud, but the ethics of which he
spoke were those of imperial military service, not ordinary police duty.
In addition to opening RIC recruitment in Britain, Dublin Castle officials ushered
in the new year by replacing the head of the force. Rumors had been swirling that
Inspector-General Joseph Byrne was on his way out since he had been granted a month‘s
leave on December 10. The hammer fell on January 6. Byrne was replaced by his
deputy T.J. Smith. Byrne had been a popular and successful police chief, and The Times
correspondent wrote that the effects of his dismissal would be ―deplorable‖ and place a
―strain on the discipline and temper‖ of the rank and file.23 J. Anthony Gaughan asserts
that Byrne opposed the closure of small RIC stations that began in August 1919. He
realized that the abandonment would give the insurgents a free field of operations, and
the police would be unable to protect government sympathizers.24
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The Intelligence War
In Dublin, the intelligence war continued. Police authorities sent veteran RIC
Detective W.C. Forbes Redmond from Belfast at the beginning of the year, and appointed
him Deputy Assistant Commissioner of the DMP in charge of G-Division. He brought a
squad of plain-clothes detectives with him from Belfast, and Neligan said his objective
was to ―smash up Collins‘s activities.‖ However, the problem with bringing in outside
policemen was that they did not know Dublin. Redmond appointed James MacNamara
as his secretary and guide. This compounded his problems, as MacNamara was passing
information to Collins. When the intelligence director learned that Redmond was living
in the Standard Hotel in Harcourt Street, he got Tom Cullen a room there to study his
movements. On the morning of January 21, members of the Squad tracked the GDivision chief as he walked to Dublin Castle and shot him dead.25 The Times wrote days
later that ―The murder…is accepted as final proof of the existence in Ireland of a criminal
organization of the most desperate kind. The crime must have been planned with much
care and skill.‖26 While the republicans were now consciously pursuing guerrilla war
tactics, members of the British press were still loath to admit the scale of unrest in Ireland
or its political nature.
Despite the murder of the G-Division chief, Dublin Castle had succeeded in
placing two secret agents close to republican intelligence. The first was known as
Jameson, who ingratiated himself with Collins by posing as a representative of a British
soldiers and sailors union while the Intelligence Director was trying to foment disorder in
Crown forces by encouraging strikes. He arrived in Dublin with a letter of introduction
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from Art O‘Brien, head of the IRB in London. Shortly before his death, Redmond
boasted to several detectives that they, who knew Dublin so well, could not get close to
Michael Collins, while ―a man who had only recently arrived from England had managed
to meet him more than once.‖ The only suspect was Jameson, and Collins ordered the
intelligence staff to stay away from him.27
The other agent was Timothy Quinlisk, a former member of Roger Casement‘s
Irish Brigade, formed from Irish prisoners of war in Germany. This affiliation gave him
immediate nationalist credentials on his return to Dublin after the war, and the Irish
National Aid Association paid his bills for several months. During this time, Quinlisk
became familiar with Collins and other republican intelligence staff. In February 1920,
he decided to turn Collins over to the government and made a statement to G-Division
offering his services to the DMP in return for a reward. Eamon Broy copied the message
and passed it to Collins. Collins passed information to Quinlisk that he was in Cork, and
wanted to meet him there. On February 18, Cork Volunteers picked Quinlisk up from his
hotel to take him to the meeting. His body was found in a field north of the city the next
night with multiple bullet wounds.28 Two days later, three Dublin detectives resigned
from the force.29 The republican intelligence goal of destroying the opposing
organization—one way or another—was bearing fruit.
Late in February, Jameson cornered Collins‘s aide Joe O‘Reilly in Dublin. He
said he desperately needed to meet the intelligence director. Collins had members of the
Squad pick him up on March 2 and take him to Glasnevin, in north County Dublin, where
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they killed him. His wife came to Dublin and identified the body. His real name was
John Charles Byrne, and his wife understood he was in Dublin on holiday.30 The Times
recognized that the killings followed the same pattern, and added the ―mysterious
assassinations‖ of Quinlisk and Byrne to their list of outrages against Crown forces.31
Neligan later wrote that Byrne ―was the last agent to try the personal approach.
His employers must have found it difficult to get people for such a mission.‖32 The
detective was, however, mistaken. One more secret service agent tried to get close to
Collins and the intelligence staff, but he reported to British Army officers, and apparently
had no interaction with the DMP. This speaks to the growing distrust between the police
and military forces in Ireland at the time. Lily Mernin, a typist in Ship Street military
barracks and cousin of Piaras Béaslaí, warned Collins that Fergus Bryan Molloy was a
British spy. Mernin witnessed Molloy ask a contact to write down the names and
addresses of prominent Sinn Féiners on Dáil notepaper that had been seized in a raid on
the party‘s Harcourt Street headquarters on November 11, 1919.33 At the time,
republicans were receiving death threats on that same notepaper.34 On March 24,
members of the Squad shot Molloy at the corner of South William and Wicklow streets.
For the first time, Dublin civilians attempted to stop the killers from escaping.35 Squad
members concluded that the civilians thought they were soldiers in civilian clothes,
executing a man on the street.36
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On March 3, members of the IRA‘s Dublin Brigade held up a mail van in
Dominick Street. They seized the official Dublin Castle mail, including the
correspondence of the Lord Lieutenant and the Chief Secretary.37 Two days later, The
Times admitted the nature of Irish unrest with the headline ―Sinn Fein‘s Guerilla War.‖
Ironically, it was not the barrack attacks or assassinations that forced Britain‘s leading
journal to this conclusion, but the mail seizure. The Times Dublin correspondent called
the operation ―highly injurious to the executive‘s prestige,‖ adding that ―the capture of
the official mailbags, which may have contained matter of vital importance to the
conspirators, ought to have been impossible.‖ The writer acknowledged the importance
of intelligence in the conflict, quoting ―a great soldier‖ saying ―the business of
generalship is to find out what the other fellow is thinking.‖ He urged the government to
take ―the ordinary precautions of guerilla warfare.‖38 The mail found its way to Dublin
Castle by March 8. The republicans had marked each envelope ―Passed by Censor.‖39
The direct approach was not the only one Dublin Castle used in attempting to
undermine the republicans. On March 8, Resident Magistrate Alan Bell began a wellpublicized inquiry into sources of funds to Sinn Féin and the Dáil.40 The Irish Bulletin
asserted that Bell had been brought to Dublin Castle ―to assist in the concoction of
conspiracy charges against the Republican Leaders.‖41 The sixty-two-year-old Bell was
sitting on the tram on his way to Dublin Castle on the morning of March 26, when Mick
McDonnell and Liam Tobin of IRA Intelligence boarded and sat down next to him. ―Are
you Mr. Bell?,‖ McDonnell asked. After Bell answered in the affirmative, the two men
37
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grabbed him and hauled him off the trolley. Other Squad members, who had taken up
positions on the tram, exited at the same time. McDonnell and Tobin shot Bell dead in
the middle of the Simmonscourt-Donnybrook crossroad.42
Condemnation of the murder was universal and widespread. The Times claimed
in an editorial that Bell was killed because he ―became obnoxious to that secret force of
assassins who have sought to establish a reign of terror in Dublin and throughout the
South and West of Ireland.‖43 The New York Times correspondent wrote that ―This latest
outrage has carried public indignation to the boiling point and in many quarters it is being
urged that the Government must take the severest steps to suppress the campaign of
murder by extremists who are terrorizing the whole community.‖44 British MP William
Davison used the killing to argue for sterner measures in Ireland, stating in the House of
Commons:
The coercion in Ireland to-day is entirely on the other side; it is not from
the British Government. When a man like Mr. Bell, in the middle of the
morning, is dragged from a crowded tramcar into the street and murdered,
and not a member of the public is prepared, owing to fear of the coercion
of Sinn Fein, to stand up and protect his life, I say that this country ought
at once to put down coercion of that kind.45
Despite this torrent of indignation, Dublin Castle did not make another attempt to
investigate republican funds, and in that sense, the attack achieved its object.

Republican Murders and the Propaganda Battle
Retaliatory attacks now created a new dynamic in the escalating violence. At
about 11 p.m. on March 19, Constable Joseph Murtagh was shot dead near Pope‘s Quay,
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in Cork City.46 Two hours later, there was a knock at the door of the Lord Mayor‘s
house. One of the prominent Sinn Féiners who had received a death threat was the Lord
Mayor of Cork and Commandant of the First Cork Brigade of the IRA, Tomás
MacCurtain. James Walsh, MacCurtain‘s brother-in-law, was awakened when his sister
Eilish called, ―The police are below.‖ Walsh opened the door, later telling the press, ―I
thought it was the usual raid.‖ Two men with blackened faces, armed with revolvers,
brushed past Walsh and Eilish up the stairs. When MacCurtain appeared in the doorway,
the intruders shot and killed him.47
Another man who received a threatening letter was Michael McCarthy, a Sinn
Féin urban councilor in Thurles, Co. Tipperary. On March 27, armed men knocked on
his door and asked for ―McCarthy.‖ The councilor‘s brother James answered, and the
unidentified men shot him dead.48 The next night, Thomas O‘Dwyer of Bouladuff, in the
same county, was killed in similar fashion.49
The most sensational of these attacks was the killing of the Lord Mayor of Cork.
On March 22, South Down MP Jeremiah MacVeagh called it ―a police murder‖ in the
House of Commons.50 Two days later, The Times correspondent reported that this
strange rumor was actually gaining credence:
Public feeling is so inflamed that it has become quite irrational. Men
believe what they want to believe, and the most outrageous charges
against the Irish Government are accepted as Gospel truth by the majority
of Nationalists. As I write the coroner‘s inquiry into the Lord Mayor of
Cork‘s death has not been concluded, but only a few persons make any
pretence of suspending their judgment. Sinn Fein asks the country to
46
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accept, and apparently it does accept, the monstrous theory that Mr.
MacCurtain was killed by actual agents of the Government, or at least by
its friends.51
This quotation is worth noting for its complete incredulity toward the idea that the British
government might murder one of its citizens. The same day, the Irish Bulletin printed
evidence from the MacCurtain inquest, including statements by Cork civilians that armed
men—some wearing uniforms with civilian overcoats and caps—left the area of the Lord
Mayor‘s house after the killing and entered King Street RIC barracks.52
On March 30, The Times reported that it had new information on MacCurtain‘s
killing. The night before his murder, the Lord Mayor attended a meeting of the Irish
Republican Brotherhood, where several members were expelled for ―infidelity to the
cause.‖ One of those expelled was allegedly shot soon afterward.53 The next day, the
London paper reiterated that ―the Government have information that the Lord Mayor of
Cork was the victim of Republican vengeance.‖ The correspondent noted indignantly
that ―a deliberate attempt is being made to fasten this and other murders on the police.‖
The writer added that information to be brought out at the inquest would provide a
complete answer to these charges.54 On April 1, Professor Stockley, the man allegedly
shot following an IRB meeting on March 17, denied all knowledge of the society. 55
Arthur Griffith denied press allegations that MacCurtain was murdered by a ―Sinn Fein
Black Hand,‖ accusing publications printing such an ―infamous falsehood‖ of breaking
―journalistic law.‖ The Irish Bulletin insisted that ―the murderers of Ald. MacCurtain are
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policemen.‖56 On the other hand, Lord French gave an interview to the Daily Mail in
which he stated emphatically that MacCurtain was murdered by ―the Sinn Feiners
themselves.‖57
The far less-publicized inquest verdict on James MacCarthy was given on April
13. The jury found that he had been murdered by ―persons unknown, wearing long black
overcoats and caps similar to those worn by policemen.‖58 The inquest result for Thomas
Dwyer stated that his killers were members of the Royal Irish Constabulary.59 This
verdict does not seem to have made the pages of The Times. The MacCurtain verdict,
finally promulgated on April 19, surpassed both of these. The jury found that ―the
murder was organised and carried out by the R.I.C. officially directed by the British
government.‖ The verdict personally indicted District Inspector Oswald Swanzy,
Divisional Commissioner Clayton, the RIC‘s Acting Inspector General T.J. Smith, former
Chief Secretary Ian MacPherson, Lord Lieutenant French, and Prime Minister Lloyd
George.60
The Times correspondent took notice of the verdict‘s wide-ranging nature, stating
―It had been assumed that the coroner‘s jury at Cork would find a verdict of wilful
murder against the police, but the flourish which involves the Prime Minister, the Lord
Lieutenant, and the late Chief Secretary was not expected.‖ The writer warned his
readers, ―It is not to be taken seriously, for the southern mind is prone to melodramatic
gestures of this character.‖61 Expected, melodramatic, ineffective; the verdict might have
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been all of these things, but it was still an embarrassment for the British government. In
the House of Commons, Liberal MP Joseph Kenworthy asked if the government had
information that MacCurtain was murdered by ―a secret society,‖ why it was not brought
forward during the inquest. The question went unanswered.62 The New York Times
quoted the MacCurtain family attorney as saying, ―The eyes of the civilized world were
upon the trial and its result.‖ Though an inquest verdict was not equivalent to criminal
charges, the paper added that the police mentioned might expect to be arrested.63 No
arrests took place. Historians agree that members of the RIC likely killed MacCurtain,
but analysis focuses on the propagandistic nature of the verdict and its use to discredit the
police and government.64

The Easter Burnings
In the midst of the furor over the Dublin, Cork, and Tipperary assassinations, the
guerrilla war continued. Despite The Times awakening to the guerrilla war situation, as
Easter approached, officials worried about a mass uprising in imitation of 1916. In the
House of Commons on March 22, Clement Edwards asked the Prime Minister if the
government had information of a ―rising‖ scheduled for April 5—Easter Monday.
Clearly the British IRA had made an impression, as Edwards suggested that action would
take place not only in Ireland but Glasgow, Liverpool, and Manchester, supported by a
German arms landing. Lloyd George refused to answer the question.65
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On April 3, strong military pickets placed barricades across the roads leading into
Dublin and searched every vehicle and individual entering the city. The New York Times
correspondent reported that for the past week the military had been moving ammunition
into the city, guarded by armored cars. Similar precautions were taken in other towns,
including Londonderry, Limerick, Newry, and Tipperary, and soldiers manning a
barricade told the correspondent they were likely to continue for several days.66 While a
―well-informed citizen‖ assured the New York Times writer that nothing untoward would
happen in Dublin, The Times‘ correspondent cautioned, ―it is possible that the week will
not pass without some disturbance in the South or West.‖67 Even as that statement was
being committed to paper, the ―disturbance‖ was likely already beginning.
At 9 p.m., four Dublin tax offices were simultaneously set on fire. The Times
correspondent conveyed reports of similar incidents in Kilkenny, Dundalk, and Cork.
The Newry custom house was partially burned, and at least twenty unoccupied barracks
around the country were destroyed. Another reporter stated that all of the tax offices in
Belfast had been attacked, and the city‘s venerable custom house had been damaged by
fire.68 Even these initial reports do not convey the full extent of the damage. The
number of empty police barracks destroyed grew daily as press reports came in from
around the country.
Confusion abounded as to why the attacks took place, and how many rebels had
been involved. The Times editorialized that they had been ―stage-managed‖ to press for
wider powers in the Home Rule Bill. The view from London could not frame the conflict
outside of parliamentary politics or recognize that there was a military purpose in
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destroying the abandoned posts. Observers on the ground in Dublin were far more
impressed by the synchronized actions. By April 5, the London paper‘s correspondent
was aware of 140 barracks destroyed, and repeated the Irish Times assertion that the
country was in a ―state of war.‖69 The final count for that night was 218 barracks
destroyed and 17 tax offices raided throughout Ireland, but most observers exaggerated
the numbers upward.70
IRA Headquarters had issued orders for the simultaneous and systematic attacks,
due to rumors that the empty barracks might be reoccupied by the military.71 The next
issue of An t‟Óglác—which claimed 250 ―enemy strongholds‖ were destroyed—said that
the success meant that even bigger operations could be carried out.72 The AttorneyGeneral for Ireland Denis Henry contemplated that if 250 barracks had been destroyed,
and at least 100 men were involved in each, the rebels might have had 25,000 men under
arms that night. This did not fit with the government‘s insistence that the crimes in
Ireland were being committed by small, unsupported murder gangs. T.P. O‘Connor
mused ―one might almost call it war.‖73 Robert Cecil insisted the situation was not war;
the rebels did not deserve to be treated as though they were at war with the British
Empire. The word he chose was ―anarchy.‖ Nevertheless, he was forced to admit that
―we are drifting through anarchy and humiliation towards an Irish republic.‖74
The destruction of so many barracks across the country cleared the RIC from
large areas of rural Ireland. As everyday structures of government, particularly police
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and court services, retreated into the larger towns, republican organizations stepped in to
fill the void. The IRA established unarmed ―police‖ units in many areas. Though these
particularly served areas from which the RIC had been expelled, in some places both the
Constabulary and their republican rivals existed side by side. Policing activity proved so
popular with Volunteers that in August An t‟Óglác had to remind its readers that a war
was on, and ―the primary duty and raison d‟être of the Volunteers is to fight the
enemy.‖75 Another initiative was the establishment of the Dáil or ―Sinn Féin‖ courts. Set
up to prosecute criminals and arbitrate land disputes, some tenants, landless laborers, and
small farmers hoped these republican courts would invariably work to break up large
estates and redistribute land.76 While significant redistribution took place, the brand of
justice Dáil judges sought to implement was far less revolutionary, and they prided
themselves on dealing evenhandedly with landlords, tenants, and small farmers.77
During the uproar over the Easter burnings, a new commander in chief of British
forces arrived in Ireland. Nevil Macready was chosen to replace Frederick Shaw due to
his dual police and military experience, and the resulting belief that this would enable
him to coordinate the varied forces in Ireland.78 Macready later wrote that he did not
want the job, because he realized his work ―would be affected by every variation of the
political weathercock.‖ Before leaving London, he attempted to learn all he could about
Sinn Féin, including reading Arthur Griffith‘s The Resurrection of Hungary. Macready
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proclaimed it a precise blueprint for Sinn Féin activities, but that this inherently peaceful
political movement had been hijacked by armed extremists.79
Upon arriving in Ireland on April 13 he found the destruction of the DMP‘s GDivision ―accomplished‖ and the RIC in a state of ―disintegration.‖80 He admitted that
the ex-soldiers ―diluting‖ the RIC did little to fight the insurrection.81 These observations
led to the conclusion that the Irish police were of little use as fighting forces, and
Macready‘s opinions contributed to the growing alienation between them and the
military. The general also recognized the need for positive relations with the press. He
wrote, ―A factor which increased the exasperation of the troops was the total absence of
counter propaganda on the part of the Government in reply to the very efficient
circulation of systematic falsehood spread broadcast by Sinn Fein and their friends in
England and America.‖82 Sixteen days after arriving in Dublin, Macready called a press
conference. He informed the assembled journalists that when incidents took place
involving British troops, his command staff would provide them with prompt
information. Macready also assured them these regular reports would not be used to
influence the press or provide propaganda.83
Following the coordinated assaults of Easter 1920, the conflict settled into a
pattern of localized action. Arson became one of the main weapons in the insurgent
arsenal. Flammable materials were easier to obtain than firearms, and burning a building
provided an opportunity to involve a large number of Volunteers in a local action. These
operations were not without risks. One republican was wounded and four captured while
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burning Belmullet coastguard station in Co. Mayo in August.84 The following month, the
RIC evacuated Ballinlough barracks in Co. Roscommon. Hours after the police left, a
number of republicans set fire to the barracks. As they were watching the building burn,
a military patrol approached and shot three of them dead.85
Attacks on occupied posts resumed as well. The Limerick Volunteers pioneered a
new technique during an attack on Ballylanders barrack on April 27. Instead of blowing
in a wall, the Volunteers entered an adjoining building, broke a hole in the roof, and
dropped in a grenade, followed by paraffin and a lighted torch. As flames spread over the
top floor of the barracks, the five-man garrison surrendered.86 The brigade used the same
technique in attacking Kilmallock barracks one month later. However, with the main
structure engulfed in flames, the garrison retreated to an outbuilding and refused to
surrender. As ammunition and bombs began to explode in the barracks, the Volunteers‘
leader Tomás Ó Maoileóin, operating under the name Sean Forde, decided to break off
the attack. The barracks was almost completely destroyed and had to be evacuated the
next day. Volunteer Liam Scully was killed during the operation.87
Though a strategic victory for the republicans, the police heads attempted to use
the tenacious defense at Kilmallock as propaganda material. Constable John M. Regan
said the police were slow to recognize the value of good publicity. He invoked a maxim
from Aeschylus in writing, ―We did not appreciate the fact that the first casualty in war is
truth and that propaganda was regarded as a legitimate weapon of the most powerful
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kind.‖88 The RIC‘s reputation had been damaged by implication in multiple murders of
republicans, and Kilmallock offered a chance to rebuild it.
Constable Jeremiah Mee said the official version of the engagement ran as
follows: ―the report of the attack on Kilmallock barracks indicated that the R.I.C.
defenders offered to surrender on conditions that their lives be spared and that this
request was denied by the attackers.‖89 This account differs from republican
remembrances in one key respect. Tomás Ó Maoileóin and Michael Quirke state that the
Volunteer commander called on the garrison to surrender several times, and they
refused.90 Contemporary press reports confirm the republican version of events. The
New York Times quoted local sources asserting, ―The garrison was called upon to
surrender and upon refusing the barracks were attacked from the front and back with rifle
fire and bombs.‖91 Nonetheless, Mee says that the official version ―was emphasized
again and again by the police authorities and had the desired effect – that of furthering the
alienation of the vast majority of the R.I.C. from Sinn Féin.‖ In addition to increasing
hostility between the republicans and the police, Mee says that the incident was used to
boost morale. He wrote, ―The defence of Kilmallock was also held up to the R.I.C. as an
example of bravery and dedication to duty which they were encouraged to follow.‖92
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Flying Columns
Another development in the aftermath of Kilmallock had enormous implications
for the IRA‘s intensification of the conflict. In this operation, as well as those that
preceded it, Volunteers assembled at a point of attack or ambush, received weapons from
the battalion or brigade arms dump, and carried out a plan conceived by their officers.
The Volunteers would then go back to their homes, or men ―on the run‖ would find a safe
house. There was a growing feeling among IRA members that they needed a standing
force to carry out a sustained series of attacks. The May 15 issue of An t‟Óglác urged
Volunteers to ―Speed Up the Work,‖ calling for ―intensive, persistent, and widespread
guerilla warfare.‖93
Following Kilmallock, Donal O‘Hannigan and P. Clancy of the East Limerick
Brigade traveled from Liam Scully‘s funeral in Tournafulla to Sixmilebridge, Co. Clare,
where an attack was planned. When the operation was canceled, they returned to East
Limerick. O‘Hannigan later wrote, ―Fully armed we had traveled over 30 miles crosscountry in daylight without any great difficulty.‖ Deprived of Clancy, who was arrested,
O‘Hannigan gathered a unit of twelve Volunteers from the East Limerick Brigade as the
IRA‘s first standing ―active service unit.‖ O‘Hannigan said of the force, ―What we had
in mind was an efficient, disciplined, compact and swift-moving body of men which
would strike at the enemy where and when a suitable opportunity arose.‖94 The unit
carried out its first operation on July 9, disarming four constables at Ballinahinch. Its
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first active engagement occurred four days later, when the Volunteers ambushed a
military patrol at Emly.95
The idea for flying columns has been attributed to several individuals. The
discrepancy is important relative to how GHQ interacted with units around the country.
Dan Breen credited his Tipperary comrade Sean Treacy with the idea. He writes, ―We
wanted full-time soldiers who were prepared to fight by night or by day, ready for any
adventure. They would constitute a mobile force capable of striking at a given moment
in one district and on the next day springing a surprise thirty miles away.‖96 The
similarity between this and O‘Hannigan‘s statement reveal analogous strains of thought
occurring at roughly the same time in different parts of Ireland. Various contemporaries,
including Dublin Volunteer Joe Good and General Macready, assert that Michael Collins
invented the units.97 This reflects a tendency to attribute every republican initiative to the
energetic Collins. Piaras Béaslaí made two statements regarding Dick McKee‘s
involvement with the flying columns. Initially, Béaslaí writes that the units were formed
―largely due to his initiative.‖98 Later, he refers to ―McKee‘s plan of ‗flying columns‘ in
each brigade area.‖99
The second statement is likely closer to actual developments. McKee spent his
time in Dublin, and like Breen, Collins, and Treacy, could not have been responsible for
the formation of units elsewhere in the country. They each might have had theories about
full-time mobile republican units, but O‘Hannigan‘s evidence and the chronology of the
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conflict establish that the first functioning column began operating in East Limerick. All
of the Dublin officers listed likely encouraged GHQ staff to adopt flying columns as a
policy. The tactical innovation took place in the field, but Headquarters adopted the idea
and sought to facilitate its spread to other areas.
In addition to providing a standing body of troops, the columns helped to alleviate
the arms situation. Brigades and later battalions forming a column pooled their weapons
on the understanding that they would be more effective in the hands of a compact striking
force than scattered in dumps across the countryside. Even so, the East Limerick column
began with five Lee-Enfield service rifles, one old Winchester, seventy rifle rounds, three
shotguns, three revolvers, and a few cartridges for each. This was hardly a formidable
arsenal.100 It is no surprise that their first action was to seize arms from a police patrol.
Local Volunteers were often called up to provide support for an ambush or attack in a
given area. They would normally make use of shotguns or revolvers, while the column
men used rifles. In August IRA Headquarters ―recommended‖ that all brigades form
flying columns, and in September issued orders to each unit to do so.101 GHQ organized
camps all over the country to facilitate the growth of the new units.102
It is not surprising that several IRA officers conceived ideas of flying columns at
approximately the same time. Republican journals show an obsession with highly mobile
British forces as early as 1919. On August 2 of that year, one of the earliest issues of the
Irish Bulletin reported that ―flying columns of English forces‖ were scouring the
Limerick countryside for republican suspects.103 Following the April 1920 burnings, The
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Times asserted that General Macready was establishing ―a system of garrison posts and
flying columns‖ as part of reforming the deployment of British forces in Ireland.104 The
June 1 issue of An t‟Óglác highlighted the dangers of this formation to republican units,
as they might give the military the capacity to counterattack during barrack sieges.105
There is no evidence that military and police deviated from their usual system of patrols
until 1921, but fear of this type of mobile unit likely prompted republican officers to
press for similar measures in their own organization.106
While these preparations for larger-scale actions were in progress, members of the
Second Cork Brigade pulled off the IRA‘s greatest publicity stunt yet. On June 26, 1920,
Brigadier-General C.H.T. Lucas and two aides were on a fishing trip near Fermoy. A
squad of the IRA‘s Second Cork Brigade seized the trio as they returned from the River
Blackwater to their cabin. Colonel Danford was shot during a subsequent escape attempt,
and Colonel Tyrell was left behind with his dying comrade.107 The Irish Bulletin did not
admit that the IRA had the general in custody, but published news of his capture. The
issue also reported another attack on Fermoy, where British soldiers again wrecked shops
in the town upon learning of Lucas‘s misfortune. Other disturbances took place in
Lismore, and bombs were thrown at the houses of prominent republicans in Limerick and
Newcastlewest.108 The Times carried the story under the headline ―A Sinn Fein Coup,‖
and by June 30 was citing the Irish Bulletin as its source for updates on his condition. It
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is worth noting that the London paper made no mention of the reprisals carried out in the
wake of the abduction.109
The kidnapping turned into little more than a publicity stunt because, having
succeeded in capturing the general, the republicans were not sure what to do with him.
There was a vague idea of holding him as ransom for the release of Volunteer Michael
Fitzgerald, who was on hunger-strike in Mountjoy, but nothing came of it.110 The Second
Cork Volunteers had disregarded one of Clausewitz‘s central tenets: military action
without a clear political objective is useless.111 The republicans transferred General
Lucas from North Cork to West Limerick, where the Volunteers also found him a
nuisance. Guarding the high-profile prisoner occupied fighters who could be engaged in
other work, and the necessity of feeding him imposed on local families already providing
for the Volunteers on the run.
The West Limerick officers shifted Lucas to East Clare. Commandant Michael
Brennan complained, ―His presence completely immobilised us as we daren‘t do
anything which would involve raiding by the British.‖ GHQ was embarrassed by the
unprofitable hostage, and a visitor from Dublin asked Brennan, ―Why the hell doesn‘t he
escape?‖ Two nights in a row the Clare Volunteers neglected to place a guard outside
Lucas‘s window, and on July 29 the general finally made his getaway. A military patrol
picked Lucas up from the roadside. Ironically, the convoy ran into an ambush at Oola,
Co. Tipperary, while taking the general to safety.112 The patrol arrived safely, and the
press interpreted the unrelated ambush as an attempt to re-capture Lucas. The headlines
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in The Times rang out the next day, ―General Lucas Escapes, Roadside Fight and
Rescue.‖113

The Auxiliaries, the Weekly Summary, and Reprisals
Between June and July, the situation was so bad from the British point of view
that at least one high-ranking military figure saw a danger of British forces being forced
off the island altogether. Henry Wilson, a Co. Longford native and chief of the imperial
general staff, was an upper-level officer with deep connections to the prewar opposition
to Home Rule. In 1914, as an officer at Imperial Headquarters in London, he had
encouraged the ―Curragh mutiny‖ during which British officers in Ireland decided to
resign rather than move against the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF).114 Wilson‘s support
for drastic measures against republicans may have been prompted by an acceptance of the
precarious position of the British presence in Ireland. As a Unionist from outside the sixcounty area in which they formed a majority, Wilson understood that Irish Unionists were
vastly outnumbered and no military campaign could hope to win overwhelming popular
support. While most observers believed that republican victory against the British was
impossible, Wilson‘s writings reveal a genuine fear that Crown forces could be expelled
from Ireland.
Wilson‘s letters show that his major concern was not casualties in large actions,
but rather the cumulative effect on morale of soldiers engaging in policing operations.
He wrote to Secretary of State for War Winston Churchill, ―I have absolutely no faith in
the present regime as a semi-military semi-police operation, and I think that before long
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we will find that the troops do not like the work.‖ Mentioning the disarming of seven
soldiers in Ennis and rebel sniping in Londonderry, he wrote to Churchill the next day:
―These are very deplorable incidents and are very bad for the troops. They will continue
until the Government realize that they are at war with Sinn Fein and say so and act on the
fact.‖ Churchill responded that it was not as simple as ―declaring war,‖ and asked the
general to draw up a series of specific regulations he wished to see in place. Wilson did
not do so.115
Wilson wrote in his diary on June 28 that he ―really believed we shall be kicked
out‖ of Ireland.116 Meeting with Churchill on July 11, the general said, ―the present
policy was suicidal, and it would lead to our being put out of Ireland, that we must take
strong measures or retire.‖ He saw the Irish conflict as the possible beginning of a
cascade of reverses for Britain and acknowledged the importance of winning greater
support among the British public. Wilson told Churchill ―that if we retired we lost our
Empire, that before we take strong measures we must convince England that they are
necessary.‖117 While politicians including Lloyd George and Hamar Greenwood insisted
that supporters of the insurrection constituted a minority among nationalists, Wilson had
already given up on winning Irish hearts and minds. He only wanted British support for
strong measures against them.
Instead of handing the situation over to the military, the British government
continued to reinforce the RIC with former soldiers. On July 10, 1920, the order to form
the Auxiliary Division Royal Irish Constabulary was issued. This force originated in a
Cabinet suggestion in May to form a special ―gendarmerie‖ to supplement the RIC. The
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result was what government touted as a corps d‘élite. By July 23, General Tudor told the
Cabinet he had 500 recruits, all of them former Army officers. Though designated
―temporary cadets,‖ they had the rank of sergeant within the RIC, and were paid £1 per
day. Unlike the Black and Tans, the ―Auxies‖ as they were quickly nicknamed, did not
integrate into the regular RIC but formed their own 100-man companies.118 They also
had distinctive khaki and black uniforms topped with a tam-o-shanter bonnet. The new
force was heavily armed, as each cadet carried a Lee-Enfield carbine, bayonet, grenades,
and a revolver worn low on the hip in what Lord French dubbed ―the American style.‖
Each company included a machine-gun section.119
C.J.C. Street described the Auxiliaries as ―a striking force,‖ only to be deployed
in ―disturbed areas.‖120 Like other constables they took the police oath, but as with all the
other forces in Ireland their duties incorporated military features. Addressing a newly
raised company in October, Lord French immediately reminded them of their military
service, told them their task was ―putting down rebellion,‖ and added, ―to strengthen such
a magnificent force as the Royal Irish Constabulary is a task worthy of soldiers who have
proved their prowess and mettle on many a blood-stained field of battle.‖121 The force
almost immediately became confused with the Black and Tans in the press, among
republicans, and with politicians.122 The Auxiliaries were placed under the command of
Frank Percy Crozier, another officer with ties to the Ulster Volunteer Force.123 By
October 1920 nine companies of the Auxiliary Division were dispersed in what the
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commander called ―the hot spots‖: Clare, Cork, Dublin, Galway, Kerry, Kilkenny,
Limerick, Mayo, and Meath.124
On the propaganda front, the British government launched its response to the Irish
Bulletin. Dublin Castle‘s Weekly Summary, a four-sheet newsletter, debuted on August
13, 1920. In form and substance it greatly resembled the Irish Bulletin. It quoted
excerpts from daily publications, captured republican documents, and British leaders‘
speeches, as well as published its own editorials. Hamar Greenwood described the
circumstances that gave rise to the Weekly Summary in the House of Commons, saying,
―When I undertook the office of Secretary for Ireland, the police, especially those living
in remote parts, were almost marooned in their barracks, and this we thought was the
proper way of connecting them with the central organisation in Dublin and keeping them
in touch with events in Ireland.‖125 As far as the editing and production of the paper were
concerned, Greenwood said, ―This publication is produced by the heads of the police for
the benefit of the members of that force who, if no such periodical existed, would have no
means of knowing the truth regarding current events in Ireland.‖126
The Weekly Summary attacked the IRA as a ―murder gang‖—echoing statements
by British politicians—and derided the Dáil‘s propaganda efforts as part of the ―screen of
terrorism‖ put up around the republican movement. While gunmen terrorized ordinary,
law-abiding Irish people into accepting their illusory ―republic,‖ republican propaganda
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subverted the truth about the violence.127 Columns in the Weekly Summary always
insisted that the rebels were on the verge of defeat.128
Unlike the Irish Bulletin in its early days, the Dublin Castle publication did not
ignore the uglier actions of its adherents. In a period when British generals and the
public were debating the necessity or morality of uniformed police or soldiers destroying
citizens‘ property, it stated flatly that Crown forces were responsible for reprisals carried
out after republican attacks. Yet, it was so vigorous in its insistence that murders of
policemen or soldiers caused a reaction against people and property where IRA attacks
occurred that it appeared such retaliation was natural rather than deliberate.129 British
leaders were united in both their condemnation of reprisals and their inability or
unwillingness to do anything about them. Hamar Greenwood assured the press that
reprisals were not government policy and that steps had been taken to prevent them.130
Macready was much more tolerant of such breaches of discipline, saying in an interview,
―the machinery of the law having been broken down they [the police] feel there is no
certain means of redress or punishment, and it is only human that they should act on their
own initiative.‖131
The Weekly Summary regularly reported statements of the ―Anti-Sinn Fein
Society,‖ supposedly a civilian group undertaking vigilante actions against violent
republicans in the south of Ireland. Historian John Borgonovo persuasively argues that
this title was a façade behind which off-duty police carried out reprisals against
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republican suspects.132 In the House of Commons, British MP Joseph Kenworthy quoted
a resolution supposedly emanating from the Lismore branch of this society to the effect
that ―if any attempt was made to kill any servants of the Crown a Sinn Feiner would be
killed, or else if one was not available two sympathisers would be killed.‖ Kenworthy
was not taken in, saying, ―I do not know what that society is. I am informed that it is a
spectre, and that there is no such society or branch at all.‖ He went on to point out the
danger of publicizing such a declaration: ―That resolution published in the ‗Weekly
Summary‘ was sent to every barracks in Ireland, and these young recruits would read it—
these young men living in this super-heated atmosphere. Hon. Members may laugh, but I
call that incitement to murder.‖133
According to Henry Wilson, Prime Minister David Lloyd George was aware and
approved of the murders of republicans. At the same time, he disavowed any official
involvement:
He [Lloyd George] reverted to his amazing theory that someone was
murdering 2 Sinn Feiners to every loyalist the Sinn Feiners murdered. I
told him that, of course, this was absolutely not so, but he seemed to be
satisfied that a counter-murder association was the best answer to Sinn
Fein murders. A crude idea of statesmanship, and he will have a rude
awakening.134
For his part, Wilson preferred flooding Ireland with regular troops and strangling the
rebellion. The situation was too complicated to be dealt with either by official repression
or unacknowledged reprisals, and it was left to the Weekly Summary to describe what no
other part of the state would yet admit.
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The debate on reprisals soon took a turn. On September 20, Head Constable Peter
Burke, an instructor at Gormanstown police depot, met his brother and RIC Sergeant
Michael in a pub in Balbriggan, Co. Dublin. The two were shot by a republican police
patrol, Peter fatally. The Irish Bulletin asserted that the RIC officers had refused to pay
their bill and drawn revolvers on the republican police when they appeared. These
accusations were repeated in the House of Commons.135 Two hours later, a party of
Auxiliaries arrived from Gormanstown depot. For five hours, they ran riot in the town.
One of their first acts was to burn down the hosiery factory, the principal employer in the
area. Houses were cleared of inhabitants and burned to the ground. The invaders took
John Gibbon out of his house into the street, where they shot and bayoneted him. They
also seized James Lawless and took him to the local police barracks, where he was
killed.136
The Times reported every detail of the incident, as well as reports of reprisals in
Carrick-on-Shannon, Frenchpark, Macroom, Tralee, and Tuam.137 A September 23
editorial stated, ―We made allowances for exaggeration on the part of those who are
seeking to blacken the reputation of British rule; but we found a residuum of truth which
seemed to support the charge that the forces of the Crown are no longer acting in
accordance with the standards of civilized government.‖138 For the paper that had so
vigorously defended the RIC from accusations of involvement in the MacCurtain murder
six months previously, this was a significant admission. It went on to say that its writers
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did not believe that British leaders had sanctioned ―a war of indiscriminate retaliation
upon the Irish people for the offences of Irish extremists,‖ but that ―the new Irish police
have, with some encouragement, arrogated themselves a free hand in inflicting
indiscriminate and illegal punishments.‖139
Hamar Greenwood stated in the House of Commons that the Balbriggan episode
was regrettable, but proposed no punishments for those involved. He believed instead
that ―the best and the surest way to stop reprisals is to stop the murder of policemen,‖ a
sentiment expressed almost word-for-word twelve days earlier in the Weekly Summary.140
Dublin Castle official Mark Sturgis wrote in his diary that if the Auxiliaries had simply
―confined themselves to the dignified shooting of the two prominent Sinns, notorious bad
men, the reprisals would have been not so bad,‖ adding, ―worse things can happen than
the firing up of a sink like Balbriggan.‖141 At the same time that individuals at various
levels of the British administration were permitting both reprisals and the killings of
alleged Sinn Féiners, the press was beginning to admit these things were taking place and
to criticize the government for allowing them. While the Irish Bulletin—which had
alleged these acts throughout the conflict—gained greater credibility among the
mainstream press, the Weekly Summary‘s defense of reprisals made it increasingly
infamous.
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Conclusion
The opening months of 1920 saw the IRA launch an all-out assault on the RIC.
Barrack assaults and a widespread arson campaign coordinated by GHQ eliminated the
force from much of Ireland, enabling republican government over much of the cleared
area. The Irish Bulletin established itself as a credible news source by vigorously arguing
that the RIC were murdering republicans, as well as reporting incidents such as the
kidnapping of General Lucas. Many IRA units established flying columns to intensify
the guerrilla struggle, and GHQ constantly encouraged more widespread action.
Witnessing this radical diminution of its authority, Dublin Castle and the British
government took steps to reinforce the RIC with British recruits. They also established
the Weekly Summary to counter republican propaganda. Both of these initiatives
backfired as the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries proved unsuited to police work and
began to deliver heavy-handed reprisals in the wake of republican attacks, while the
Weekly Summary began to function merely to excuse their excesses. By September,
brutal patterns were emerging in the variegated and chaotic conflict: assassination and
counter-assassination, sabotage and counter-sabotage, ambush and reprisal. With these
dynamics set, the war was to enter its fiercest phase.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
NEW HEIGHTS OF VIOLENCE, OCTOBER 1920-JULY 1921

This chapter will show that republican GHQ initiatives sparked a dramatic rise of
violence in the final three months of 1920. The IRA‘s leadership mandated widespread
action in the wake of high-profile republican deaths, and many country units responded
with vigor. The intelligence war culminated in a large, coordinated operation in
November, planned by the IRA‘s intelligence department and approved by GHQ staff.
Having mandated that all units establish flying columns, these units increased the number
and scale of attacks. Though scoring many successes, some of these units operated
almost autonomously of any higher authority, causing potential disruptions in the brigade
hierarchy. Operations involving large numbers of Volunteers threw inexperienced
fighters into an increasing intense guerrilla war, causing a string of republican casualties
early in 1921. Nevertheless GHQ continued to encourage more attacks, particularly
outside the southwest region, where units had responded most vigorously to the call to
form flying columns.
IRA leaders also instituted a new organizational scheme in 1921, designed to
increase communication between GHQ and units around the country. Some brigade
leaders resented what they saw as a growing bureaucracy within the IRA. Throughout
this period, the press increasingly singled out republican leaders. The names of GHQ
staff appeared in the press for the first time, indicating that British military intelligence
was making inroads into the organization and angering republicans who felt individuals
were using the movement for self-aggrandizement. The sudden cessation of hostilities
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during the truce of July 1921 caught the rank-and-file of both sides by surprise. The IRA
and British forces both felt they were making headway against their opponents and
excoriated the politicians who had deprived them of victory. On the republican side, this
added to tensions caused by the IRA‘s convoluted hierarchy and individual hostilities.
This chapter will argue that while GHQ succeeded in maintaining a guerrilla force in the
field despite enormous government pressure, structural issues within the IRA
organization added to the tensions that burst forth in the political debates over the AngloIrish Treaty that ended the war in December 1921.

Republican Vengeance: MacSwiney, Kevin Barry, Bloody Sunday
October ended badly for the British government in Ireland. In the north, Belfast
and Londonderry were consumed by rioting, while republicans attacked a barracks in
Fermanagh. Republican flying columns were becoming active around the country. In the
west, the IRA launched multiple attacks in Galway, Roscommon, and Sligo.1
Republicans carried out ambushes and barrack attacks in Clare.2 Insurgents attacked
military and police in Kilkenny, King‘s County, and Westmeath. Columns from the Cork
Brigades carried out multiple attacks, including a successful ambush of the Essex
Regiment at Toureen.3 The First Tipperary Brigade column ambushed a military patrol at
Thomastown on October 28.4 Police or military reprisals followed most of these attacks.
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None of this violent activity was as damaging for the British government as the
solitary death of Terence MacSwiney. Elected Lord Mayor of Cork after the late Tomás
MacCurtain, MacSwiney was arrested during an RIC raid on City Hall on August 12. He
immediately went on hunger strike, refused to recognize the court that tried him for
possession of IRA documents, and imprisoned in Brixton jail. The press carried regular
reports of MacSwiney‘s condition during the seventy-four-day ordeal, particularly in the
last weeks before he died.5 Terence MacSwiney‘s funeral turned into an enormous public
demonstration. The British government was already embarrassed by the fatal hunger
strike. Hundreds of prewar suffragettes had adopted the same tactic, but this was the first
to result in death. Now a guard of ―Irish Republican Volunteers,‖ some in uniform,
marched through the streets of London at the head of MacSwiney‘s funeral procession.
They were followed by hundreds of mourners and surrounded by a silent, bareheaded
crowd of London-Irish and sympathetic Britons. A few cheers even greeted what The
Times called ―the Sinn Fein flag.‖6 The coffin was inscribed ―Murdered by the Foreigner
in Brixton Prison.‖7
Things did not improve as the days rolled into November. A military court had
passed the death sentence on eighteen-year-old Volunteer Kevin Barry, captured taking
part in an ambush in Dublin on September 20. The agitation for a reprieve was intense.
Barry signed a statement alleging he was beaten in prison to give evidence against other
republicans.8 Arthur Griffith sent a ―Message to the Civilised Nations‖ through the press,
emphasizing Barry‘s youth and the fact that British forces captured by the IRA had not
5
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been subject to execution.9 The affair had military implications as well. An t‟Óglác
stated the hope that his execution would provide ―a fresh inspiration and a fresh incentive
to relentless warfare against the enemy murderers,‖ and GHQ issued orders to all units to
launch attacks in the wake of Barry‘s execution.10
The hanging took place on November 1, by which time a wave of attacks had
already begun. Between October 30 and November 1, police or military were assaulted
in counties Donegal, Kerry, Kilkenny, King‘s, Longford, Roscommon, Sligo, Tipperary,
and Tyrone.11 The most activity took place in Co. Kerry. Two RIC officers were
kidnapped in Tralee—the county seat—on November 1. The next day a notice appeared
warning of ―reprisals of a nature yet not heard of‖ if they were not returned.12 Police
returned to the town each day for the next week, keeping all the shops closed, killing
Thomas Wall, and wounding Simon O‘Connor, both former British soldiers. The
military patrolled the streets by day, but each night the police returned and burned
businesses in the town. Market days were forbidden and food became scarce.13 In the
House of Commons, T.P. O‘Connor read an article from the Daily Mail describing it as
―like a town with the plague,‖ while The Times headline read ―Terror in Tralee.‖14
At approximately the same time, reprisals were taking place in Granard, Co.
Longford. The IRA assassinated District Inspector Philip Kelleher there on October 31,
and on the night of November 3 uniformed men entered the town and burned down a
number of buildings. The same night, a convoy of military and police was ambushed in
9
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the nearby town of Ballinalee and forced to retreat.15 The Times correspondent visited
both towns the following day, and described Granard as a scene ―that can scarcely be
imagined in a town which is not in the throes of actual war.‖ Most of the businesses and
the market hall were ―smoking ruin.‖ Despite official denials, the writer concluded that
―No reasonable man…could come to any other conclusion than that this terrible
punishment had been inflicted on the town by the R.I.C.‖ Visiting Ballinalee, local
people told the correspondent that both soldiers and Black and Tans had tried to enter the
town the previous night, but ―Forces of the Republic‖ had carried out a successful
defense.16
Despite the wave of attacks, the Prime Minister assured a Guildhall audience in
the City of London that British forces were winning the conflict. According to Lloyd
George, ―We have murder by the throat‖ in Ireland. He described the rebel campaign as
―a spectacle of organized assassination, of the most cowardly character.‖ He then asked
his audience to disregard distorted accounts of ―what they call reprisals,‖ and insisted
―There will be no peace in Ireland, there will be no conciliation, until this murder
conspiracy is scattered.‖ After the reorganization of the police, ―we struck the terror, and
the terrorists are now complaining of terror.‖17 An editorial in The Times argued that the
Prime Minister had ―committed himself to war upon large sections of the Irish people‖
and added that his government was ―engaged in an effort to scourge Ireland into
obedience.‖18
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Two violent episodes at the end of the month undercut Lloyd George‘s assertion
of imminent victory. On the morning of November 21, members of the Squad and the
Dublin Brigade entered houses, boarding houses, and hotels all over the city. The
republicans dragged men from their beds and shot them immediately, sometimes in the
presence of female companions. Where more than one was present in a certain building,
Volunteers collected them in hallways and executed them in groups.19 The Times initially
reported nine deaths and fifty wounded, but stated reports were ―panic-stricken and
contradictory.‖20 Fourteen people died in the shootings: nine former soldiers, one exsoldier and RIC sergeant, two Auxiliary Cadets who happened upon a group of
republicans during the shootings, and two civilians.21 The IRA‘s intelligence department
had targeted the British counter-espionage organization in Dublin, attempting to wipe out
the government‘s secret service agents in one fell swoop. In the wake of the attacks, the
British army and officials were loath to admit that those killed had been on secret service
duty. Describing them as ―British officers,‖ they attempted to portray the violence as
random acts of aggression against vulnerable and inoffensive government employees.
Accounts from witnesses tell a different story.
Auxiliary Commander F.P. Crozier learned of the shootings when he arrived at
Dublin Castle that morning. An officer received a phone call, and after hanging up
turned and said, ―Collins has done in most of the secret service people.‖22 British
Intelligence Director Ormonde Winter later claimed the attacks were a further measure of
revenge for Kevin Barry‘s execution, or perhaps Lord Mayor MacCurtain‘s murder. He
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never refers to the dead as intelligence officers, but admits that some of them were
―attached to military headquarters.‖23 Auxiliary officer J.L. Hardy later fictionalized his
experiences in Ireland, changing characters‘ names but describing historical events with
brutal accuracy. In the novel Never in Vain, he states that ―a sort of semi-official semisecret force was being recruited to combat the Dublin terrorists,‖ comprised of former
army officers.24 Castle official Mark Sturgis wrote that those attacked were ―employed in
Courts Martial or Secret Service men.‖25
For months prior to the attacks, republican intelligence staff gathered information
from its friendly detectives within G-Division, from mail raids, and from employees or
residents of the hotels and boarding houses where the agents resided.26 The operation
was originally planned to be much larger. Frank Thornton was in charge of compiling a
case against each target. He later said, ―I had to prove that each and every man on my list
was an accredited Secret Service man of the British government. This, as everybody can
realise, was not an easy task.‖27 Frank Gallagher claims that Defence Minister Cathal
Brugha struck fifteen names from the list, as ―the evidence against them was not beyond
doubt.‖28 Dublin Brigade member Todd Andrews wrote that before the operation
republican officers reminded those taking part of the notorious spies who had infiltrated
previous Irish nationalist movements. He understood it was a means of ―screwing up my

23

Winter, Winter‟s Tale, 321-322. The idea that the shootings were a measure of vengeance for the
MacCurtain killing is especially interesting. Winter claims throughout his book that republican extremists
killed MacCurtain, but if this was true, why would they lash out at British army officers in Dublin in
revenge?
24
J.L. Hardy, Never in Vain: A Novel (London: Collins, 1936), 88.
25
Sturgis, Last Days of Dublin Castle, 76.
26
Andrews, Dublin Made Me, 163; Dalton, With the Dublin Brigade, 102-103; Neligan, The Spy in the
Castle, 122.
27
Thornton, Comrades, 254.
28
Gallagher, The Four Glorious Years, 242.

123
courage to the sticking point.‖29 Andrews added that many more killings were attempted,
but ―the majority of the raids made by the IRA were abortive because, as in our case, the
man sought was not at home or, in several cases, the Companies concerned bungled the
job.‖30
In the afternoon after the shootings, a mixed party of regular RIC and Auxiliaries
went to Croke Park, Dublin‘s athletics stadium, where a Gaelic football championship
was being played between teams from the capital and Tipperary. The police opened fire
on the crowd, killing twelve spectators. The Times carried the official explanation:
Crown forces entered the park with the intention of searching the crowd, but IRA pickets
around the stadium opened fire as they approached. The correspondent notes that Gaelic
Athletic Association officials claimed the idea that republicans were guarding the park
was ―ridiculous,‖ and eyewitnesses claimed that no shooting took place until the police
were inside the stadium.31 The Irish Bulletin published an account by one eyewitness
who stated that no firing took place except from the police. The same issue insisted that
the British officers slain that morning were engaged in secret service work.32
On the night of November 21, Auxiliary guards in Dublin Castle killed three
prisoners captured the evening before. The dead included Dublin Brigade Commandant
Dick McKee and Vice-Commandant Peadar Clancy, who had helped to organize the
killings—though the Auxiliaries could not have known this for certain. The final dead
man was Conor Clune, who was not a Volunteer, but was captured alongside McKee and
Clancy. His uncle, Archbishop Clune of Perth, was appealing to Lloyd George for
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peace.33 British officials insisted they were killed during an escape attempt and showed
journalists a guardroom in disarray as proof. Republicans universally disbelieved the
story, and the Irish Bulletin reported their deaths as a reprisal.34
The Times had no doubt that the officers shot on what became known as ―Bloody
Sunday‖ were targeted because ―the military Intelligence Service got hot on the trail of
the chief conspirators.‖ The paper‘s correspondent wrote that ―Dublin is profoundly
horrified by yesterday‘s murders,‖ and there was a belief that this was ―the last desperate
demonstration of the murder movement, which is being sorely pressed by the forces of
the Crown.‖35
Despite this optimistic rhetoric, the shootings left a mental scar on the British
Army in Ireland comparable to the affect of the early attacks on the RIC. Private J.P.
Swindlehurst wrote, ―time is now reckoned as since or before ‗Bloody Sunday.‘‖36
Following November 21, all of the officers and their families living incognito in Dublin
were brought inside the Castle or surrounding premises. This crippled whatever capacity
they had left for intelligence-gathering.37 Captain R.D. Jeune, one of the intelligence
officers who escaped death that day, was forced into a guarded hotel, ―where it was
impracticable to do any useful work.‖38 The killings shook the British administration at
its highest levels. After Bloody Sunday, Chief Secretary Hamar Greenwood told the
Cabinet that he had taken precautions against his own assassination. He said, ―All my
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household are armed. My valet, my butler and my cook. So if you have any complaints
about the soup you may know what to expect.‖39
On November 27, the British IRA set fire to a number of warehouses and timber
yards in Liverpool. The New York Times correspondent said that the port‘s warehouse
district extended for seven miles, and fires ―spread over almost the whole of the area.‖40
This operation was also smaller than originally planned. Two weeks earlier, British
authorities seized plans to blow up the Liverpool docks. Even the warehouse burnings
were to coincide with similar operations in London and Glasgow, but the units there
could not complete their arrangements.41 While escaping the scene of the burnings, a
republican shot and killed a civilian in Parliament Street.42
Exactly one week after Bloody Sunday, seventeen Auxiliaries and a District
Inspector stationed in Macroom, Co. Cork, ran into an ambush not far from their base. It
was normal in these situations for the attackers to inflict a small number of casualties
before the police surrendered. At Kilmichael, the West Cork Brigade flying column
killed sixteen of the Auxiliaries and the Inspector. One policeman escaped only to be
captured by a republican patrol and executed, while the eighteenth man suffered severe
brain damage and was initially taken for dead.43 The Times stated that the patrol was
―wiped out,‖ calling it ―the most disastrous of a long series of ambushes.‖ It also printed
Hamar Greenwood‘s statement in Parliament that some of the Auxiliaries were disarmed
and executed.44 After visiting the Macroom area, the paper‘s correspondent abandoned
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the idea of executions, writing that the Auxiliaries fought until they were all killed.45 The
paper also quoted a Dublin Castle statement that the cadets‘ bodies were mutilated with
shotgun blasts and hatchets.46 The Irish Bulletin claimed that the extensive injuries were
caused by grenades, which killed several of the Auxiliaries at the outset of the action.47
Tom Barry, the republican commander at Kilmichael, later wrote that one factor
leading to the high death toll was the less-than-ideal ambush position, which did not offer
the Volunteers an escape route if the fight went against them. Before the operation he
paraded the Volunteers and informed them ―that the positions they were about to occupy
allowed of no retreat; the fight could only end in the smashing of the Auxiliaries or the
destruction of the Flying Column.‖48 Barry also supported Stephen O‘Neill, a section
leader in the column, in writing that some of the Auxiliaries offered to surrender, only to
pull revolvers and shoot three Volunteers who exposed themselves. The remaining
column members did not cease firing until all the policemen were dead.49
The cumulative effect of the week‘s actions was to show that if Lloyd George‘s
government had ―murder by the throat,‖ it kept a very loose grip. The operations in
Dublin, Britain, and Cork were the largest of their kind to-date. British BrigadierGeneral H.R. Cumming, stationed in Kerry, told the press in December that his troops
were ―not making any appreciable headway against the guerrillas‖ and that they were not
trained for this type of warfare.50 Ironically, these events were followed by rumors of a
truce. The Galway Urban Council—which had sworn allegiance to the Dáil—and Sinn
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Féin Vice-President Fr. O‘Flanagan both sent messages urging negotiations early in
December.51 The Times stated that a Sinn Féin envoy had been secretly visiting London
for five weeks discussing terms.52 Also, Archbishop Clune of Perth was said to be in
contact with Michael Collins, the alleged ―‗Commander-in-Chief‘ of the Sinn Fein army‖
about a proposed settlement.53 British officials, who took this as a sign that ―the ‗murder
gang‘ are beginning to realize the game is up,‖ came under pressure not to bow to
republican demands.54 The Times later printed a statement from the unnamed envoy that
these informal discussions collapsed on the demand that the IRA give up its arms.55
As the scale of republican attacks escalated, its propaganda arm became
increasingly comfortable acknowledging these actions. During the final three months of
1920, the Irish Bulletin increasingly acknowledged IRA attacks on Crown forces.56 By
April 1921, the publication carried a ―Weekly Review of the War in Ireland,‖ which
attributed the attacks to ―Irish troops‖ and to the IRA by name.57 The growth and
escalation of the republican campaign produced a significantly higher casualty rate
during 1920. Over the course of the year, 165 police lost their lives while 225 were
wounded. The military were increasingly targets of IRA attacks, resulting in 53 soldiers
killed and 188 wounded.58
At the same time, the press increasingly printed names of republicans said to be
responsible for the ―outrages‖ and ―murders‖ in Ireland. Figures such as de Valera and
Arthur Griffith were well-known due to their political activities, but the guiding hands of
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the IRA remained tantalizingly anonymous. However, in August 1920, Michael Collins
gave an interview to American journalist Carl Ackerman. The resulting article stated that
British officials believed ―Dail Eireann was not the real power in Ireland…Michael
Collins was.‖ Ackerman added that ―the British military authorities considered him the
field marshal of the Irish Army and that they feared him.‖59 In September, the New York
Times published an article describing him as the ―Republican War Minister‖ and chief of
the Sinn Féin ―irreconcilables.‖60 Three months later the paper dubbed him
―Commander-in-Chief of the Irish Republican Army.‖61 Béaslaí asserts that de Valera
and Brugha were angered by the press attention.62
Richard Mulcahy‘s name appeared in the press in November as a leader of ―Sinn
Féin extremists‖ alongside Collins.63 The Times published a statement from Hamar
Greenwood that Mulcahy was the IRA chief of staff and confirmed Collins as
commander-in-chief.64 In March 1921, the British published their names alongside that
of ―Charles Burgess‖ (Cathal Brugha) as organizers of attacks on British forces.65 The
appearance of these names in the press indicates that British intelligence was learning
more about its enemies, and these three most important Headquarters staffers were
becoming targets. The position ―commander-in-chief‖ never existed in the IRA, but a
1921 British military intelligence summary explains that its authors believed this title
went hand-in-hand with ―President of the Republic.‖ With de Valera in America and
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Griffith imprisoned after Bloody Sunday, Collins became ―Acting President,‖ and,
British intelligence believed, ―Commander-in-Chief.‖66

Advances and Reversals: The Course of the War in 1921
The Weekly Summary proved prophetic in its insistence that reprisals would
inevitably follow republican attacks. At the beginning of 1921, the British government
sanctioned the destruction of property of known Sinn Féiners, or in areas where attacks
had taken place.67 With this dictum, the pattern for the remaining six months of the
conflict was set. IRA units carried out their opportunistic attacks, which were routinely
followed by ―official reprisals.‖ Republican organizers constantly encouraged more
widespread activity, while British forces increasingly imitated their opponents‘ tactics.
The year 1921 began with a series of reversals for IRA units. British Major T.A.
Lowe wrote that the activities of the flying columns ―gave back the initiative to the
Crown Forces.‖68 While these formations provided the full-time active units for which
republican planners longed, they also supplied a target for British raids. Moreover,
despite GHQ‘s orders, flying columns were most actively pursued in the already ―active‖
counties in the south, particularly Clare, Cork, Kerry, Limerick, and Tipperary. Smaller
actions continued throughout the country, but the concentration of major actions in the
south allowed the British to flood the region with Auxiliaries and military
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reinforcements. The pages of An t‟Óglác constantly implore units from around the
country to conduct even minor operations to relieve the pressure on the south.69
GHQ‘s constant insistence that more units join the struggle threw largely
untrained Volunteers against an increasingly efficient British garrison. Even in areas in
which many actions had already taken place, officers constantly rotated Volunteers in and
out of flying columns, so that no individual experienced active service for too long a
period.70 A by-product of this was that even the most veteran unit could include untested
Volunteers.
On January 28, an ambush was surprised near Dripsey, Co. Cork. One Volunteer
was killed and ten arrested.71 Between February 15 and 16, seven Cork Volunteers were
killed in two incidents: three during a bungled train ambush at Upton and four attempting
to trench a road near Crois an Leanbh.72 Twelve Cork Volunteers were killed and eight
captured at Clonmult on February 20. Republican sources state that three were killed
during the fight, while the Auxiliaries executed seven who surrendered before soldiers of
the Hampshire Regiment arrived.73 Eight days later, six Volunteers were executed in
Cork Gaol; three were from Cork, one from Mayo, one from Tipperary, and one from
Wicklow.74
On March 8, Limerick‘s Sinn Féin Mayor George Clancy and former Mayor
Michael O‘Callaghan were killed in their homes. Michael‘s wife Kate O‘Callaghan later
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made a statement accusing the police.75 The next day, three Volunteers were killed
during a roundup near Nadd, Co. Cork.76 The RIC killed Seán Connolly, commander of
the Longford flying column, and five other Volunteers on March 11 at Selton Hill, Co.
Leitrim.77 Two Volunteers were killed in a shootout with police near Gortdrum, Co.
Tipperary, on May 2. The press reported the dead men were ―Sinn Fein Chiefs,‖ but they
were regular Volunteers on the run.78
British propaganda attempted to capitalize on military victories by driving a
wedge between ―moderates‖ and ―extremists‖ within the republican movement. The
effort to identify individuals with whom they could negotiate a settlement played on
existing republican fears that some of their leaders might compromise with the British.79
The Weekly Summary re-published a statement from the Cork Constitution that ―The
Government require that any who undertake to speak for Ireland shall leave all thoughts
of an independent Irish Republic outside the Council Board.‖ Another statement,
originally from the Freeman‟s Journal, asserted that ―men of moderate views‖ were
making peace overtures.80 A May 1921 editorial in the Weekly Summary said of
republican leaders, ―They are all for peace now. They are all for negotiation now.‖81
Despite the rising casualty rate, republicans in active brigades achieved a number
of spectacular attacks, while large-scale actions spread to areas where activity had been
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scant. On January 28, members of the North Cork and East Kerry brigades killed MajorGeneral Holmes in an ambush at Tureengarriffe.82 The same units cooperated in an
ambush at Clonbanin, Co. Cork on March 5. They killed Brigadier-General H.R.
Cumming and three other soldiers in the action.83
Tom Barry was hunting big game with the West Cork flying column, now grown
to 104 officers and Volunteers. After attempting to intercept 300 military reinforcements
near Shippool, the unit took up positions near Crossbarry on March 19. The new military
flying columns in the area, assisted by Auxiliaries, began a round-up. Instead of leaving
the area, the Volunteers engaged, ambushed three lorries of troops, and broke out of the
encirclement involving several hundred Essex Regiment soldiers under Major Arthur
Percival. Four Volunteers were killed, while ten members of the Crown forces lost their
lives.84
On April 11, the Dublin Brigade launched a gunfire and grenade attack on the
London and Northwestern Railway Hotel. Located on North Wall Quay, it was occupied
by the Auxiliaries who were using it as a base for searching ships in the dock areas.
C.J.C. Street wrote that the assault produced no result, but ―showed that the Republican
forces were prepared to take the offensive even in Dublin, the seat of the British
power.‖85
On May 15, an IRA unit ambushed a party of police and military officers at
Ballyturin, Co. Galway. The officers were returning from a tennis match with their
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wives. Volunteer Martin Dolan later wrote that District Inspector Cecil Blake was killed
in the opening salvo, but his wife picked up his revolver and fired at the ambushers. The
Volunteers shot her dead during the fight, as well as three other military officers and a
constable.86
The Mayo brigades launched a sustained campaign in May, but suffered casualties
along the way. The South Mayo flying column carried out a successful ambush at
Tourmakeady on May 3, but lost a Volunteer.87 British forces killed three West Mayo
column members when they surprised an ambush at Kilmeena on May 19.88 The
republican unit was surprised again at Skirdagh on May 23, but managed to escape and
inflict one casualty on the RIC.89 On June 2, the West Mayo column killed a District
Inspector and seven constables at Carrowkennedy, as well as capturing two Lewis
machine-guns.90 The experiences of these flying columns in mid-1921 are in many ways
typical of the course of the war at that time. Not especially active before this period, the
Mayo brigades stepped up their efforts in response to GHQ urgings.91 The units found
capable column leaders in Michael Kilroy in West Mayo and Tom Maguire in South
Mayo, but the units‘ inexperience inevitably led to casualties. Nevertheless, the columns
scored key victories, proved they could remain in the field for an apparently indefinite
time, and captured more and better weapons. Kilroy‘s and Maguire‘s reputations soared
as a result, leading to their elections to the Dáil.92
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The most notable region in Ireland to experience a general rise in action was the
new Northern Ireland. Comprising six northeastern counties, this statelet had a core of
four counties dominated by Unionists. In accordance with Lloyd George‘s twoparliament idea, the area was officially partitioned from the rest of the country with the
passage of the Government of Ireland Act in 1920.93 The region had mostly experienced
mob violence and barrack attacks, but on April 5 The Times reported that republican
flying columns were operating in the area.94 Republican activity in Londonderry and
Belfast, which had been rocked by sectarian riots throughout the conflict, took on an
organized nature. Police and military posts were simultaneously attacked in Londonderry
on April 1.95 Attacks on police in Belfast became routine, and on June 14 the IRA set up
barricades around several nationalist neighborhoods and used them to snipe at patrols.96
More barrack attacks took place, and ambushes such as those seen in the south now
occurred in five of the six counties: Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry, and
Tyrone.97
Action in Northern Ireland was alarming, but attacks in Britain itself threatened
all-out panic. The November 1920 burnings in Liverpool were just the first of a series of
republican sabotage missions. Cathal Brugha pushed GHQ staff to emphasize operations
in Britain, and by March 1921 this evolved into a sustained campaign.98 Liverpool IRA
officer Edward M. Brady said the arson and sabotage efforts were in retaliation for the
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destruction wrought by police in Ireland.99 On March 9, a series of fires began to break
out at farms in Cheshire, Lancashire, and Liverpool.100 Three days later, The Times
reported that republicans had specifically targeted property near Liverpool owned by an
Auxiliary Section Leader serving in Ireland.101 On April 2, fires broke out in various
hotels in Manchester. Police went to an Irish club in the city to arrest suspects, and were
fired on. Four officers were wounded.102 In May, a London timber-yard went up in
flames, and republicans raided and burned the homes of Auxiliaries and Black and Tans
in the capital, St. Alban‘s, and Liverpool.103 On May 21, farms and boat-builders‘
premises in Stockton and Newcastle-upon-Tyne were targeted.104
During the night of June 16, armed and masked men raided railway stations all
around London. They assaulted railway employees, burned signal huts, cut telegraph and
signal wires, and fired on police when they tried to interfere.105 These types of raids were
repeated at Manchester on June 18.106 Eleven days later, masked men stopped two trains
and stole the mail they carried. Such events were typical in Ireland—but had never
occurred in Staffordshire.107 The campaign had the desired effect of altering the normal
course of life in Britain. Between July 1 and 3, London police searched carts, examined
drivers‘ licenses, and noted vehicles moving in and out of the city. The New York Times
correspondent wrote that there was ―practically a complete cordon‖ around the capital. 108
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Problems of Command: The Expanding IRA Officer Corps
In April, GHQ made another major effort at reorganization. Hoping to increase
coordination between brigades, IRA leaders decided to group them into divisions based
on geography. On April 26, Ernie O‘Malley presided over a meeting at Kippagh, Co.
Cork, to form the First Southern Division. The officers present—representing the
brigades from Cork, Kerry, West Limerick, and Waterford—agreed on the need for
greater cooperation, but some of them viewed the division scheme as administration run
amok. O‘Malley began the meeting by reading a memorandum from GHQ, which raised
the already simmering ire of the Cork officers, who were hard-pressed and felt they were
getting little support. Seán Moylan recalled the document as follows: ―those who wrote
such communications at G.H.Q. seemed to have as bedside book a Bible and a copy of
General Lettow Vorbeck‘s story of the war in East Africa. From this and Infantry
Training, 1914, I assume came the inexplicable military periods and inapplicable military
proposals which this communication contained.‖109
Commandant Seán O‘Hegarty of the First Cork Brigade told O‘Malley that GHQ
should focus on organizing the west or the midlands, to take the pressure off the south,
and suggested that ―Dicky Mulcahy or Micky Collins‖ should visit the region to see the
situation for themselves.110 Moylan told Tom Barry in private, ―We started this war with
hurleys, but, by Heavens, it seems to me we will finish it off with fountain pens.‖111
Barry himself noted that the divisional structure ―did not and could not add a man, a rifle,
a bomb, a round of ammunition, or a shilling to the strength of any Brigade, nor did it

109

Moylan, Seán Moylan: In His Own Words, 119.
O‘Malley, On Another Man‟s Wound, 339.
111
Barry, Guerilla Days in Ireland, 159.
110

137
organise any action or issue a single operation order to any Unit.‖112 Despite the
objections, GHQ persisted in the organizational scheme. By July, only the southern
brigades and several in the north had been organized along divisional lines.113
The Cork officers had a right to be concerned over the profusion of new officers
and ranks within the IRA. While trying to respond in a systematic way to problems that
surfaced throughout the conflict, republican GHQ set up a complex and variegated
command structure involving local battalions, brigades, divisions, and semi-independent
flying columns. All of these units had to relate to one another and with the national
leadership in Dublin. On paper, the hierarchy was well-defined and need only be
respected in order for the organization to function smoothly. In practice, issues of
personal pride, ambition, jealousy, and safety concerns complicated the individual
relationships between officers.
The flying columns in particular set up a strange dynamic within brigades. GHQ
mandated that brigades form flying columns, but did not produce uniform guidelines or
place their officers within the command structure. An t‟Óglác articles on membership of
brigade councils and duties of brigade officers do not reference flying column
commanders.114 Local units were left to work these issues out on their own.
Theoretically, the column commander was in charge of all the Volunteers under his
control during the planning and execution of operations. Brigade commandants could
serve in the unit, but they were expected to obey the column commander. Outside the
column, officers in that unit returned to their normal ranks, and the brigade staff were in
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charge.115 For instance, West Cork Commandant Charlie Hurley at times served under
Tom Barry with the Brigade‘s flying column.116 There does not seem to have been any
animosity or strain in this relationship, and Barry later praised Hurley—who was killed
on the morning of Crossbarry—in several publications.117
An opposite example comes from the North Tipperary Brigade, where
Commandant Seán Gaynor served at times with the column. In discussing a failed action
at Latteragh in November 1920, he says, ―I was with the column in this engagement but
did not interfere with the O/C‘s arrangements.‖118 The statement indicates that Gaynor
could have interfered had he so chosen, which would have gone against the command
relationship at work in other brigades. Column commander Ned O‘Leary says that
attempting to work with any officers outside his own unit was a struggle. He states,
―From the beginning I received very little co-operation from the brigade staff,‖ adding
that he often could not get supplies. Relations with several of the battalions within the
brigade were no better. O‘Leary says the reason was ―senior officers of these units did
not want any trouble in their area.‖119 Following a moderately successful ambush at
Kilcommon in December 1920, the local battalion commander Paddy Doherty pulled
O‘Leary aside and ―abused me strongly…over having attacked the police patrol in his
area.‖120

115

Ned O‘Leary, ―An Account from the Bureau of Military History: Ned O‘Leary‘s Account of the War of
Independence in North Tipperary,‖ Tipperary Historical Journal 23 (2010): 116.
116
Flynn, ―My Part in Irish Independence,‖ 63.
117
Tom Barry, ―Charlie Hurley‘s Work and Death for Ireland,‖ in Rebel Cork‟s Fighting Story, 163-168;
Barry, Guerilla Days in Ireland, 16.
118
Seán Gaynor, ―With Tipperary No. 1 Brigade in North Tipperary 1917-1921, Part II‖ Tipperary
Historical Journal 7 (1994): 31.
119
O‘Leary, ―Account of the War of Independence in North Tipperary,‖ 116.
120
O‘Leary, ―Account of the War of Independence in North Tipperary,‖ 111-113, 116.

139
Successful column commanders often gained widespread reputations and fame,
while brigade officers fell into the background. Thomas Ryan, commander of the South
Tipperary flying column, later wrote that this damaged the relationships between active
service Volunteers and the Brigade Commandant Seamus Robinson. He states, ―From
the time the Columns began operations, Robinson remained in and about the Brigade
Headquarters at Rosegreen, taking no active part in the work of the Columns, and so was
not regarded by the men of the Columns as having any effective control over them.‖ He
added that this dynamic was not unique to his unit and Robinson, asserting, ―the Column
Commanders at this time seemed to be supreme in their respective commands, the
Brigade Headquarters merely acting as a centre for intelligence reports and other
communications.‖121 This view of the brigade commandant as a figurehead could only
damage discipline and respect for hierarchy within the organization.
The IRA‘s geographic basis also hampered coordination between units. Seán
Moylan, commander of the North Cork flying column, complained in his memoirs that
his unit had not been notified in advance of the Kilmichael ambush, which took place in
their area. Following the disaster at Clonmult, where the East Cork IRA flying column
was surrounded and annihilated, rumors were rife in republican circles that another
column was close by and heard the shooting, but made no attempt to aid their
comrades.122 A Cork Volunteer later claimed that another unit was in the area, but did
not arrive until the fighting was over.123 Whatever the truth of the matter, the fact that
such a story could be given credence indicates a level of disorganization and ambivalence
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to events outside one‘s local area. Throughout the conflict, GHQ attempted to provide
Volunteers with a larger context for viewing their actions.
The divisional scheme was meant to provide greater coordination between units,
but also introduced another layer of authority into the IRA structure. This profusion of
officers is also evident in the expansion of Headquarters Staff. When first created in
1918, the staff consisted of six members. Throughout the war, successful local
commanders or longtime republicans were rewarded with GHQ positions, so that by July
1921, the staff had more than doubled to thirteen.124 This included directors of both
purchases and munitions, causing Volunteer gunrunner Seán MacBride to quip, ―I never
knew what the distinction between Purchases and Munitions was.‖125 Joe Good says that
nepotism played a role in the appointment of several of these extraneous officers. He
states, ―A number of men were approved solely because of their popularity and social
position.‖ Good notes the case of an unnamed officer, who was ―appointed mainly
because his brother had supposedly fought in the GPO‖ during the Easter Rising, which
the writer knew he had not.126
Chief of Staff Richard Mulcahy recognized that the IRA‘s convoluted hierarchy
was causing discipline problems, and made an attempt to rectify it. During a meeting
with divisional commandants and Headquarters staff in August 1921, he outlined a
ranking system between these officers, but did not mention either brigade commandants
or flying column commanders.127 It is possible that he assumed the column commanders
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would report to their brigade superiors, who would in turn report to divisional staff, but
this did not always work in practice.

Anticlimax
The IRA‘s most daring, and reckless attack of the entire conflict in Ireland took
place on May 25. Dozens of members of the Dublin Brigade rushed the sprawling
Custom House on the Liffey quay, while others stood guard outside. They evacuated the
staff and set fire to the building. The target of the raid was not unusual; dozens of
smaller custom houses all over the country had been burned during the arson campaign.
An attack on the Dublin building was even considered during the Easter 1920 burnings,
but it was held by a strong military guard at the time.128 The idea resurfaced after Eamon
de Valera returned from America at the end of 1920.129 Chief of Staff Mulcahy later said
that de Valera and Brugha ―dragged‖ GHQ into the operation.130 The action cost the
Dublin Brigade dearly. Five Volunteers were killed and about eighty captured. Despite
the losses, the building was completely destroyed, and republicans claimed a victory.131
A desire for peace had been a frequent feature of newspaper letters and editorials
throughout the first six months of 1921. On June 21, cabinet member F.E. Smith, a
former Ulster Volunteer, admitted in Parliament that the situation in Ireland amounted to
a ―small war.‖132 He was one of just a few leading British parliamentarians to
acknowledge the state of hostilities that the republicans had claimed since 1918. The
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next day, King George V opened the Northern Ireland Parliament in Belfast with a
speech calling for ―an end of strife amongst her [Ireland‘s] people, whatever their race or
creed.‖ He added an ―appeal to all Irishmen to pause, to stretch out the hand of
forbearance and conciliation, to forgive and to forget, and to join in making for the land
they love a new era of peace, contentment, and good will.‖133 Prime Minister Lloyd
George and his government took their cue from the king‘s widely praised speech. As the
message stressed several times that Ireland should stay within the British Empire, they
could reiterate this as the official policy guiding any settlement proposals. The
sovereign‘s call for a cessation of violence undercut conservative arguments at
Westminster that the rebellion should be stamped out before imposing a political
solution.134 Two days after the speech The Times declared that now was ―The Moment
for a Truce.‖135
Lloyd George moved quickly to capitalize on the opening. On June 24, he sent a
letter to de Valera at the Mansion House in Dublin asking for a meeting between
themselves and Northern Ireland Prime Minister James Craig to ―explore to the utmost
the possibility of a settlement.‖136 De Valera initially insisted that no settlement was
possible until Lloyd George recognized Ireland‘s ―essential unity,‖ and right of ―national
self-determination.‖137 Over the next two weeks, a series of letters circulated between
Dublin, Belfast, and London. De Valera met with Craig and other unionists to discuss the
possibilities of cooperation between unionist and republican Ireland. He also met South
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African Prime Minister Jan Smuts, who assured the republican leader that the
government earnestly desired a settlement.138 The correspondence and news of the
meeting found their way into the press, where speculation on what form the settlement
would take reached a fever pitch.139 By July 8, de Valera had dropped his conditions and
agreed to meet one-on-one with Lloyd George.140 The next day‘s Irish Bulletin carried
an order from Richard Mulcahy that ―active operations by our troops will be suspended
as from Noon Monday, July Eleventh.‖141 Attacks continued right up to the moment the
Truce came into effect; Volunteers killed two policemen on July 11.142 January to July
1921 was by far the bloodiest period of the conflict. Casualties among the various police
forces amounted to 223 killed, 428 wounded. The military suffered 94 killed and 210
wounded.143
The Truce was not a surprise as the negotiations which led to it were wellpublicized, but republicans differed on whether it was necessary.144 Kerry Volunteer Con
Casey later insisted, ―We were going full pelt. The I.R.A. never felt stronger.‖145 GHQ
organizer Seán MacBride said he was annoyed by the cessation of hostilities, adding,
―We were on the way to really ‗make things hotter.‘‖146 An anonymous Dublin
Volunteer later claimed that before the Truce they were preparing for ―our biggest
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operation‖ in the city, which was to be ―much bigger than Bloody Sunday.‖147 On the
day of the Truce, the North Cork and West Limerick flying columns were forced to
abandon a joint ambush prepared near Templeglantine. The operation involved eight
road mines and four lorries of British soldiers—double the contingent wiped out at
Kilmichael.148 Ernie O‘Malley later wrote that prior to the Truce that there were rumors
that all British troops would be withdrawn to the coasts.149 Some thought the IRA could
force the British army to evacuate Ireland altogether, including Dáil cabinet members
Cathal Brugha and Austin Stack.150 On the opposite side British Major A.E. Percival,
later a lieutenant general, expressed the view of many soldiers when he asserted, ―in
another few weeks the back of the Rebellion would have been broken.‖151 Captain
Douglas Wimberley, later a major general, was more circumspect. He insisted that if the
British army was left to its own devices to enact an ―official policy of ruthlessness‖ it
would stamp out the rebellion, but under the circumstances a negotiated settlement was
―the only sensible course left.‖152
Many republicans viewed the Truce itself as a validation that their military and
political campaigns were legitimate. Dáil member Liam de Roiste called it ―a recognition
of our national status as coequal with England.‖ For the IRA, the Truce meant that ―what
the English termed a gang of murderers was now an army.‖153 General Macready
insisted that the republicans were on the verge of defeat when the Truce was declared,
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and Conservative and Unionist polemicists dubbed the cessation a surrender to
gunmen.154 When de Valera was on his way to London for the first round of peace
negotiations, Lloyd George told Henry Wilson he would have a chance to converse with
the republican leader. Wilson replied, ―I do not speak to murderers.‖155 Despite such
lingering contempt, the shooting was largely over between the IRA and its government
opponents. The future relationship between Britain and Ireland would be determined by
negotiations between individuals who had only weeks before been plotting ways to
eliminate one another.

Conclusion
The IRA faced its greatest pressure from government forces in late-1920 and the
first six months of 1921. In this same period, it achieved its greatest military and
propaganda victories. These successes were the combined results of GHQ policy and
local initiative. IRA leaders played a role in planning attacks in Dublin, while the
institution of flying columns provided the weapon that inflicted the greatest wounds on
the police and British army in the countryside. The Irish Bulletin provided an
increasingly effective republican mouthpiece, no longer shying away from the violent
side of the movement. Despite these successes, other GHQ policies sowed dissension
among the IRA. The leadership provided no guidance for integrating the flying columns
into the brigade hierarchy, which remained the most effective structure for operating
country units. The divisional organization was designed to increase cooperation between
units, but added another layer into an increasingly complicated hierarchy. By the Truce,
154
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the GHQ staff was unwieldy, confusing to the rank-and-file, and faced accusations of
nepotism.
While the conflict was ongoing, these tensions were subsumed beneath the overall
need for cohesion against police and military forces. In forcing the government to the
negotiating table, the IRA won a concession that many had considered unimaginable. As
late as December 1919, the New York Times warned republicans that ―nothing could be
more hopeless‖ than taking on the British army.156 The IRA did this with a considerable
measure of success, but as soon as the conflict was over, its organization began to
unravel.
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CHAPTER SIX:
CONCLUSION

The truce marked a condensed but intense period of development for the IRA.
The months between July and December 1921 saw its ranks swell, its arms increase, and
its defiance of authority grow. This chapter will analyze the pressures brought on by the
peace. It will argue that the hierarchical issues present from the beginning of 1921
resulted in indiscipline once the war had ended. In conclusion, this chapter will assess
the role of GHQ over the course of the struggle, and how its initiatives contributed to the
IRA‘s military successes.

IRA Development during the Truce
To many members of the IRA, the truce did not mean an end to the war. Ernie
O‘Malley, who had been promoted from GHQ staff captain to commandant of the Second
Southern Division, later wrote that he and his officers expected the truce to last for two or
three weeks.1 Dáil member and Irish Bulletin editor Desmond Fitzgerald later wrote that
some militants, led by Defence Minister Cathal Brugha, never intended the truce as
anything but a ―breathing space,‖ a chance to reorganize, relieve pressure on hard-pressed
units, and import arms.2 This idea took hold with many units, and GHQ began
organizing training camps to prepare them for further fighting.3 An t‟Óglác constantly
warned its readers to maintain discipline and be ready to return to active service if

1

O‘Malley, The Singing Flame, 15.
Desmond Fitzgerald, ―Mr. Pakenham on the Anglo-Irish Treaty,‖ Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review
24:95 (1935): 406.
3
Deasy, Towards Ireland Free, 314.
2

148
necessary. As early as July 22, 1921, the journal warned, ―A truce is not a peace‖ and
―The guns are silent—but they remain in the hands of the Irish Volunteers.‖4 The Irish
Bulletin also downplayed hopes of a settlement, printing a column entitled ―The War
That May Be Resumed‖ on July 14.5 Tension between the previously warring sides was
palpable on the ground. Republicans formerly ―on the run‖ now returned to their homes,
where they were lauded as heroes, while police and British soldiers could move freely
outside their barracks, where they had been largely confined except when on patrol.6
Adding to this tension was an influx of new recruits. For months An t‟Óglác had
emphasized the need for introducing new blood into the organization, but with the truce
many young men were suddenly eager to join the IRA—now that peace had been
declared.7 Dubbed ―Trucers‖ or ―Trucileers‖ by the veterans, they were brimming with
patriotic enthusiasm; too much of it in fact. Ernie O‘Malley stressed that they could not
be trusted as well as the Volunteers who had been tested under fire.8 Piaras Béaslaí
asserted that not only were the new recruits difficult to handle, but the discipline of IRA
veterans broke down under their new status as heroes of the republic. He wrote, ―They
learned to swagger about in trench-coats and leggings, with a revolver in their
pocket…The man with a gun learned to be a law to himself.‖ Many IRA members had
prided themselves on abstention from alcohol, but Béaslaí says during the truce ―Men
who had been models of sobriety, took to hard drinking .‖9
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In spite of the truce, clashes between police and military and IRA members soon
began. In August a Cork Volunteer was tried for attempting to commandeer an RIC car
at gunpoint.10 The next month a constable was shot and wounded in Limerick, and a
shootout in Tipperary resulted in the wounding of a constable and soldier, as well as the
death of a civilian.11 In October a court clerk died while in the hands of republican
police. The inquest jury returned a verdict of heart failure.12 In December, unknown
assassins killed an RIC member in Ballybunion and another in Kilmallock.13
Other republicans directed their aggressive tendencies toward aiding jailbreaks.
By the truce, about 4,000 suspected republicans were interred in jails or prison camps in
Ireland and Britain.14 Combined with convicted IRA members, The Times placed the
number of Irish political prisoners at about 6,000. Dáil members were released to take
part in debates on the peace negotiations. Though the press debated whether a full
amnesty should be granted, this was not forthcoming.15 Between July 11 and the year‘s
end, approximately 165 republican prisoners escaped.16 The most dramatic jailbreak
occurred on September 9, when forty-nine IRA members tunneled out of the Curragh
military camp in Co. Kildare.17
Of greater import for the IRA organization than the escapes were two successful
arms landings. Arms and ammunition shortages were a constant problem throughout the
conflict, lowering the number of Volunteers under arms and at times preventing actions
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by entire units. In September 1921, the IRA possessed a total of 3,295 rifles, 5,911
pistols, thirty-eight Thompson submachine-guns, and eighteen captured British machineguns.18 On November 11, Londonderry IRA member Charlie McGuinness landed the
Frieda at Helvick, Co. Waterford. The ship‘s cargo consisted of 1,500 Mauser rifles,
2,000 Luger parabellum pistols, and 1,700,000 rounds of ammunition. The weapons
were unloaded by local IRA units and hidden in the nearby Comeragh Mountains.19 On
April 2, 1922 the republican gunrunning ship Hannah landed 200 rifles, 500 pistols,
several machine-guns, and ammunition at Ballynagaul, Co. Waterford. Most of these
weapons went to the northern IRA, which was attempting an offensive against the
government of Northern Ireland.20 All of the arms had been purchased by republican
agents in Germany. The effect of the two successful arms importations was to boost the
IRA‘s arsenal by more than 50 per cent.
Despite discipline concerns, the cumulative effect of increased recruitment,
training, and arms importation was to dramatically augment the IRA‘s fighting ability.
Even prior to the Hannah‘s landing, Cathal Brugha reported to the Dáil on December 17,
1921 that compared with the beginning of the truce, ―We are in an indefinitely better
position from the military point of view.‖21 The British army commander in Ireland
agreed with the assessment. Nevil Macready later wrote that in July he requested the
British army garrison in Ireland be increased to 80,000 troops in order to stamp out the
rebellion. By December he estimated the task would take 150,000.22
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The Treaty Split
While the IRA strengthened its organization, the peace negotiations ground on in
London. One-on-one talks between de Valera and Lloyd George had amounted to
nothing except an agreement that both would appoint negotiating teams for a full peace
conference. The republican team, consisting of five negotiators led by Arthur Griffith
and Michael Collins, arrived in London on October 8. Griffith was regarded as a
moderate and pragmatist. He insisted that a republic would be an impossible expectation
for the negotiations.23 Collins was sent to capitalize on his fearsome reputation, which he
called ―the Michael Collins legend.‖24 The negotiations progressed for the next two
months, carefully followed in the press. On December 6, all five members of the Irish
delegation signed the Anglo-Irish Treaty, ending the War of Independence. The treaty
did not grant a republic, but set up the Irish Free State in the twenty-six counties not
included in Northern Ireland. The agreement promised a boundary commission would
review the status of the northeastern six counties. The Free State would remain in the
British Empire, and members of its parliament would swear an oath of allegiance to the
monarch as head-of-state.25 The agreement required ratification by the Dáil, and its
signers returned to Ireland to convince their colleagues to vote in its favor.
The treaty immediately polarized republicans, particularly within the IRA. Ernie
O‘Malley wrote that his immediate feeling on hearing of the agreement was that its
signers had ―betrayed us.‖26 Tom Maguire later said that some officers wanted to arrest
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the negotiators on their return to Dublin.27 During an IRA officers‘ meeting in Dublin to
discuss the treaty, GHQ‘s Director of Chemicals Jim O‘Donovan called Collins a traitor,
and said he should be court-martialed for treason.28 The GHQ staff was divided on the
agreement: nine were in favor and four opposed.29 De Valera repudiated the treaty
publicly on December 8. An t‟Ólgác continued to preach discipline and unity,
emphasizing loyalty to the Dáil whatever its decision on the treaty.30 One of the treaty
signers, Robert Barton, said he had only signed at the last minute after Lloyd George
threatened ―immediate war‖ if the treaty was rejected.31 Secretary of State for War
Winston Churchill had already threatened ―real war, not mere bushranging,‖ if the peace
conference failed.32 To many republicans, such statements raised the question of whether
the IRA could offer effective resistance if the treaty was rejected. Following the signing,
Collins told former Chief Secretary for Ireland Hamar Greenwood that without the truce
the IRA could not have lasted two weeks.33 Brugha asserted that the IRA was now in a
much stronger position. Pro-treaty Dáil members insisted that against the British army
the IRA‘s relative strength was insignificant, and used these arguments in favor of
ratification.34
Added to this mix of opinions was the covert influence of the Irish Republican
Brotherhood. Many Volunteers were members of this secret society, or joined it during
the war. In fact, after the Easter Rising the IRB admitted no one who was not also a
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Volunteer.35 Members of both organizations insist that the IRB never attempted to usurp
the IRA or exert military influence during the conflict.36 Despite their nearly identical
aims and mutual membership, the IRA and IRB did not always operate in harmony. IRA
leaders including Cathal Brugha had established their anti-IRB stance as early as 1917.
In May 1921, IRB President Michael Collins and Secretary Sean Ó Muirthile visited
Seámus Ó Maoileóin, an IRA intelligence officer who had left the IRB, to try to convince
him to rejoin the organization. On Ó Maoileóin‘s refusal, Ó Muirthile warned him,
―Brugha and yourself should be shot, and maybe some day ye will.‖ Collins separated
the two and ejected Ó Muirthile from the meeting. He even convinced Ó Maoileóin to
deliver messages to other IRA officers that they were welcome to join the IRB, but the
story makes it clear that the IRB were still recruiting, and some within the organization
believed it should be the vanguard of the republican movement rather than the IRA, the
Dáil, or Sinn Féin.37
After the treaty signing, the IRB‘s Supreme Council dictated that the agreement
should be ratified. Many rank-and-file IRB members opposed the treaty on principle, as
did many of the IRA. However, the IRB ruling body‘s decision in favor of the agreement
forced its members to decide whether to support it in a complex web of principles and
loyalties.38 Both organizations were accused of attempting to influence the treaty vote.
Cathal Brugha faced allegations in the Dáil that IRA units were trying to intimidate
members into voting against the agreement.39 Brugha in turn accused the IRB of using its
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influence to pass the treaty.40 Tom Maguire, whose successes leading the South Mayo
flying column led to his election to the Dáil, later told an interviewer that an IRB member
tried to convince him to vote for the treaty. He described the messenger as, ―my senior in
the I.R.B. (I would not admit that he was my senior in anything else, particularly, in the
fight).‖41 The implication is that Maguire did not feel compelled to listen to someone
who had not contributed to the war as much as he had. Despite the IRB dictum, Maguire
voted against the treaty. Republicans were choosing loyalties along a number of different
trajectories: political principles, a choice between the IRA and IRB, and loyalty to
individuals deemed to have been actively involved in fighting the guerrilla war, whatever
their status within the republican movement.
The Dáil‘s debates on the treaty lasted from December 14, 1921 to January 7,
1922. During these heated discussions, the treaty‘s merits as well as the personalities of
its signers offered major points of discussion. Much of the debate centered on the
military reputation of Michael Collins. Griffith called him, ―the man who won the
war.‖42 On the final day of the debates, Cathal Brugha stated that many Dáil members
and other Irish people were in favor of the treaty because Michael Collins, who had
―fought many fights for the Republic,‖ had signed it. Brugha then launched an attack on
Collins as ―a subordinate in the Department of Defence…specially selected by the Press
and the people to put him into a position which he never held; he was made a romantic
figure, a mystical character such as this person certainly is not.‖43 The treaty was ratified
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by a majority of seven, 64-57. The last words spoken in the Dáil that day were by
Brugha, promising to keep discipline in the IRA.44
The former minister of defence and others were able to hold the IRA together for
another three months, but that was all. The anti-treaty IRA broke ranks in April 1922,
refusing to acknowledge the Dáil‘s ratification of the agreement. The emerging Free
State regime turned its rhetorical weapons against its former comrades. An t‟Óglác,
which by April 1922 functioned more as a propaganda tool than a military manual,
announced the division with the headline, ―Mutineers Cause Army Split.‖ In a detailed
unit analysis, pro-treaty battalions and officers are described as ―loyal to GHQ,‖ while
those against the agreement are dubbed ―disloyal.‖ The unit breakdown attempts to show
that GHQ still commanded the loyalty of the majority of the IRA, but the complex figures
show no clear pattern according to unit or geographic orientation. While some writers
argue that the rank-and-file generally followed their local officers, the An t‟Óglác
breakdown shows that individuals made their own choices.45 Brigade, battalion, and
company staffs were fractured. Some units are marked ―fifty per cent. loyal,‖ and where
specific figures are given they read in terms such as ―133 out of 224 stand with G.H.Q.‖46
The IRA was fragmenting along many fault lines. The final break was on the
treaty, but other factors were the result of issues that arose during the War of
Independence. These contributing features included complicated hierarchies at GHQ and
local levels, a willingness to follow leaders on the basis of their reputation during the
44
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war, and mounting indiscipline during the truce. The treaty split marks the end of the
IRA as it had existed since 1916. During the civil war which followed, the anti-treaty
side became known as the IRA, while the pro-treaty faction was reconstituted as the Irish
National Army. The National Army decisively defeated the IRA in the Irish Civil War
(1922-1923) by a mix of superior conventional tactics, ruthless repression, and a
widespread policy of executing captives. The pro-treaty forces also received small-arms,
artillery, and armored cars from the British, increasing hostility between them and their
anti-treaty opponents. Both Cathal Brugha and Michael Collins were killed early in the
conflict. Griffith also died, partly from exhaustion. De Valera, still recognized as
―President of the Irish Republic‖ by the anti-treaty faction, went into a temporary
political exile.47
That the IRA has had a marked influence on Irish society is undeniable. Despite
the Civil War, republican credentials remained a valuable commodity in Irish politics.
Between 1922 and 1966, three of the four heads of government were former IRA
members active in either the Easter Rising or the War of Independence. The Free State
evolved into the Republic of Ireland by 1948, but it did so through constitutional
evolution, not violent resistance.48 In Northern Ireland, various reincarnations of the IRA
attempt to link themselves to the body that fought the War of Independence. The longestlasting of these, the Provisional IRA, claims legitimacy based on the endorsement of Tom
Maguire, the former South Mayo flying column leader and the last living member of the
Second Dáil, until his death in 1993.49 Despite a Provisional IRA ceasefire in 1998, the
willingness of dissident republicans and their loyalist opponents in Northern Ireland to
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use violence to achieve their goals continues to mar the political landscape there as well
as in the Republic of Ireland.50

GHQ and the Irish War of Independence
The military achievements of the Irish Republican Army during 1917 to 1921 are
difficult to asses, but whatever its accomplishments, it is irrefutable that the leaders at
General Headquarters played an important role throughout the conflict. Historical
accounts often downplay or ignore GHQ, emphasizing local initiative. Peter Hart and
Richard English ignore the fact of top-down direction for IRA units and their political
aspirations, discussing them as independent gangs of gunmen.51 Hart also ignores the
leadership‘s role in forming the flying columns, posing them as a spontaneous local
development. This is especially detrimental in his critical discussion of the West Cork
column led by Tom Barry, which was formed as a direct result of GHQ encouragement
and training.52 Joost Augusteijn recognizes GHQ‘s focus on training, but he often
discusses only the leadership‘s shortcomings, not its importance in tactical innovation
and encouraging widespread action.53
Though much of the onus of tactical innovation and action lay with local units,
GHQ provided an overall strategy and hierarchical command structure, dissemination of
effective tactics to various units, and alliance to a political party. The reorganization of
the Irish Volunteers—which rapidly become known as the Irish Republican Army—in
1917 depended on individuals who would form the nucleus of militant leadership over
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the next four years. This year saw a reemergence of violent action in the form of arms
raids and political protection. With the establishment of An t‟Óglác in 1918, GHQ began
encouraging active resistance to arrest, leading to further clashes with government forces.
The publication also began to disseminate small-unit tactical ideas that formed the basis
of guerrilla war; a decisive break with past republican strategy. This year saw the first
raids on police barracks and the emergence of the ambush as a key republican tactic.
With Sinn Féin‘s success in the December 1918 elections, the republican
movement could claim a popular endorsement of its aims. The establishment of the Dáil
and GHQ‘s alliance to this elected body, however nominal, provided it with democratic
credentials and an overt political context for its actions. Dáil statements that the IRA had
played a leading role in establishing the Irish Republic in 1916 boosted the prestige of the
militant body in republican eyes. GHQ continued to encourage action, while at the same
time taking steps to moderate the IRA‘s more aggressive tendencies and set the
organization on a definite course of guerrilla war.
The widespread barrack attacks that commenced in 1920 were largely the result of
GHQ‘s strategy to provide clearance areas in which the Dáil‘s writ could run. The largest
action of the war in terms of numbers of Volunteers involved were the Easter 1920
burnings, which saw the destruction of 218 evacuated barracks that might have been
reoccupied by reinforced police or military garrisons. This operation was mandated by
GHQ, but planned at the local level. Though it cost few lives, its effect was to
dramatically impress British officials as to the danger the IRA posed to their continued
governance of Ireland. Another tactical development was the establishment of full-time
flying columns to conduct sustained operations against government forces. While not
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originating from GHQ, the leadership disseminated the idea around the country,
eventually mandating that all units implement the formation in their areas and
establishing training camps to facilitate them.
With October 1920, the War of Independence entered its most intense period.
GHQ‘s ability to order widespread attacks in the wake of a republican execution such as
that of Kevin Barry shows its engagement with and influence with local units. It also
shows that these units were awake to the political situation throughout the country. GHQ
planned and executed the Bloody Sunday attacks on British secret service agents, which
devastated the government‘s counterespionage efforts in the capital. Once the flying
columns were established in local areas, they operated independently, but remained in
contact with GHQ and with its organizers. Successful ambushes such as those at
Kilmichael, Tureengarriffe, Clonbanin, and Tourmakeady were local initiatives, but
could not have taken place without the encouragement and training provided by the
leadership. Throughout 1921, GHQ encouraged greater participation both in terms of
units and numbers of Volunteers. This policy led to higher casualties, but accomplished
the goals of spreading the war to various parts of Ireland. GHQ also encouraged action in
Britain, which terrorized the populace and hastened the cessation of hostilities. Total
casualties among the police forces from 1919 to July 1921 amounted to 405 killed, 692
wounded. Over the same period, the British military suffered 148 personnel deaths while
402 were wounded.54 Republican casualties are difficult to determine, but historians
agree that a total of 752 civilians and IRA members were killed during the conflict.55
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Despite GHQ‘s significant successes, by the truce the redundancies and
shortcomings of its policies were evident. The divisional scheme introduced what many
considered an unnecessary and bureaucratic level of authority in the IRA. Flying column
leaders had become increasingly independent, building their reputations and gaining
political clout to the detriment of their nominal superiors within local brigades.
Prominent republicans gained GHQ staff positions regardless of their necessity or
qualifications. While the truce introduced greater numbers of recruits and arms than the
IRA had ever seen, these structural issues led to indiscipline within the ranks. Chief of
Staff Richard Mulcahy recognized these commands issues and attempted to address them,
but his efforts were too little, too late. The treaty controversy blew these smoldering
embers into full flame. Republicans chose their loyalties based not on the hierarchical
structure GHQ had struggled to implement, but according to political principles and
personal loyalties. Far from being insignificant, the IRA leadership‘s role in the conflict
was decisive both in its successes and in its failure to maintain discipline and cohesion.
The same initiatives that made the IRA an effective fighting force when facing
conventional government forces caused structural issues that rent the organization at the
conflict‘s end, leading to the Irish Civil War.
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